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ABSTRACT 
 
As we near the 60th anniversary of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, 
questions still remain about its salience and our ability to provide equal educational 
opportunities to students of all races and ethnicities. Additionally, scholars and observers alike 
note the continual shift toward resegregation in American schools, but few have probed exactly 
why this occurs and the empirical implications of this shift.  As such, this dissertation project 
explores the “new” political domain of school desegregation policy to understand why some 
school districts are resegregating while others maintain their racial balance, and the 
substantive implications of this divide for minority students.  
The goal of this research is two-fold. First, I investigate the determinants of 
desegregation policy, arguing that a set of institutional (representation), structural, and 
management factors best predict a district’s level of racial balance as an indicator of the active 
pursuit of desegregation. Second, I examine student outcomes and performance under both 
educational settings—racially balanced and imbalanced—to determine where students fare 
better and how much the racial context matters to student outcomes. I frame this question 
theoretically in the organizational theory research on external control, in which I argue that the 
policy environment, in this case, the racial context as denoted by the level of racial balance, 
influences the extent to which structure, representation, and management affect outcomes. I 
compare outcomes under the two policy environments, racially balanced and imbalanced 
districts, to see their effect on the noted factors and where students fare better. 
 The general results show that the broad assumption and desegregation literature 
finding that racially balanced schools are better for minority students is not supported. 
Minority students can also gain the same if not better outcomes in racially imbalanced districts. 
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I also find that while the tested predictors play an important role, the policy environment 
significantly contributes to their role and outcomes. For policy makers and practitioners this 
means that one way to gain the equality that the Brown decision sought is to shift the focus on 
improving board and teacher representation or management strategies and practices. The 
dissertation challenges assumptions of political decisions and outcomes that fail to consider the 
external policy environment.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
A Snapshot of the Current State of US Desegregation Policy  
In the past 20 years, many US school districts have resegregated to levels beyond those 
of the Civil Rights Era. Some scholars contend that between 1970 and 1980, the touted 
“peak” of desegregation efforts, only about 33 percent of African American students 
attended extremely racially segregated schools, where they made up at least 90 percent of 
the student population. About 62 percent of African American students of this period 
attend schools in which they made up at least half of the student population (Clotfelter 
2004, 56).  Today, it is estimated that 75 percent of African American students and 80 
percent of Latino students attend racially segregated schools in which they make up over 
50 percent of the student population (Orfield, Kucsera, and Siegel-Hawley 2012). Forty 
three percent of Latino students and 38 percent of African American students attend 
schools in which white students make up less than 10 percent of the student population, 
and another 15 percent of Black and Latino students attend schools with no white student 
representation (Orfield, Kucsera and Siegel-Hawley 2012).  
When these percentages are dissected to explain the actual picture of racial balance, 
that is, the extent to which desegregated schools are possible given the overall racial 
makeup of a school district, national survey findings indicate that only about 15 percent of 
US school districts are racially imbalanced between Black and white student populations, 
and 16.25 percent between Latino and white student populations with the potential for 
correction without cross-district remedial measures. These estimates suggest that even if 
large percentages of minority students attend imbalanced or racially isolated schools, 
many school districts have resegregated to the point of little return without measures to 
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attract a more diverse population to the district. Altering the racial compositions of the 
individual schools within the district  is a futile effort for many school districts even 
considering it; however, many more have the potential to reverse the trend and as the US 
population continues to grow more diverse, greater opportunities for racially balanced 
districts are sure to follow.  
The observed shift toward more resegregated, racially imbalanced schools has in many 
parts been political and largely fueled by shifts in the federal government’s opinion on the 
means and importance of racially balanced schools. In 2007, the Supreme Court essentially 
ended school desegregation efforts in their Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education 
and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle decisions. In both cases, challenges 
were presented to district policies using race for school assignments. The Court ruled that 
neither district properly adhered to the “narrowly tailored” guidelines of using race for 
school assignments, and therefore, must abandon the practice as violations of the Equal 
Protection Clause. The decisions, coupled with the race specific mandates of the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001, have made it very difficult for school districts to pursue or 
maintain racially balanced systems while addressing the seemingly more pressing school 
accountability demands of student performance on high stakes tests, teacher quality, and 
more rigorous academic standards. Issues of equity and the benefits of an equitable, 
diverse and balanced learning environment seem to be divorced from the accountability 
equation.  
Yet, some school districts and education leaders have managed to operate both 
systems. That is, they are able to maintain racially balanced school districts and also meet 
the accountability demands.  On the other hand, many school districts have not, and have 
instead abandoned the effort of racially balanced school districts “to close the achievement 
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gap…so that no child is left behind,” (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, PL 107-110 2001). 
Since we have moved away from this era of desegregation and into an era of resegregation, 
it is important to ask two related questions:  can students really learn and reach equal 
achievement levels in racially separate environments; how much does this really matter to 
the goals of public education today? That is, can we get “equal” outcomes and outputs from 
these “separate” and “different” environments?  Second, why do some districts maintain or 
continue to pursue racial balance in their districts, given the competing demands of 
accountability and performance? This dissertation focuses on addressing these questions 
that should be central to the current education discourse, but are null from many 
discussions of the state of public education in the US. It investigates the predictors of 
pursuing racially balanced schools and then examines the extent to which these factors are 
shaped by the level of racial balance in school districts. I focus on three factors—
institutions, structures, and management—that are known to influence the nature of public 
education (Meier and Stewart 1991; Weiher 2000; Dee 2004; Polinard et al. 1994; Meier et 
al. 2005; Brewer 1993; Grissom and Loeb 2011).  
The project does not make an immediate determination, contend, or seek to “prove” 
that racially balanced school districts are better than racially imbalanced school districts, 
or vice versa. However, it does introduce a test of the “separate but equal” doctrine that 
seems to have inadvertently become the basis of the current accountability model of public 
education, in which schools with separate and unequal resources, facilities, support and 
separated students are expected to produce the same outputs and outcomes. It investigates 
the extent to which separate but equal education is possible in a comparison of student 
outcome indicators in racially balanced and imbalanced school districts when previous 
predictors of student outcomes are considered. Analyses presented in the empirical body 
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of the dissertation provide policy makers and education leaders with a basis for 
understanding the differences in racially balanced and imbalanced districts and the 
implications of those environments for school board members, teachers, and most 
importantly students. It is also my hope that this work will inform future studies and 
studies in related policy fields on the important role of policy environments in shaping 
policy systems, decisions, and outcomes. 
Contributions to Theory 
It is without question that this dissertation seeks to add to the substantive knowledge 
and debate surrounding the racial composition of schools and the recent shift in 
accountability focused policies that detract from previous gains in education equity. 
However, examining the effect of racial balance in school districts allows for interesting 
theoretical tests and developments. The empirical research of the project hinges on the 
arguments and propositions of organizational sociologists and theorists. The project 
merges organizational theory to representative bureaucracy and political institutional 
structures. It focuses primarily on questions of external control and influence, decision 
making, and policy implementation, and seeks to demonstrate how these theories and 
concepts help to more accurately explain policy outcomes often linked to the 
representation and structure. Here, scholars are challenged to take a more careful 
consideration of policy environments and their role in shaping the nature of representation 
and structure. The project also offers a more stringent test of the relationship between 
organizational theory and public management.  
However, contributions are not limited to public administration, policy or political 
science. The dissertation research also bridges the links between public administration 
scholarship and the well developed research on school desegregation and the racial 
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composition of schools. We know a great deal about the implications of racially balanced 
education for students, particularly African American students.  Desegregation scholars 
and supporters continuously note the short and long term benefits to a racially balanced 
education system—from improved minority student performance on the indicators of 
standardized tests, graduation rates, and college attendance rates (Guryan 2004; Wells and 
Crain 1994; Wells et al. 2004) to long term social and economic implications such as 
diverse social networks and homeownership in racially integrated communities (Dawkins 
1994; Trent 1997). Much of this research, however, lacks an informed discussion about the 
politics and the political and bureaucratic decision making process  that also contribute to 
varied findings of desegregation policy research.  The current project fills this void. It 
integrates various theories of public administration and political science to provide 
another view of the desegregation policy story and its current state. This integration also 
allows scholars of both disciplines to examine the value of policy environments in 
determining outputs and outcomes. The following chapters discuss how the case of school 
desegregation is used to test various theories, merge subliteratures, and develop more 
general theories, while uncovering substantively important information about student 
outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced schools.  
Outline of Dissertation 
Chapter II provides a historical overview of school desegregation to frame the current 
state of desegregation policy and the rapid retreat toward re-segregated schools. The 
chapter includes a review of the substantive research on the consequences and 
implications of desegregated education for minority students. It addresses the legal and 
political process to eliminating separate schools, and the more recent use of the same 
process to undermine the provisions aimed at ensuring racially balanced schools. A major 
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goal of this chapter is to highlight the unanswered questions of desegregation research, 
including, “Are minority students in loosely desegregated schools any better off than the 
students in segregated schools; have we really achieved the vision of the landmark Brown 
v. Board of Education decision?”  
Chapter III presents the theoretical framework used to guide the empirical chapters 
and link the supporting theories on which the dissertation project is based. I construct a 
three part, integrative framework of public policy at the local level to explain two phases of 
current desegregation policy.   The first phase is an exploration of the bureaucratic actions 
and factors related to desegregation policy decisions or outcomes, while the second phase 
examines the relationship between the policy environment and bureaucratic actions to 
predict education policy outcomes; it probes the consequences of balanced and imbalanced 
education for minority students.  The second phase of research is expanded across the 
three empirical chapters of the dissertation. Framework components are not tested in a 
single, causal model, but instead are presented to illustrate the factors that contribute to 
desegregation policy decisions and the relationship between these factors and the policy 
environment in predicting district outcomes. The chapter also gives an overview of the 
literatures that will be discussed in more detail in the later chapters.  
Chapter IV begins the empirical exploration in demonstrating how policy environments 
relate to the structure of political institutions.  It explores the relationship between the 
racial balance of school districts and the electoral structures used to elect school board 
members to understand the nature of minority representation and student outcomes in 
districts of varying policy environments. The chapter builds from previous research on the 
effect of electoral structures on minority representation and policy outcomes and theories 
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of institutional environment to deduce hypotheses about how the policy environment 
could alter the previously observed relationships and outcomes.  
Chapter V builds on the findings of the fourth chapter to explore the way that policy 
environments influence bureaucratic representation. Chapter IV corroborates previous 
findings on the positive relationship between school board representation and teacher and 
administrator representation (Stewart, England, and Meier 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991), 
so in this chapter, I explore the extent to which teacher representation is able to produce 
substantive outcomes for students, given the policy environment. Using organizational 
theories of external control, the chapter explains how and why the policy environment may 
facilitate or impede representation’s ability to lead to substantive benefits for students and 
translate into different outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced districts.  
Chapter VI, the final empirical chapter, shifts from a focus on the policy environment 
and representation linkages to consider its effect on public managers. Environmental 
constraint is not an unfamiliar topic to the public management literature. In fact, much 
public management and organizational theory research has focused on how public 
managers handle the environment, either buffering its influence or manipulating it to the 
organization’s benefit. Recognizing public managers’ unique ability to “manage the 
environment,” this chapter seeks to explain the management factors most likely to alter 
outcomes given the level of racial balance in a district. The central purpose of this chapter 
is to offer an alternative view of policy environments, how they are addressed, and the 
policy consequences that follow. The chapter also offers a more stringent test of 
environmental management techniques.  
Chapter VII concludes the dissertation project with a summary of the substantive 
findings and theoretical implications. The chapter provides an overview of insights from 
 8 
 
the chapters’ empirical analyses that state and local policymakers, district level 
administrators, and education leaders should find relevant. It also revisits the theoretical 
framework to emphasize its link to the empirical findings and discuss the more general 
theory of policy environments’ role in shaping public institutions and their outcomes.  
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CHAPTER II 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES 
This chapter is aimed at providing an overview of the historical context of the 
current project’s research questions, while setting the stage for future research in the area 
of desegregation policy. Desegregation policy—the process, outcomes, and implications of 
school desegregation and desegregation efforts—is perhaps one of the most researched or 
discussed topics of education scholarship, and yet many questions remain about its success 
and how much it has really contributed to the academic, social, and economic success of 
minority students. However, as this chapter will make evident, much is written to evaluate 
the process and speak on desegregation’s contribution to the noted areas, but fewer 
scholars probe the relationship between the politics of desegregation policy and 
organizational and bureaucratic decisions, and the outcomes that flow out of this 
interaction. The chapter is an attempt to highlight such gaps. It begins with a brief journey 
through the cases leading up to the Brown v. Board of Education decision, the response and 
events that followed the decision, its gaps and the Supreme Court’s attempt to fill them, 
and the chapter ends with a discussion of second generation of education discrimination—
grouping and tracking practices.  
The Road to Brown v. Board of Education 
 The history of the Brown v. Board of Education decision began long before the case 
arguments were ever crafted. It began before the case sat before any United States court, 
and it began before the plaintiffs were carefully selected from multiple southern and 
border states. The decision is truly built on a series of court victories related to access in 
higher education and equal pay for teachers dating back to the early 1930s that were 
carefully pursued and organized to set a precedent for the most landmark court decision in 
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education, and what some contend the most important court decision in the Supreme 
Court’s history (Martin 1998, vii). These cases set the political and legal groundwork for 
the Brown case, and inevitably shaped the decision.  
 In the mid 1920s, the NAACP developed an original plan to kill segregation 
indirectly through a series of lawsuits based in education. Although Blacks were 
discriminated against and segregated on every front, education was used as the mode of 
attack because it was viewed as “symbolic of all the more drastic discriminations,” and 
barring Blacks from equal education meant barring them from the subsequent rights and 
privileges that a quality education affords to citizens (Kluger 1975; Meier, Stewart, England 
1989). The lawyers wanted to make segregated education so expensive that it would 
nearly crush the districts attempting to maintain the system and force them to voluntarily 
dismantle it (Ashenfelter, Collins and Yoon 2006). The NAACP’s legal defense team began 
their war on segregation in challenges to segregated graduate and professional schools. 
Graduate and professional education provided a good starting ground because the 
inequalities of education and the effect of segregation were very obvious. There were only 
two professional schools for Blacks at the time1—Howard University’s College of Medicine 
and Meharry Medical School—and only one “provisionally” accredited law school, Howard 
University School of Law.  No southern Black school provided graduate education at the 
doctoral level and only a handful of private Black institutions offered some type of 
                                                 
1 Historical evidence indicates that other “black” medical programs existed in the late 19th and early 20th 
century; they consisted of Howard University Medical College; Meharry Medical College, Nashville, Tennessee; 
Flint Medical College, New Orleans; Leonard Medical School, Raleigh, North Carolina; Louisville National 
Medical College; Knoxville (Tennessee) Medical College; and the University of West Tennessee Medical 
Department, Memphis (Lloyd 2006).  Only two remained, Howard University’s program and Meharry Medical 
College, after the 1910 Flexner Report that evaluated all medical programs and established new and higher 
standards of medical education and training (Lloyd 2006; Lowell 2011).  Four black medical schools, Medical 
Department of Lincoln University, Pennsylvania; Hannibal Medical College, Memphis, Tennessee; State 
University Medical Department of Louisville, Kentucky; and the Medico-Chirurgical and Theological College of 
Christ’s Institution, Baltimore, all closed before the Flexner Report (Lloyd 2006).  
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graduate degree2—Howard University, Atlanta University, Fisk University, Hampton 
Institute,  and Xavier University of Louisiana (Patterson 2001, 15; Lovett 2011, 116-117, 
374). Not a single higher education institution for Blacks had an engineering program 
(Lovett 200, xiv). On the other hand, Whites had access to at least 29 schools to earn a 
professional, law, or graduate degree, and funding for graduate education was restricted to 
Whites in southern states (Patterson 2001, 15; Lovett 2011, 117).   
Southern states and many Border States denied Blacks access to public colleges and 
universities, and instead provided those seeking graduate or professional degrees access to 
separate schools or funding to attend schools in other states that permitted Blacks to 
attend their colleges and universities. The NAACP challenged this process. In Murray v. 
Pearson (1936), the team challenged the University of Maryland’s practice of denying 
Blacks acceptance into their law program, despite the lack of Maryland law and university 
rules requiring segregation. The Baltimore City court ruled that Murray be admitted to the 
University of Maryland’s law school (Kluger 1975, 189-193).  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, a case against the state’s university for refusing Lloyd Lionel Gaines’s application 
for admission into their law school, was the first case the team tried in the Supreme Court. 
The Court ruled that offering a privilege to white students and denying it to Black students 
based on their race was a violation of the “equal protection of laws” that Blacks were 
entitled to under the constitution (Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada 1938; Patterson 2001, 
16; Kluger 1975, 211-212). They ordered the University of Missouri law school and the 
                                                 
2  NAACP lawsuits such as Murray v. Pearson led many states to rapidly improve black access to graduate 
programs in the mid to late 1930s and 1940s. Some states offer “out of town” graduate fellowships for black 
applicants. Others created graduate studies at public HBCUs. For example, North Carolina A&T University 
worked with the University of North Carolina and Duke University to start graduate programs in biology, 
chemistry, education among others in 1939; Virginia State received aid to offer graduate courses in English, 
music, and social studies. By 1940, 12 HBCUs offered graduate education to black students (Lovett 2011, 117-
118). 
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state to provide him access to the university for a legal education. This case was significant 
because it established a precedent for other cases challenging the process in several other 
states, and the team built on this precedent. They challenged the practice in Oklahoma 
(Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents3; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents4), 
and Texas in (Sweatt v. Painter5). In each case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
Black plaintiffs and required the public institutions to grant Blacks access to their law and 
graduate programs or provide them with immediate equal access to a Black institution. The 
Sweatt and McLaurin decisions were particularly significant because they established that 
the education Black students would receive in segregated Black professional and graduate 
schools was in no way equal to the education provided at white schools, and therefore a 
violation of their right to equality under constitutional law. The cases moved the argument, 
as well as the Court’s decisions away from the blocking of access to the inequality of 
separate but equal. Justices began to acknowledge in their decisions that “separate but 
equal” was not a reality, at least at the professional and graduate school level. This was a 
direct challenge to states’ attempt to establish “fly by night” segregated institutions for 
Blacks to satisfy the equal protection clause. For the NAACP Legal Defense lawyers, the 
                                                 
3 Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents overturned the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision that denied 
qualified black students admissions to all-white state law schools. The Court ruled that the state must provide 
Sipuel with a legal education that conformed to the “equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment” and as 
quickly as for any other qualified applicant (Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents 1948). The state 
established an overnight “separate and equal” law school for Sipuel in the state capitol (Kluger 1975, 257-259.)  
 
4 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents required the University of Oklahoma to admit George McLaurin 
to their graduate program and provide him with equal access and treatment as other students as required 
under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doing otherwise restricted his graduate 
instruction and ability to study and learn his profession (McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents 1950; 
Kluger 1975, 282).  
 
5 Sweatt v. Painter, decided in conjunction with McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, the Court ruled 
that the University of Texas Law School and the state’s law forbidding admission of Negros to all-white public 
institutions was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and required that 
Sweatt be admitted to the University of Texas Law School (Sweatt v. Painter 1950).  
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rulings signified that the Court may not have been ready for a full reversal of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, but some of the justices were clearly rethinking the Plessy decision and also saw 
the flaws in the “separate but equal” ideology. Historical accounts of the Supreme Court 
justices during this period suggest that several disagreed with previous ruling and 
segregation completely, most notably Justices Black and Douglass. Others, such as Justices 
Frankfurter and Jackson also personally disagreed with racial segregation, but found the 
legality of Plessy permissible based on precedent and legislative history (Klarman2004, 
291-343; Kluger 1975, 218, 269, 617).  
The second strategy to challenging “separate but equal” was to attack unequal 
teacher pay for Blacks and women. Between 1939 and 1947, they won 27 cases related to 
the equalizing teachers’ pay. The first6 success came in the 1939 case, Mills v. Anne Arundel 
County Board of Education, in which the District Court ruled that Anne Arundel school 
district’s racial pay system “violated the supreme law of the land,” and ordered them to 
eliminate the discriminatory system7 (Mills v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education 
1939; Kirk 2009; Kluger 2004, 214). African American teachers began to see a steady 
increase in their salaries with the help of court action and few non-court related factors 
such as tighter labor markets in the 1940s (Margo 1990;  Kirk 2009). Salaries increased 
from 50 percent of white teachers' salaries in 1930, to 65 percent in 1945, to 85 percent in 
1950 (Kirk 2009).  
                                                 
6 The NAACP supported Harry Moore’s lawsuit on behalf of John Gilbert to equalize black and white teacher 
salaries in Florida in 1937, making it their first attempt to challenge salary disparities; however, they lost the 
case in state court.  
 
7 Other notable cases include Morris v. Williams (1943) and Alston v. Norfolk Board of Education (1940) in which 
the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits reversed a district court’s decision and ruled that 
unequal pay for the same services and same qualifications based on race violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the 14th Amendment (Alston v. School Board of Norfolk 1940; Margo 1990; Morris v. 
Williams 1943).  
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Interesting enough, many of significant victories were won in non-southern, border 
states8. Many southern colleges and universities actually began to move toward separate 
and equal schools as the NAACP originally predicted, but this decision toward equality was 
too little and too late. The war against segregation was official, and after a decade and a half 
of court victories, the NAACP’s legal defense team was ready to launch its largest attack, 
though Marshall and others were hesitant about the state of the Supreme Court to rule in 
their favor against the constitutionality of segregation (Kluger 2004, 290-291).  
Additionally, it was becoming significantly expensive for the team to argue case after case 
in individual states. Many of the victories had little effect on the state of Black public 
education outside of graduate and professional schools and to an extent public education 
as a whole because state courts were extremely slow in adopting the Sweatt and McLaurin 
decisions as precedent. Some institutions craftily held to their “separate but equal” 
doctrine creating separate accommodations for Black students admitted to their law and 
graduate programs (see Kluger 1975, 258; Patterson 2001, 17). Many states outright 
disregarded the law and maintained their segregated systems, despite the mandated 
changes in neighboring states (Patterson 2001, p 19).  
 In 1950, Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense team moved to 
challenge the constitutionality of segregated schools at every level. They declared that 
segregation was a direct violation of the constitution and presented inherent inequalities 
between Blacks and Whites.  They introduced their strategy at a NAACP conference that 
                                                 
8
 One exception is the Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and 
Mechanical College et al. (1950) in which the US District Court ruled that LSU must admit Wilson and future 
qualified black applicant into their law school, under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
They maintained that the law school of Southern University, a segregated university for black students, did not 
afford students the same or equal educational advantages as would be experienced at the Department of Law of 
LSU (Wilson v. Board of Supervisors 1950).  Federal court decisions also led to desegregated law schools at the 
University of Virginia and the University of North Carolina (Kluger 2004, 288).  
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summer to be adopted as official NAACP policy; “all future education cases would be ‘aimed 
at obtaining education on a non-segregated basis and no relief other than that will be 
acceptable,’” (Kluger 2004, 293). Beginning with Briggs v. Elliott case, Marshall and the 
Defense Fund began to directly challenge segregation, arguing that the differences between 
Black and white schools were a direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also 
began to use social science research to support their argument. In the Briggs case, Marshall 
and the Defense Fund sought the help of Kenneth Clark, a social psychologist, to 
demonstrate the damaging effects of segregated education on Black students’ psyche. Clark 
presented the results of his now famous “doll test,” that showed Black children’s favor and 
preference for white dolls and hostility and negative characterizations of Black dolls 
(Kluger 1975, 318).  The case moved up to the federal district court level, before being 
included in the broader Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas case along with four 
other lawsuits concerning Prince Edward County, Virginia; Wilmington, Delaware; Topeka, 
Kansas; and the District of Columbia. After nearly five years of strategy development, legal 
debates and arguments, social science research presentations, and extended Supreme 
Court contemplation and delay, the NAACP successfully convinced the Supreme Court that 
“…in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place,” (Brown 
v. Board of Education 1954).  
Now That We Have It, What Do We Do With It? The Response to the Brown Decision 
The 1954 Brown decision was an unquestionable victory for minority rights. Or was 
it? The Supreme Court ruled that separate school facilities for Black and white students 
was unconstitutional, and therefore, illegal. What the ruling did not do was outline how 
southern schools running dual systems were to come into compliance with the statute. This 
was a central question of the reargument deliberations in late 1953 as well as after the 
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public reading of the decision (Kluger 2004, 619; 732-747). In the year following the 
original decision, the Supreme Court ruled on Brown II, an implementation decree that did 
little to help move school desegregation forward. The justices agreed that requiring 
immediate remedy would be too much for the fragile southern states and was potentially 
out of their jurisdiction; they instead decided to simply encourage precipitous change 
(Clotfelter 2004; Kluger 2004, 745-747). Implementation authority was placed in local, 
southern officials’ hands and apprehensive district court judges were responsible for 
implementation oversight.  School districts were to desegregate with “all deliberate 
speed9” at the “earliest date possible” in “good faith.” Such phrases failed to send a strong, 
definitive message to southern schools about the Court’s decision to end segregated 
education in the south. Consequently, southern school districts read this message as a 
“break” for them in desegregation. It was an “attempt to correct an obnoxious decision,” 
according to Georgia’s governor at the time, Ernest Vandiver.   
In US Border States and regions in which the Black population was relatively small, 
desegregation happened quietly and peacefully overall, with a few exceptions (Patterson 
2001, 72; Clotfelter 2004). For example, in Milford, Delaware after rumored incidents 
between the few Black students and Whites in the local high school, parents petitioned, 
boycotted, and threatened violence on the school board against their desegregation efforts, 
                                                 
9Legal scholars debate the intention and meaning of “all deliberate speed” in the Brown II decision. It is 
contended that the justices realized the limits to judicial power and chose to acknowledge their weakness with 
this wording (Clotfelter 2004; Patterson 2001). It is noted of Chief Justice Warren commenting that “because 
we realized that under our federal system there were so many blocks preventing an immediate solution of the 
thing in reality that the best  we could look for would be a progression of action—and to keep it going, in a 
proper manner, we adopted that phrase,” (Kluger 2004, 747). Scholars also note that the Courts used the 
phrase as a compromise to those who opposed a time limit to eliminating segregated schools (Patterson 2001).  
Defenders of the phrase suggest that the Courts used it with full intention of moving school desegregation 
along, and not to satisfy segregationists. It aimed to give districts time to work out the logistical issues such as 
redistricting, bus routes, and teacher and student reassignment (Patterson 2001).  
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and eventually forced the district to end desegregation in its schools (Patterson 2001, 73-
75). Several of the Border States and larger cities in these states took prompt steps to 
desegregate, including those with large Black populations such as Washington, D.C. In fact, 
by 1956, nearly all of D.C.’s segregated schools were eliminated, though this was short lived 
(Clotfelter 2004).  By the 1955-1956 school term, nearly 70 percent of the Border State 
school districts had some level of desegregation in their schools and by 1964 this figure 
rose to 90 percent (McMillen 1994, 7-8; Peltason 1971, 30-31; Patterson 2001, 75, 78). 
Interestingly, the initial response to the 1954 Brown ruling in some southern states was 
met peacefully also.  The governors of Alabama and Arkansas at the time both spoke of 
their states complying with the law, indicating that even if they did not endorse 
desegregation, they were ready to accept the forthcoming changes in public education. 
Nevertheless, these responses were short lived and seemed to stumble to local level 
pressure.  
In general, the response to the decree of “all deliberate speed” in desegregating 
public schools was deliberately slow. Ten years after the initial decision, only about 1.2 
percent of African American students in the southern states attended a desegregated 
school and most schools held Black student enrollment to less than 20 students. The 
Supreme Court’s decision to place implementation at the local level and oversight at the 
state and district judicial level seemed like the perfect formula to sidestep the decision. 
Southern school districts and states responded to Brown II in three main ways. They were 
defiant and refused to open their doors to Black students. Southern states almost 
immediately implemented state laws and constitutional amendments that forbade 
desegregation. Under the motto, “if we can legislate, we can segregate,” states such as 
Mississippi and Louisiana made it illegal for students to attend racially integrated schools. 
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Georgia made it illegal to use public funding on desegregated schools (Patterson 2001; 
Meier, Stewart, England 1989). In Virginia, state leaders authorized closing down any 
public school ordered to desegregate, and they permitted state-supported tuition grants 
for white students to attend private schools. Several counties, including Norfolk, 
Charlottesville, and Warren counties, closed their schools and completely denied Black 
students an education in public schools in the county.  Prince Edward County, Virginia, one 
of the original plaintiff districts in the 1954 Brown decision, went as far as closing down 
their public schools from 1959-1964, forcing their students to attend school in neighboring 
districts.   
Others instituted freedom of choice plans that offered Blacks looking to attend all 
white schools very little choice or opportunity to enroll. Ambitious Black families looking 
to enroll their students in white schools were turned away due to sudden “overcrowding” 
in schools or errors in their completed choice forms. This plan resulted mainly in token 
desegregation in which a handful of Black students were admitted to white schools, while 
the majority of Black students remained in segregated schools.  Pupil placement laws were 
also implemented as “desegregation” plans that required school districts to assign students 
to schools based on their preparation, aptitude, morals, conduct, health and “personal 
standards.” Under these plans, school districts found very few Black students that qualified 
to attend Whites schools (Patterson 2001). The remaining districts aided segregationists in 
opening independent private schools to avoid desegregated education. 
The Black Community’s response to the decision was not as quick and rosy as one 
would expect. Support for desegregation was varied and inconsistent, especially in highly 
segregated areas and areas in which resistance was the strongest. Many parents feared the 
ramifications of sending their children to white schools. They faced physical and economic 
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intimidation at the hands of southern Whites, and social intimidation at the hands of 
southern Blacks. Additionally, families willing to desegregate despite the challenges and 
barriers had very little local support. Supportive organizations and leaders were bound to 
lengthy, slow, and costly lawsuits to assist the “desegregating” families. Most importantly, 
they rarely helped to solve the enforcement problem. Lawsuit victories to enforce 
desegregation did little to move school districts to actual compliance. 
The road to implementing desegregation was not littered with local segregationists’ 
tactics and resistance alone. The other branches of the federal government were not 
actively assisting the process either. The Supreme Court seemed to be alone or ahead of its 
time in addressing minority civil rights. Under President Eisenhower, the executive branch 
was nearly silent and inactive on the issue, outside of sending federal troops to assist in 
desegregating Little Rock High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.  The president refused to 
directly oppose or endorse court-ordered desegregation. He was often quoted in saying, 
“the Supreme Court has spoken, and I am sworn to uphold their constitutional process in 
this country; and I will obey,” and typically gave similar responses when questioned on his 
stance on school desegregation (Miller 2012, 346; Nichols 2007, 67).   The neutral 
statement sent a message to southern segregationists that desegregation and civil rights 
was not a priority to him and it left their lawless tactics to undermine desegregation 
unchallenged. To the Blacks looking for redress Eisenhower’s neutrality said, “I will do 
what the law requires me do to,” which was to ensure their equal rights to desegregated 
schools. Regardless of the neutral and confusing rhetoric, President Eisenhower’s actions 
made it clear that desegregating southern public schools was not on his agenda, ever. 
 For many Blacks, his inactivity toward desegregating public schools was 
frustrating. After all, this was a president who considered himself a “racially tolerant” man, 
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who previously moved on their behalf to desegregate federal facilities like veterans’ 
hospitals, and even supported the desegregation of Washington D.C.’s public schools. He 
signed two civil rights bills, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 
that were mainly symbolic and had little effect, but were the first to get through Congress 
since the Reconstruction era (Patterson 2001; Nichols 2007). Despite these moves toward 
racial equality on other fronts, President Eisenhower was cautious and guarded about 
court ordered school desegregation. He stood on the personal belief that real change in 
race relations had to start at the local level and that the Court’s decision was a set back for 
southern states (Patterson 2001; Nichols 2007, 67).  
The legislative branch’s response was significantly worse. Instead of ambivalence, 
southern legislators outright denounced the Court’s decision.  Rooted in a belief that the 
Supreme Court encroached on the rights of states and their citizens with a misuse of 
judicial power in their decision to desegregate public schools, the legislators outlined a 
massive resistance strategy in their “Southern Manifesto,” a formal plan to circumvent 
desegregation.  They also contended that the Supreme Court had acted based on their 
“personal political and social ideas” to establish the law of the land. All but two of the 22 
southern senators and 77 of the 105 southern congressmen signed the document that 
declared to “use lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to 
the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation,” (Congressional 
Record 1956; Martin 1998, 220; Patterson 2001). The lack of federal unity worked in the 
segregationists’ favor and contributed a great deal to the lack of early progress in 
desegregation. Furthermore, the federal disputes over school segregation set the stage for 
the state level response. 
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With resistance on every front and little support from any of the other federal 
branches of government, the courts faced an uphill battle to desegregate public schools.  
Although the Supreme Court issued several additionally decisions to strengthen 
desegregation enforcement (see Cooper v. Aaron10, Griffin v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County11), real population shifts occurred with the passage of Title VI and Title IX 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that allowed the federal government to cut financial support 
to discriminatory schools and the attorney general to sue segregated school districts 
(Clotfelter 2004; Meier, Stewart, England 1989; U.S. Department of Justice 2012).  The 
following year, Congress signed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
(ESEA) that provided southern school districts with various funding opportunities for 
complying with desegregation orders (Clotfelter 2004; Kluger 2004, 758). They also passed 
the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974, which prohibited deliberate segregation on 
the basis of not only race, but also color and national origin (U.S. Department of Justice 
2012).  Once the Supreme Court received better backing from the other two branches of 
government, it also moved in the direction of forcefully pushing desegregated education 
(see Green v. New Kent County School Board12, Alexander v. Holmes13, Keyes v. School District 
                                                 
10
 Cooper v. Aaron, the Court reaffirmed its Brown decision as the “supreme law of the land”  and unanimously 
ruled that Arkansas officials resisting school desegregation did not have the authority or liberty to annual 
Supreme Court decisions (Cooper v. Aaron 1958).  
 
11 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, decision to close all local, public schools and provide 
vouchers to attend private schools were constitutionally impermissible as violations of the equal protection 
clause (Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County 1964).  
 
12 Green v. Kent County School Board questioned the legality of “freedom of choice” programs to implement the 
Brown decision. The Supreme Court ruled that open enrollment or “freedom of choice” plans were not enough 
toward desegregation and established the school board as responsible for making plans that realistically work. 
State imposed segregation must be completely removed, “root and branch,” (Green v. Kent 1968).  
 
13 Alexander v. Holmes clarified the “deliberate speed” wording of the Brown decision and ordered schools to 
desegregate at once. The court ruled that “the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school 
 22 
 
No. 1, Denver, Colorado14.)  By the 1970-1971 school term, nearly 80 percent of all Black 
students were attending schools with Whites (Clotfelter 2004, 56).  
The Brown decision also failed to speak on the scope of minority rights. The Justices 
declared that segregation had no place in public education based on the original arguments 
surrounding legalized Black and white segregation in southern and border states. What 
was to become of non- southern and non-border states running less overt, but clearly dual 
systems for Blacks and Whites was unclear. Because northern school districts were de facto 
segregated, that is, they were not legally segregated but segregated by residential patterns, 
northern districts remained segregated in the decades following the Brown ruling.  The 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) reported enrollment figures in northern states that showed 
patterns of de facto segregation that many Southern legislators felt should also be 
addressed. A series of cases (see Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education15; Davis v. 
School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc16) challenged de facto segregation and other 
discriminatory practices in the north, and federal courts agreed that neither this form of 
segregation nor any form of discrimination or limits to education equality based on race 
                                                                                                                                                
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools,” (Alexander v. Holmes County Board of 
Education 1969).   
14 Keyes v. Denver School District No 1. expanded the scope of the Brown ruling to also address de facto 
segregation. The Supreme Court ruled that although no formal law was established mandating segregated 
schools, the district’s leaders and government agencies in the state were responsible for the segregation in the 
district. Their policies and practices were designed to keep African American students isolated and must be 
disbanded. The ruling held non-Southern states responsible for ensuring that their schools were desegregated 
(schools (Keyes v. Denver School District No 1. 1973; Kluger 1975, 763).   
 
15 Spangler et al. v. Pasadena City Board of Education challenged the racial discrimination in the district and the 
school board’s use of a neighborhood school policy to perpetuate school segregation and prevent “crosstown” 
busing. The District Court ruled that the district’s freedom of choice plans were inadequate in reducing racial 
imbalance and ordered them to establish a revised plan that would desegregate schools at the student and 
faculty levels (Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education 1970).  
 
16 Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc. eliminated the district’s discriminatory hiring and 
assignment policies of teachers and administrators and attendance zones used to circumvent desegregation. 
The US District Court judge ordered the immediate desegregation of Pontiac schools and a complete 
desegregation plan from the school board (Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc. 1970).  
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should be permitted in public schools (Clotfelter 2004, 27; US Commission On Civil Rights 
1972). Many northern districts altered their grade systems, established cross-district 
busing plans, and revised their hiring and promotion procedures to improve the overall 
racial balance of their districts (US Commission on Civil Rights 1972). The Supreme Court 
also found the crossing of districts and busing as an acceptable remedy to achieving 
racially balanced schools in the South in their Swann v. Mecklenburg County (1971) case. As 
history shows, cross-district busing was short lived; the Supreme Court later overturned 
their support for cross-district busing to desegregate schools, even in southern states, in 
the Milliken v. Bradley case.  
 Third, the Brown decision also failed to clearly identify the reference groups of 
their decision. Blacks were far from being the only minority group excluded from the 
privileges of the constitution. Although states with large Mexican American populations 
such as Texas and California did not have formal laws segregating them from Whites, these 
students also found themselves systematically placed in separate schools, and yet they 
seemed to be excluded from the Brown decision (Meier and Stewart 1991, 60; Clotfelter 
2004, 22).  Separate Mexican schools were aimed at “Americanizing” or assimilating 
Mexican American students (Bowman 2001). Mexican Americans in Texas were often 
denied access to secondary schools, but those seeking education beyond elementary school 
were permitted to learn a trade (Meier and Stewart 1991). In California, the few Mexican 
students that matriculated to secondary school were allowed to attend mixed schools 
because there were so few of them, and the cost to run a segregated secondary school was 
beyond what many districts could afford. In areas with larger Mexican American 
populations, students could attend mixed schools if a school’s “Mexican quota” had not 
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been met or the students met the district’s non-academic criteria for entrance such as one’s 
level of cleanliness (Meier and Stewart 1991; 62-63).   
However, the Latino fight for education equality is perhaps just as lengthy as 
Blacks’. With the support of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 
Mexican Americans challenged school segregation beginning with the 1930 case, Del Rio 
Independent School District v. Salvatierra. The group argued that by being placed in 
separate schools, Mexican American students were being denied equal protection of the 
law. The court ruled that segregating Mexican American students based on their ethnicity 
was a violation of the Constitution’s equal protection clause, but did not find the school 
district in question in violation of the law. Instead, they found that the district’s practice of 
segregating students based on the limited English ability and truancy violations was 
permissible (Meier and Stewart 1991, 67; Del Rio Independent School District v. Salvatierra 
1930). In 1945 the group challenged segregated education again based on the premise that 
it violated the equal protection clause for Mexican American students in Mendez v. 
Westminster School District. This time the courts sided with LULAC and the federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals prohibited the practice. Although a legal victory for Mexican Americans, 
actual implementation was futile. Some California and Texas districts still maintained 
separate schools or some form of segregation between Latinos and non-Latino Whites. In 
some areas the policy changed slightly to resemble other districts in which students were 
segregated in elementary grades, permitted to integrated classes in higher grades, but not 
mixed in extracurricular activities (Cloftelter 2004, 22-23).  The lack of implementation 
guidelines kept the segregation of Latinos alive in Texas and in California well into the 
1970s (Meier and Stewart 1991, 67; Bowman 2001).  
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A handful of other cases (see Hernandez v. Driscoll Consolidated Independent School 
District17; Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District18; U.S. v. Texas Education 
Agency19) challenged the dual education system for Mexican American students and white 
students among other education issues such as discrimination in school employment, 
school finance, and bilingual education. Although challengers experience victories in the 
court room, the direct impact of their victories was limited and lacked sufficient federal 
support for any meaningful redress or equity gains. Part of the challenge was being 
federally recognized as a unique, marginalized group subject to legal protection and 
desegregation provisions.  Originally, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the federal 
government’s agency responsible for enforcing school desegregation, considered people of 
“Hispanic” descent as white. This meant that school districts could continue to practice 
segregation or use discriminatory education policies to subordinate Hispanics and not be 
in violation of federal law. School districts also saw this as a means to “desegregate” 
without desegregating. They could group Blacks and Hispanics into the same school, away 
from non-Hispanic Whites and still legally comply with the Brown ruling.  However, this 
practice changed under two federal decisions. First, OCR changed its policy toward Latinos 
in 1970, noting that they would deal with discrimination on the basis of national origin; 
                                                 
17
 Hernandez v. Driscoll Consolidated Independent School District challenged the district’s process of segregating 
Mexican students through an untested academic grouping process that held Mexican students in the first grade 
for four years. The court ruled that the grouping was “arbitrary and unreasonable” and should be halted 
because it was directed solely against Mexican children (Hernandez v. Driscoll Consolidated Independent School 
District 1957).  
 
18 Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District was the first legal attempt to extend the Brown decision 
to Mexican Americans in which the courts ruled that although there was no formal history of state law 
requiring segregation, the school district’s dual school system perpetuated traditional segregation and was 
unconstitutional (Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District 1972).  
 
19 U.S. v. Texas Education Agency ordered the Texas Education Agency to assume full responsibility for 
desegregating public schools in Texas and eliminating dual systems established through ethnic origin 
assignments (U.S. v. Texas Education Agency 1970).  
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they shifted their focus from exclusively on Black-white discrimination in the South to 
multiple group discrimination beyond the South.  The second decision occurred in a 1973 
case, Keyes v. Denver School District No 1, in which the Supreme Court ruled that Mexican 
Americans were a separate group from non-Hispanic Whites and should be recognized as 
such for desegregation purposes. They could not be used as “Whites” to desegregate 
schools. Unfortunately, the Keyes decision did not spark as much Latino desegregation as 
expected, but it marked a broad shift in the government’s view of Americans of Hispanic 
descent (Bowman 2001).  
Desegregation Policy as It Stands: Entering an Era of Resegregation  
The desegregation picture looks quite differently today. School districts’ decisions 
to pursue racially balanced schools and the mode to this racial balance are generally 
shaped by a series of more restrictive court decisions that have eroded the provisions of 
early desegregation court cases. In the 1970s, the Court began to adopt a more 
conservative stance after Justice Douglass, cited as the most liberal member of the Court, 
retired (Kluger 1975). By the mid 1990s, when the entire tide and attitude of the Court had 
changed, no hard-line Liberal remained on the Court and most were replaced with 
moderate leaning justices or solid conservatives.  Though the Supreme Court is 
theoretically viewed as the non-partisan interpreters of the Constitution, the stark 
difference in the new Supreme Court’s decisions on school desegregation cases when 
compared to the more liberal Warren and Burger Courts suggest otherwise.   
First signs of the Court’s retreat became evident in their decision in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez. The case did not center on racial segregation 
within school districts specifically, but instead on the equality of school finance, a central 
issue of the early Defense Fund cases and their original tactic in ending segregated 
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education. The Supreme Court decided 5-4 that tax revenue differences leading to unequal 
access to education resources was not a violation of the equal protection clause (San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 1972; Kluger 1975; Patterson 2001).  In 
the majority opinion, Justice Powell argued that “the equal protection clause does not 
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages," dealing a severe blow to one of 
the major goals of desegregated education.  The Rodriguez ruling almost ensured that 
schools would be unequal.  A second retreat case of the 1970s, Milliken v. Bradley, involved 
the Black citizens of Detroit suing Governor William Milliken for the state’s lack of effort 
addressing schools’ racial imbalance through de facto segregation. The Court ruled that 
achieving racial balance stopped at school district lines and prohibited inter-district 
busing. For metropolitan areas, this meant that suburban schools did not have to 
accommodate students from the racially segregated inter-city schools. The majority 
opinion held that because suburban school districts had not acted to cause Detroit’s racially 
imbalanced schools, they were free to maintain their community schools; the court was not 
permitted to reach across or extend district boundaries. This decision was the first in a 
series of decisions that directly weaken the provisions of Brown v. Board of Education and 
the subsequent decisions that strengthened it. It was a direct reversal of the Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg decision that allowed cross district merging and busing measures to 
achieve racially balanced schools. During the 1980s, the Burger to Rehnquist Court 
continued the subtle retreat of school desegregation in related affirmative action cases 
such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education20 . 
                                                 
20 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education questioned the layoff practice used in Jackson, Michigan that provided 
special protections from layoffs for minority teachers in the name of societal discrimination and role model 
effects for minority students. The Court ruled that because the district failed to have a significant past of 
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The retreat was made more evident in the 1990s with decisions on issues of 
attendance zone realignments, white flight, and the length of the desegregation process. In 
their decision on the length of mandated desegregation plans, the Supreme Court ruled that 
once a district received ”unitary status,” indicating it has eliminated segregation and 
achieved racially balanced schools in its district, it is no longer responsible for addressing 
racial balance (see Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell 1991). In other words, a 
district is “free of any obligation to maintain racially balanced schools,” (Clotfelter 2004, 
32). They followed this decision with their ruling in Freeman v. Pitts, which stated that a 
district is not responsible for addressing de facto segregation in schools when it is related 
to changes in residential patterns. This decision essentially reversed the Green v. New Kent 
County decision.  In 1995, they solidified their stance in the decision on Missouri v. Jenkins, 
ruling that Missouri was no longer responsible for remedying substandard education and 
racial imbalance in Kansas City due to changes in the district’s demographics. The US 
District Court responsible for overseeing Kansas City desegregation efforts ordered the 
district to fund a series of programs and establish a magnet program in an effort to 
improve the performance level of the schools and consequently attract out of district white 
families to the inner city schools. The Supreme Court found fault with this procedure, 
however, arguing that the District Court had exceed its remedial powers; their 
“interdistrict goal was beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation identified by the 
district;” and that the Constitution ensured equal opportunity not equal results (Missouri v. 
Jenkins 1995; Kluger 2004, 772; Chemerinsky 2005). It became increasing clear that for the 
                                                                                                                                                
employment racial discrimination, the racial classification layoff provision violated the equal protection clause 
(Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 1986; Powell 1987). The decision reduced preemptive efforts to address 
employment segregation and discrimination.  
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more conservative Supreme Court, racially separated and imbalanced schools were 
perfectly acceptable as long as policy makers were not mandating it or deliberately 
discriminating against certain groups. The collective decisions of the 1990s signaled to 
lower courts that the days of forcing desegregation orders were done, and many school 
districts were prematurely relieved of their mandatory desegregation plans.  
The shift has made it extremely difficult for school districts looking to voluntarily 
hold onto or establish desegregation plans to find federal support when challenged. For 
example, Charlotte-Mecklenburg lost its battle to maintain a successful desegregation 
policy that used race in student assignments after the federal courts ordered an end to its 
desegregation efforts (see Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 2001). Most 
recently, the Supreme Court has taken an additional stab at desegregation in limiting 
voluntary desegregation plans. They have decided that voluntarily desegregation plans that 
use race as a deciding factor in school assignments are unconstitutional. In Meredith v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education, the Supreme Court ruled that the district’s plan to use 
race as a determinant of school assignment and its requirement of school populations 
between 15 and 50 percent African American was a violation of the equal protection 
clause; their use of race to prevent racial imbalance did not meet the Court’s standard for a 
“constitutionally legitimate use of race,” and the plan was not narrowly tailored enough to 
be a race-conscious plan (Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education 2007). Similarly, 
their Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle decision argued that the use of race 
as a tie breaker for school assignments intended to maintain racial diversity was a violation 
of the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it did not meet the Court’s 
standard for a “constitutionally legitimate” use of race, and failed to include the “narrow 
tailoring” they require in establishing race conscious programs. While some supporters of 
 30 
 
the decisions such as Justice Kennedy contended that race should still be considered in 
public schools to ensure equal educational opportunities, others like Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race,” (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 2007). The “color blind” 
logic of alleviating racial discrimination and racial balance in public schools has not only 
colored the way in which desegregation is pursued today, but has also shaped mass 
attitudes toward racial inequalities. It discourages the consideration of systematic and 
structural discrimination and causes of inequality among races. It also hampers any 
significant effort to address inequalities using targeted methods.  
The Role of the Executive and Legislative Branches 
However, the judicial branch is not alone in its attack on desegregated education. 
The executive branch has always been slow on supporting it, and efforts to significantly 
limit its provisions have made the policy difficult to implement. Beginning with the Nixon 
Administration, much effort was taken to eliminate busing and reduce federal funding 
toward desegregation. Nixon often made special provisions for southern school districts to 
delay required “full compliance” with the Johnson established laws and deadlines 
(McAndrews 1998).  Under Regan, desegregation was deemed a costly, unpopular failure. 
The Regan Administration argued that all students were better served in local community 
schools that were closer to home and subject to parental oversight, despite the known 
disproportionately negative effect it would have on minority students in segregated 
communities. School districts and states experienced significant cut backs in federal 
funding used to remedy segregation, and inevitably the entire funding appropriation was 
cut for the Department of Education under Regan (Kluger 2004, 768). The support for 
neighborhood schools and hostility and doubt surrounding desegregated education 
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continued through the 1990s and eventually turned into a reform effort of school choice as 
the preferred solution to equity concerns in public education (Orfield and Eaton 1996; 
Schofield and Hausmann 2004). 
 In reducing the amount of federal funding aimed at maintaining racial balance, the 
legislative branch has also aided in reversing the Brown decision and weakening 
desegregation policy. As recent as this fiscal year, the federal government continues to 
throw a cold shoulder to desegregated education. The 2012 Education Appropriations Bill 
strictly prohibits the use of any federal funds to “transport teachers or students in order to: 
(1) overcome racial imbalance in any school, or (2) carry out a racial desegregation plan,” 
(2012 Education Appropriations Bill, Sec. 301). Section 302 is more specific; it:  
(Sec. 302) Prohibits the use of funds to require, directly or indirectly, the 
transportation of any student to a school other than the school nearest the student's 
home, except, for a student requiring special education, to the school offering that 
special education, in order to comply with title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Declares that such a prohibited indirect requirement of transportation of students 
includes the transportation of students to carry out a plan involving the 
reorganization of the grade structure of schools, the pairing of schools, the clustering 
of schools, or any combination of grade restructuring, pairing, or clustering. Exempts 
the establishment of magnet schools from such prohibition.  
The explicit exclusion of funding for any portion of desegregated education clearly 
indicates the legislative branch’s stance on it. One implication of this statue is that states 
and/or districts that value school diversity and desire to maintain or pursue desegregated 
education, must fund the process alone. Poorer districts, those most likely to be racially 
imbalanced, are forced to choose between funding racial balance efforts (i.e. busing, 
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magnet programs) or “more pressing” education goals. For wealthier, suburban districts, 
also most likely to be racially imbalanced, there is little incentive or real reason to attempt 
racial balancing.  
With the growing minority population and limited federal support in upholding the 
principles and decrees of the Brown v. Board of Education decision and subsequent 
supporting cases, racially separated schools are no longer a thing of the past. 
Resegregation, the process of returning to racially segregated schools, is on the rise, 
especially for Latino students (Orfield and Eaton 1996). Even some of the most successfully 
desegregated districts (i.e. Wake County, North Carolina and Charlotte, North Carolina) are 
abandoning their plans and returning to neighborhood schools (Boger 2003; Zucchino 
2010). Racial minorities and others supporters of racially balanced schools have begun to 
turn to local political venues to address the woes of racially imbalanced schools (Smith, 
Kedrowski, Ellis 2004).  As the chapter demonstrates, desegregation implementation has 
always occurred at the local level, while political leverage at the federal level manipulated 
the process. Today, this relationship has changed and implementation along with political 
leverage and policy design rest at the local level.  This venue shift has increased the 
importance and salience of local actors, particularly, school board members, 
administrators and teachers in shaping desegregation efforts and its implications for 
student performance and outcomes. As such, it is equally important to investigate the 
manner in which the actors influence this process, and also to consider how the racial 
composition of schools may influence their behaviors and policy outcomes.  
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Why Even Do This? The Benefits of Desegregated and Segregated Education 
Contrasted 
Desegregating public schools was important to ensure that all students had fair and 
equal access to a high-quality public school education and an equal opportunity to the 
“American dream,” (Patterson 2001). In a society where equality is the law of the land, it 
was only fitting that the educational system was also equal; therefore, desegregating public 
schools was a way to ensure equality was being met (Crain 1968). As one African American 
parent stated about allowing her students access to desegregated schools, “Sitting next to a 
white child does not ensure that my child will learn, but it does ensure that he will be 
taught” (Crain 1968, 112). By desegregating schools, minority students were given access 
to a quality educational experience—access to the same teachers, facilities, and education 
resources necessary for successful learning and academic achievement. Civil rights 
advocates and others who supported school desegregation did not intend for it to be the 
cure of all education or racial issues, but it was intended as a step toward successful racial 
acceptance, respect, and integration (Orfield and Eaton 1996, 104; Armor and Rossell 
2002). Mixed schools were seen as the best way to reach the American dream of equal 
opportunity (Patterson 2001, xvii). As Thurgood Marshall often noted in his arguments for 
desegregated education, separating Black students was as harmful to the students as the 
resource inequalities in public education. Isolating them deprived Black students of 
association and competition with Whites, further perpetuating the assumption that Blacks 
must be incompetent, inadequate and  inferior (Patterson 2001, xvii).  The students were 
unable to develop an adequate sense of self worth in segregated schools (Crain 1968, 112).  
The expectations of desegregation proponents and supporters were met to an 
extent; students in racially diverse or “white” schools tend to have a larger percentage of 
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qualified teachers, a more rigorous academic climate, college bound peers, and access to 
resources not afforded to students in racially segregated schools (Southworth and 
Mickelson  2007). Students in segregated “minority” schools, on the other hand, are more 
likely to have a larger percentage of unqualified teachers, more poor, homeless, or non-
English speaking peers, fewer academically advanced classmates and fewer courses to 
prepare them for college (Southworth and Mickelson  2007; Goldsmith 2011).  Overall, 
students in segregated schools tend to achieve less; they attain less education and hold 
lower prestige occupations compared to their counterparts in White concentrated or 
racially balanced schools (Goldsmith 2011; Dawkins and Braddock 1994; Wells and Crain 
1994).  
The anticipated peer effects or social benefits of desegregated education are also 
frequently cited in explaining the necessity of desegregation.  In fact, peer effect is the most 
widely discussed mechanism in which desegregated education links to student 
achievement (Coleman et al. 1966; Card and Rothstein 2007; Goldsmith 2011).  Beginning 
with Coleman and his colleagues’ (1966) path breaking evaluation of school desegregation, 
scholars argue that peers influence students; students become like their peers with 
frequent interaction and indirect socialization. Peer expectations, attitudes, and 
achievements often color students’ perceptions of their own attitudes, expectations and 
achievements. Additionally, minority students are able to develop and/or share the same 
networks of white students to gain invaluable knowledge for current and future academic 
success (Wells and Crain 1994). Proponents suggest that as lower income, minority 
students are exposed to middle class students’ beliefs, behaviors, and networks related to 
achievement and the normative climate of achievement that Whites create, disadvantaged 
students also adopt these beliefs and behaviors. The peer socialization and assimilation of 
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each environment differs, leading to differences in outcomes. Consequently, students in 
racially balanced schools adopt the pro-school attitudes, behaviors, and networks of their 
middle class peers, while the attitudes of students in racially segregated schools reflect the 
less positive attitudes of the low income or working class peers that their environment 
fosters. Much of the empirical research supports this theory; students with more diverse 
peer groups tend to have better performance outcomes, while those with larger minority 
peer groups tend to have lower outcomes (Coleman et al. 1966; Jencks and Mayer 1990; 
Guryan 2004; Goldsmith 2009; Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2009).  
Additionally, segregated schools restrict students’ interracial contact, necessary to 
break down stereotypes and biases against different groups. It denies students the 
opportunity to learn first hand about different people and cultures and perpetuates 
inequality (Goldsmith 2011). Even major corporations such as General Motors, Microsoft, 
Merck, and Shell Oil have spoken out in support of diversity efforts and the benefits of an 
education in more balanced, diverse schools and universities for their companies and in 
improving social relations in society as a whole (Kluger 2004, 777-778). 
Some scholars note that there are some benefits, however, to students attending 
racially segregated schools, and challenge the widely held assumption that minority 
students will always “do better” in racially balanced schools or schools with greater 
populations of white students.  For example, there is evidence that being in a school with a 
proportional population of Latinos has a positive effect on Latino achievement, more so 
than being in a racially balanced school with white students (Goldsmith 2003). Goldsmith 
(2004) finds that Black and Latino students in segregated schools have more positive and 
optimistic attitudes about school and this positive attitude is related to reductions in the 
Black-white and Latino-white achievement gaps. Minority students in racially segregated 
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schools were more likely than Whites to have high educational aspirations and 
occupational expectations. Advocates of neighborhood schools, even if it is at the expense 
of racially balanced schools, often argue that neighborhood schools have the potential to 
provide a better education to students because the students are closer to home and the 
funds used for transportation could be used to enhance educational experiences (Orfield 
2005). There is also an argument that less racially balanced but neighborhood assigned 
schools foster greater parental involvement and offer them some control over their 
child(ren)’s education (Colwell and Guntermann 1984). 
Research on early Black education under the segregated system highlight the 
cultural benefits that students gained in separate schools.  Although Black schools lack 
resources and adequate facilities, they also had much community support and institutional 
policies that helped Black students learn and succeed, despite their limited environment 
(Anderson 1988, 3).  Historical accounts of students educated in segregated schools also 
report students’ satisfaction with the supportive, encouraging, and rigid atmosphere of 
segregated schools compared to the hostile, unwelcoming and isolating environment of 
desegregated schools (Anderson 1988, 3). Teachers and administrators were seen as 
“parent-like” figures with complete autonomy to shape student learning and discipline; 
segregated schools addressed the “psychological and sociological needs of clients,” 
(Anderson 1988, 3-4). African American critics of school desegregation argue that 
desegregation destroyed African American’s sense of community. As previously mentioned, 
some Blacks were resistant and also fought to maintain segregated schools (Anderson 
1988, 4). These accounts of education in segregated schools are distinct from the 
arguments of Brown and the understood general consensus of Black families. 
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Consequences of the Brown Decision and Its Retreat 
The expansive body of school desegregation literature across all fields generally 
focuses on the successes and failures of the policy through an examination of its effects on 
various outcome measures such as academic achievement, intergroup relations, and 
quality of life. Though the evaluative literature on the policy has been mixed, more scholars 
find positive long and short term benefits than negative consequences to desegregated 
education (Mickelson 2001; Schofield and Hausmann 2004).   
Academic Consequences  
The literature on school desegregation’s effect on African American students’ 
academic achievement is highly debated and inconclusive. Early work on African American 
students’ academic success immediately after formal desegregation showed that Black 
students educated in desegregated schools were more likely to have higher test scores, 
more likely to graduate from high school and more likely to attend a desegregated college 
(Crain 1971; Crain and Mahard 1978; Braddock 1980; Reber 2004). More contemporary 
and sophisticated analyses yield similar results. Scholars continue to show a positive 
relationship between racially balanced or desegregated schools and minority students’ 
academic achievement on standardized tests (Wells et al. 2004) and graduation rates 
(Guryan 2004) and negative relationships between minority students’ academic 
performance and more imbalanced, racially isolated schools (Caldas and Bankston 1998; 
Mickelson, Bottia, and Lambert 2013).  
Yet some scholars find limited short term benefits to racially balanced schools, and 
conclude that desegregation does not have a significant effect on Black students’ 
achievement (Cook 1984; Cook and Evans 2000; Rivkin 2000). Cook (1984) suggests that 
scholars touting the positive effect of desegregation are overstating their findings; he finds 
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that desegregation has no effect in particular subjects like mathematics and very small 
effects on reading. Rivkin (2000) assess the effect of peer relationships, African American 
students’ exposure to Whites, on academic attainment and finds little evidence of it having 
a positive effect on African American students’ academic attainment. Instead, he concludes 
that focusing on the quality of schools versus the “reallocating of students among schools” 
is more effective in improving academic achievement.  Similarly, Cook and Evans (2000) 
contend that little of the Black-white difference in National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP) scores can be linked to the racial composition of schools21. They suggest 
that changes within schools—“a narrowing of the score gap of students with the same level 
of parental education in the same school,” is responsible for the observed gap reduction 
(Cook and Evans 2000). Researchers like Reber (2010) point to the differences in school 
finance and expenditures to explain changes in Black students’ high school graduation 
rates, over explanations of exposure to white students or the overall racial composition of 
the school. Ryabov and Van Hook (2007) find socioeconomic composition, not the racial 
composition of a school, to have a significant effect on Latino students’ outcomes. Their 
findings support early notions of the benefits of minority students’ access to more wealthy 
and privileged white students with greater external resources, networks and culture 
(Coleman et al. 1966; Cook 1984). However, they also show that today, these assumed 
benefits are not limited to white students; in fact, race is less important and any student of 
a middle class or higher background has a positive effect on student achievement. 
Unfortunately, race and socioeconomic status remain highly correlated and Blacks and 
                                                 
21 Cook and Evans (2000) do find the differences in test scores related to changes in school quality, though only 
marginally important to the overall white-black test score difference, is largely due to the worsening of quality 
of poor, inner city schools with a white student population of less than 20 percent in which black students are 
more likely to attend.  
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Latinos are most likely to fall into the lower status categories, suggesting that the racial 
composition of schools remains a relevant factor to consider in district policymaking and 
predicting student outcomes.  
A handful of scholars note that the limited short term benefits evolve into 
significant long-term effects that often help improve life for Black students. For example, 
Kaufman and Rosenbaum (1992) and Dawkins (1994) show that graduates of 
desegregated schools are more likely to go to college and pursue 4-year bachelor degrees.  
Similarly, Johnson’s (2011) research on the socioeconomic and health outcomes of children 
born between 1950 and 1970 as measures of attainment, finds that school desegregation 
helped to significantly increase Black educational attainment and earnings among a host of 
other social factors. On the other hand, Goldsmith (2009) finds that students in 
predominately Black or Latino schools have lower levels of later academic attainment. 
They are less likely to earn a high school diploma or its equivalent and any form of 
postsecondary education in their lifetime, compared to equally disadvantaged students in 
predominately white schools.   
Racial Composition of Schools and the Achievement Gap 
Beyond observing the effect that the level of racial balance in a district or school 
has on minority students’ academic performance and educational attainment, scholars also 
consider its effect on the growing gap between Blacks and Whites and Latinos and Whites 
in general academic achievement.  Advocates of desegregated education, such as Orfield 
and Eaton (1996) and Kozol (2005) often note that the achievement gap of the “active 
desegregation era” was lower than the gap observed today. Others, such as Jaynes and 
Williams (1989) and Grissmer, Flanagan, and Willamson (1998), also attribute the reduced 
achievement gap of the 1970s and 1980s to desegregation.  The more recent trend of 
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accountability in education reform has re-heightened the rhetoric and salience of gaps in 
achievement among racial groups, but some argue that it has also taken focus away from 
desegregation efforts and racial equality in school districts (Daniel 2004).  Although 
accountability systems have helped student achievement in general, this effect has not 
translated into a reduction in the achievement gap between Black and White students, and 
has shown only modest reductions in the Latino-white gap (Hanushek and Raymond 
2005). These findings, as well as claims of its negative effect on policies aimed at 
addressing school equity via racial balance, has led some interested scholars to probe other 
factors related to the racial achievement gap, including the racial composition of schools.  
Hanushek and his colleagues provide much evidence that the growing gap between 
Black and white academic achievement is not based on ability alone. Instead, they show 
that the gap is often tied to the racial composition and quality of one’s school. In a study on 
the relationship between school racial composition and the achievement gap in Texas 
public schools, they find that balancing the Black enrollment of all imbalanced schools 
would close “over 10 percent of the seventh grade22 Black-white test score gap,” 
(Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2009).  An additional study on the distribution of the Black-
white achievement gap showed that high-achieving African American students suffer the 
most from racially unbalanced schools; the achievement gap widens the most for them 
between grades 3 through 8 in schools with larger Black populations (Hanushek and Rivkin 
2009). Reducing this Black student population and improving the quality of teachers to the 
state’s average could eliminate nearly 20 percent of the growth in the Black-white 
achievement gap from grades 4 to 8 (Hanushek and Rivkin 2009).  Card and Rothstein 
                                                 
22 Their sample includes students in grades 5-7 in all Texas’s public schools.  
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(2007) reach a similar conclusion in their study of segregation’s effect on students’ SAT 
scores. They show that moving from completely segregated schools to completely balanced 
schools could raise Black students’ relative SAT scores about 142 points and reduce the 
Black-white difference in scores by nearly 70 percent (Card and Rothstein 2007).  
Their findings are not unique. Instead, they are very much consistent with the 
previously discussed research focusing solely on Black or Latino achievement, as well as 
early research used to eradicate “separate but equal” schools. For example, both Margo 
(1986) and Orazem (1987) show that school quality and school characteristics had a 
significant effect on the racial differences in student performance, prior to the Brown 
decision. Orazem’s (1987) study of pre-Brown student achievement found that school 
quality and school characteristics accounted for nearly 40 percent of the large racial gap in 
average test scores, while Margo (1986) showed that equalizing school characteristics 
would have narrowed the early achievement gap between Blacks and Whites, but family 
characteristics and school attendance had a larger effect on this relationship. Nevertheless, 
critics of this research continue to argue that the racial composition plays little to no 
significant role in the achievement gap. They point to individual, school and academic 
cultural factors (i.e. quality teachers, challenging and innovative curriculums) to explain 
the gap in achievement among racial groups (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003).  
Social Consequences  
 Some, such as Coleman et al. (1966) and Crain (1971), attribute the academic gains 
of Black students in desegregated schools to their social environment. The research shows 
evidence of a relationship between desegregated education and greater social and 
psychological competence (Crain 1971). Being in an environment of diverse abilities and 
social backgrounds is a positive indicator of academic success (Crain 1971). 
 42 
 
Scholars have also found long term social implications and benefits to desegregated 
education.  Contact theory, an argument of more positive intergroup attitudes occurring 
when face to face interactions between members of differing, antagonistic groups 
increases, is often used to explain why desegregated education is socially beneficial to all 
students over segregated education. Early proponents of desegregation used the theory in 
assumptions that desegregating schools would also change racial attitudes and reduce 
racial isolation outside of school; the empirical literature supports this contention. 
Students attending desegregated schools tend to have more positive perceptions of other 
races, are more tolerable of other groups, and have preferences for desegregated schools 
(Scott and McPartland 1982; Orfield and Eaton 1996).  Blacks who have attended 
desegregated schools are more likely to also live in integrated neighborhoods, attend 
desegregated colleges and universities, work in integrated environments, and have 
integrated social networks compared to their segregated peers (Dawkins 1994; Trent 
1997; Crain 1971). Interactions of this proportion have also been linked to decreased 
homicide rates (Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig 2009).  
Economic Consequences/ Quality of Life  
Related to these academic and social implications are the long term economic 
benefits associated with attending desegregated schools.  Through their educational 
attainment and social network benefits, Black graduates of desegregated high schools 
typically have higher occupational prestige and higher incomes compared to peers from 
segregated schools (Crain 1970; Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkon 1992).  Ashenfelter. Collins 
and Yoon (2006) find that desegregation helped to reduce the significant income gap 
between non-southern Black men and southern Black men, especially on incomes 
conditional on educational attainment. Southern Black men educated after desegregation 
 43 
 
had higher incomes than those educated before the Brown decision. They are also more 
likely to work in white-collar, professional, or “nontraditional Black” jobs in the private 
sector, while Black graduates of segregated schools are more likely to hold government or 
blue collar positions (Wells and Crain 1994; Crain and Strauss 1985).  These occupational 
differences are often related to higher incomes and greater economic stability.   
On the other hand, some scholars are skeptical of the relationship between school 
desegregation or segregation and future earnings and income. Neal and Johnson (1996) 
suggest that almost all of the Black-white gap in wages is attributed to ability differences, 
not racial differences. Rivkin (2000) finds that mandatory desegregation plans offer limited 
benefits to one’s future earnings, challenging the scholarship on the benefits of certain 
desegregation plans and racially balanced educational environments.   
Based on these outcome focused studies, scholars assessing the successes and 
failures of school desegregation have come to mixed conclusions.  In general, many findings 
indicate successful outcomes for students, demonstrating gains in equal access to quality 
education (Wells and Crain 1994). Yet, limitations to this access within schools in the form 
of student grouping and tracking, and loopholes in district plans that reduce their 
implementation and effectiveness  have led some to question desegregation’s noted 
success (Eyler, Cook and Ward 1983; Clotfelter 2004).   
The Rise of Second Generation Discrimination 
 Within school segregation is a long known process used to subvert desegregation 
even before racially balanced schools became the law of the land. As early as the 1940s, 
scholars note the use of within school techniques to separate racial groups. For example, 
many California schools created “schools within schools” for Mexican students, keeping 
them academically and socially isolated from Whites (Clotfelter 2004; Meier and Stewart 
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1991). The use of within school segregation became more prevalent after the Brown 
decision, in which many districts found themselves struggling to meet parental demands 
for separation between the races, while also complying with federal law (Southworth and 
Mickelson 2007). The most widely used means to achieve both goals—separation and 
desegregated education—was grouping and tracking students based on ability, though 
most tracking systems were highly correlated with race (Southworth and Mickelson 2007; 
Buttaro et al. 2010; Mickelson 2001). Some school districts began tracking almost 
immediately after desegregating. For example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district 
began using racially driven tracking shortly after desegregating, leading the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare to withhold funding (Smith 2004). Others gradually moved 
into the process as the proportion of minority students to white students grew.  For 
example, a study of Milwaukee public school suspension rates within the first two years of 
desegregation revealed that schools experiencing more desegregation-related population 
changes also had disproportionately higher Black suspension rates (Larkin 1979).  Eitle 
(2002) notes that school districts under court mandated desegregation plans were more 
likely to track Black students into lower tracks compared to Black students in similar 
schools not under the mandate. The political and legal context of a school’s racial 
composition is attributed to the rate at which minority students are tracked. Yet, even this 
relationship is debated with some scholars and many practitioners arguing that grouping 
and tracking is solely to help students and is not based on race.  
Defining Grouping and Tracking: The Arguments 
 In her seminal work on tracking practices in US high schools, Oakes (1985) defines 
tracking as “the process whereby students are divided into categories so that they can be 
assigned in groups to various kinds of classes.” Students are most generally characterized 
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based on their academic ability, as mentioned above, in an effort to produce a better 
learning environment and generate greater peer effects. Tracking significantly influences 
students’ learning opportunities, and holds implications for their cognitive achievement, 
postsecondary path, and even career trajectories. Students that are tracked in lower 
academic tracks typically remain in them throughout their entire post-secondary career, 
and vice versa for students tracked in higher ability groups. The students are usually 
exposed to the same curricula, but at different paces, breadth, and depth. Students in 
higher ability tracks can expect to receive the most fruitful academic experience because 
they are exposed to a broader curriculum, more advanced and higher quality teachers, and 
often the best or additional resources not offered to other students. Furthermore, the 
benefits noted of peer effects on student achievement (i.e. highly motivated, middle class, 
cultured peers) are all centralized in higher ability classrooms under academic tracking 
systems.  In essence these students learn more; they receive the best education the school 
has to offer. On the other hand, students of lower tracks typically cover less of the formal 
curricula, experience less rigorous standards, and have lower quality and less experienced 
teachers.  
Despite this obvious breach in the commitment to equality in education that 
tracking poses, many view grouping and tracking as the premier method of educating 
students of different knowledge sets. They contend that it is the most efficient and student 
friendly strategy to disseminating curricula to students of varying ability (Van Houtte, 
Demanet, and Stevens 2012). These arguments are based on several assumptions about 
student learning: 1) students learn better in groups with students similar to themselves, 2) 
most similar student classrooms are easier to teach, and teachers worry less about “losing 
the slowest or boring the fastest learners”,  3) less academically advanced students develop 
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positive attitudes about themselves, schools, and education when they are not grouped 
with more advanced students, 4) grouping students allows education to be tailored to 
students’ different labor market trajectories and anticipated educational or vocational 
needs, and 5) the groups are accurate, fair, and only reflect students’ past achievements 
and raw academic ability(Kulik and Kulik 1982; Oakes 1985; Southworth and Mickelson 
2007; Brunello and Checchi 2007; Trautwein et al. 2006).   
Nevertheless, empirical research shows that many of these assumptions are false. 
First, homogenous learning environments do not consistently benefit any student (Oakes 
1985; Kulik and Kulik 1982). Instead the literature on learning environments indicates that 
sometimes academically advanced students learn more when they are taught amongst 
equally competent peers; other times they do not fare any better than academically 
advanced students taught in heterogeneous academic environments (Oakes 1985; Kulik 
and Kulik 1982; Lleras and Rangel 2009).  Sometimes homogeneous learning environments 
negatively affect academically average or weaker students, and other times the learning 
environment has no effect on their academic success (Oakes 1985; Carbonaro 2005). These 
inconsistent findings lead many to believe that creating homogenous learning 
environments through tracking does not benefit students. Academically advanced students 
do not suffer in mixed ability classrooms, and average or weaker students do not benefit 
from learning amongst similar students, nor are they more easily assisted (Oakes 1985). 
Taken together, such findings indicate that ability grouping produces a stratified learning 
environment for students, in which the best students get better, but the average and poor 
students get worse (Lleras and Rangel 2009). 
Second, tracking fosters lower self-esteem and negative attitudes about one’s 
ability and educational success among less academically advanced and average students. 
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The stereotypes, stigmas, and perceptions about lower tracks cause the students to adopt 
the same negative perceptions about themselves. They often have lower aspirations and 
limited future plans (Oakes 1985; Van Houtte, Demanet, and Stevens 2012). These students 
develop an anti-school culture that sometimes manifest in disruptive behavior, bullying, 
and complete alienation from school (Van Van Houtte and Stevens 2010).  Grouping and 
tracking practices also widens the self-esteem gap between tracks. Being in a higher track 
enhances students’ self esteem. They develop a greater sense of status, ability and 
superiority compared to their lower tracked peers and more further away from them in 
characterizations of self concept (Van Houtte and Stevens 2010; Van Houtte, Demanet, and 
Stevens 2012). Additionally, once a student is placed in a lower track, it is extremely 
difficult for the student to move out of it, creating a sense of hopelessness and inferiority.  
Finally, teachers and school administrators work hard to ensure that tracking 
placements are accurate. After all, students are typically placed in lifetime tracks that 
expand beyond secondary school. It is imperative that schools get this correct. However, 
they often do not.  As briefly mentioned earlier, ability tracks are highly correlated with 
race (Oakes 1985; Buttaro et al. 2010; Mickelson 2001, but see Haller 1985). The literature 
shows that a host of other factors influence one’s track placement, including the school’s 
racial composition, poverty level, desegregation status—voluntary versus court mandated, 
teacher representation or grade level (Southworth and Mickelson 2007; Buttaro et al. 
2010; Meier, Stewart, England 1989; Eitle 2002). Interestingly, Southworth and Mickelson 
(2007) find that tracking can adversely affect both Black and white male and female 
students, demonstrating that within-segregation practices greatly and consistently affect 
the outcomes of all students and nearly always at disproportionate rates.  
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Conclusion 
In outlining the history of achieving desegregation and the high and low points of 
the Brown legacy, this chapter helps to set the stage and context of the current research. 
Are minority students in desegregated schools any better off than the students in 
segregated schools?  The evaluative literature on school desegregation is inconclusive in 
answering this question.  While some scholars point to academic, social, and economic 
victories for minority students and the state of racial equality in the US, others emphasize 
the other predictors of students’ academic success that conflict with and weaken 
desegregation’s influence. Consequently, it is unclear from the broad overview of literature 
if students are better served in racially balanced schools or if the threat of rapid 
resegregation is cause for concern. These gaps, inconsistencies, and the limited discussion 
of the local level politics of desegregation policy leaves much room for theoretical 
exploration into the political, organizational, and bureaucratic factors likely to shape local 
desegregation policy decisions and outcomes, as well as the manner in which the racial 
composition influences the noted factors.  
The historical literature draws a clearer picture on why the focus is currently at the 
local level, how the historical and more recent federal actions have shaped where school 
districts are today in pursuing this goal, and where this policy should be directed to resolve 
the standing issues. It is through this lens that the empirical questions of the upcoming 
chapters are derived; testable hypotheses are established; and empirical findings are 
interpreted and probed for deeper insights on the differences and/or similarities in 
segregated and desegregated education. In the next chapter, I outline the theoretical 
framework used to explore the research questions of the dissertation project. The 
framework applies theories of organizational theory to the political dimensions of school 
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districts in an effort to explain how, when, and why the level of racial balance in a district 
matters.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL 
The literature previously discussed suggests a broad approach to fully 
understanding the predictors of school desegregation and its consequences for students. A 
historic look at desegregation policy highlights how that body of literature can benefit from 
an updated study of policy implementation and the outcomes for students as the U.S. 
demographics rapidly evolve and education remains the pathway to future success.  The 
education literature from which most of the previous chapter is drawn, fails to 
acknowledge the political context in which desegregation policy functions. The previous 
chapter’s limited focus on the political nature of desegregation policy demonstrates the 
lack of discussion in education circles about the role that local government actors, political 
institutions and even the political environment play in shaping implementation decisions 
and policy outcomes and outputs. As such, this chapter develops and discusses a three part 
theory of school desegregation that considers the politics of desegregation policy. The 
research introduces the broad body of public administration literature to a well established 
sector of the education literature, demonstrating the interconnectedness of the fields while 
empirically testing the effect of this interaction in application.  It draws from mid-range 
theories and subliteratures of public administration and political science that focus on non-
policymakers in policy development, implementation, and outcomes. The model explores 
how challenging social policies such as school desegregation are decided at the local level, 
across varying political environments, and the consequences that follow.  
 In building this model, the work allows for not only a study of school desegregation 
policy, but also a broader study of public policy, local governance, and public organizations.  
The model serves as a guide to understanding the relationships among institutions, 
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structures, and the political environment. The case of school desegregation provides a 
testing ground for learning how bureaucrats, as non-policy factors, shape outcomes.  
Bureaucrats are often thought of as non-policymaking, non-partisan, unbiased experts of 
policy implementation. Some bureaucratic scholars perceive the bureaucracy as an 
appendage to the legislative and executive branches of government that should be 
controlled from the top-down (Hammond and Knott 1996; Wood and Waterman 1994).  
Others, however, argue the contrary, finding bureaucrats to be policymakers that operate 
as a semi-independent “fourth branch of government” that may be capable of exercising the 
public’s will and values (Shipan 2004; Meier and O’Toole 2006). Scholars of both 
arguments agree that bureaucrats are relevant and important to the study of public policy, 
especially as implementers and shapers of policy outcomes.   Secondly, the case of school 
desegregation and the model allow for a test of the relationship between the political 
environment and public policy.  
 This dissertation is one of the few studies to explore and test a multi-theory, 
integrative framework of public policy at the local or organizational level.  I use theories of 
representative bureaucracy, institutional structure, and public management to construct 
the theoretical model because these particular bodies of literature all place a great deal of 
emphasis on local level actors and their relationship to policy development, 
implementation and outcomes. Yet, these literatures provide room for more exploration 
into how the political and policy environment shape such relationships.  The remaining 
sections of the chapter provide a brief overview of the multiple strands of theory with 
supporting literature on its effect on policy outcomes and a more developed discussion of 
the three part theory of desegregation.  
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Understanding Institutional Structure 
 Institutional structure includes the rules, boundaries, and limits of any organization 
or public institution that defines how the organization operates and makes policy 
decisions. Every happening of the organization is restricted and limited to these structural 
boundaries. “Structure is a major determinant of policy,” (Moe and Wilson 1994). The 
research on political control provides one point of view in examining the way that 
structure relates to policy decisions and outcomes. Scholars of this field note that political 
principals often use ex ante and ongoing controls to manipulate agencies’ structure in a 
way that accommodates their interests and reduces political drift while capitalizing on the 
technical competence of the agency (Bawn 1995; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1994). Moe and Wilson (1994) suggest that many of the struggles 
between the executive and legislative branches are over the structure of bureaucracy—its 
design, location, staffing, and the appropriate levels of control or power from both 
branches of government.  
 From a public administration or public management perspective, structure not only 
includes the statutes or rules that govern an organization and managerial strategy, but also 
indicates the level of stability in an organization’s relations (O’Toole and Meier 2011; 
Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004; Hill and Lynn 2005). Public managers and organizations may 
operate in central authority controlled, hierarchical systems or more decentralized, 
interdependent networked systems (Hill and Lynn 2005; Heinrich, Hill and Lynn 2004; 
O’Toole and Meier 2011). Such structural relationships define how an organization and its 
public manager flex their power via collaborations with other organizations, external 
stakeholders, or clients. O’Toole and Meier (2011) contend that managers use structures to 
regularize organizational actions (xii).  Structure also includes organizational form, 
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whether an organization is public, private, for-profit, or non-profit, in this body of 
literature (Hill and Lynn 2005).  
 As such, many studies on institutional structure focus on bodies of authority, those 
with the discretion and power to propose policy, oversee policy implementation and 
organizational evaluation, enact regulations and budgets, and establish the norms and 
values of an institution or organization. Empirical studies suggest that the structure under 
which governing authorities operate or impose on organizations can influence their 
leadership, policy decisions and the overall direction of an organization (Bawn 1995; Balla 
1998; Meier et al. 2005; Knott and Payne 2004). Structure has been linked to 
organizational performance, as well as variation in outcomes for particular groups (Knott 
and Payne 2004; Hicklin and Meier 2008; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Ellis, Hicklin, and 
Rocha 2009). Scholars also examine access to governing bodies through varying structures, 
finding some structures to be more equitable than others (Jones 1976; Welch 1990).    
 I focus on the electoral structure used in school districts to elected school board 
members to inform my understanding of institutional structure’s effect on education policy 
in general and the implications for school desegregation policy and minority student 
outcomes. Using electoral structure and school board elections to examine how 
institutional structure may affect desegregation policy and outcomes is important for 
several reasons. First, historical evidence indicates that manipulating electoral structures 
was a frequently used tactic to limit electoral representation and the benefits of 
representation for certain groups. Although Progressives argued that certain structures 
were used to promote democracy and ensure fair elections for all, many states and 
localities used them to circumvent the minority and poor vote and reduce their political 
power. School districts were no different; they too used structure to reduce minority 
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access.  The Voting Rights Act of 1965 made all forms of voting manipulation and 
disenfranchisement illegal. Most significant to this research, it forced many states and 
districts to redraw their district lines and change their electoral strategies to provide equal 
access to minorities. For many this meant moving to a single member district (SMD)/ward 
electoral system23. Lawmakers assumed that creating majority-minority districts would 
decrease voter dilution, increase the chances of minority candidates’ success, and lead to 
greater minority representation in Congress, on city-councils, and on school boards. Social 
scientists testing this logic have reached varying conclusions that are discussed in the 
coming sections.  
Second, school boards are possibly the most important school district actors to 
district policy and therefore, play a significant role in student outcomes and school success. 
Howell (2005) notes that school boards do not enjoy the total jurisdictional power they 
held in the early days of public education due to federal, state, local political intervention, 
as well as private interests. Nevertheless, school boards remain the official school district 
governing body. They frame and set the district’s policy agenda and are generally 
responsible for superintendent employment, curricula, budgeting and reform (Wirt and 
Kirst 1989; Allen and Plank 2005; Howell 2005).  School boards are also seen as the liaison 
between the community and professional educators. Community concerns about education 
are addressed through the school board (Allen and Plank 2005). On the other hand, the 
                                                 
23 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 states that state and local officials shall not adopt or maintain 
voting laws or procedures that purposefully discriminate based on race, color, or membership of a language 
minority.  In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled in Mobile v. Bolden that required plaintiffs to file suit and prove that 
the electoral standard, practice, or procedure was enacted or maintained to restrict racial minority opportunity 
in the political process. Shortly after in 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to include this language. The 1982 
amendment prohibits any voting practice or procedure. that leads to a discriminatory result, regardless of the 
intention. Plaintiffs must prove discrimination and harmful effects on minorities beyond the expectation of a 
harmful outcome (US Department of Justice 2013).  
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professional educators view the school board not only as their “boss,” but also the buffer 
between them and political influences and public discontent (Howell 2005).  
As such, understanding how people are elected to this highly salient governing 
body and the factors that influence this process is important for predicting school policies, 
functioning and outcomes—from administrative, faculty and staff outcomes to student 
performance. Any study of k-12 education policy is incomplete without a discussion of the 
school board, so I focus on board members’ system of election to explore desegregation 
policy and students’ outcomes under its varying contexts.  
About Electoral Structures 
Scholars acknowledge two main types of electoral structural systems—single-
member district (SMD) systems, also called wards, and at-large systems24.  In a SMD/ward 
system, school districts or communities are divided into geographic units, and 
representatives are elected from each individual borough to make up a complete, 
representative elected body (Rocha 2009).  Prior to the Progressive reform movement of 
the early twentieth century, SMD/ward elections were typically used for city council 
elections; however, reformists argued that this system was corrupt and less focused on the 
public good and more on private and individual goals (Lineberry and Fowler 1967). As a 
result, reformists supported the second type of electoral system—at-large. Members are 
                                                 
24 A third system, appointed systems, is mentioned in the literature, though less frequently because a smaller 
percentage of US school districts use this system. In appointed systems, the school board is nominated or 
selected by a superior individual to serve in the elected body. Appointive systems traditionally 
underrepresented minorities (Stewart, England and Meier 1989). However, research on Latino school board 
representation suggests that appointive systems can generate significantly large levels of representation for 
minorities (Meier and Stewart 1991; Leal, Martinez-Ebers and Meier 2004). The effect on African American 
representation also varies. Some scholars find that appointive systems can also be beneficial to African 
American representation on school boards, yielding greater representation than elective systems , particularly 
in  larger cities with sizable black populations  (Welch and Karnig 1978; Robinson and England 1981, but see  
Davidson and Korbel 1981; Karnig 1976; Fraga, Meier and Stewart 1986; Welch 1990).  
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elected from the totality of the county, district, or community in at-large systems. The 
reformists saw the at-large system as a way to “maximize representation of the city as a 
whole,” and meet their main goal to “‘rationalize’ and ‘democratize’ city government by the 
substitution of ‘community oriented’ leadership,” (Lineberry and Fowler 1967).   Ironically, 
at-large elections were also established to reduce the impact of socio economic cleavages 
and minority voting blocs in local politics.  Electoral systems were institutions created to 
serve as barriers against particularistic interests (Lineberry and Fowler 1967).  
Although the original principles and goals of the reformers were intended to be 
“inclusive,” at-large systems were only successful for those who could afford to participate 
and attract voters. The system had a dramatically negative effect on minorities who were 
subject to residential segregation and disenfranchisement laws; it limited their ability to 
gain descriptive representation. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 sought to alleviate the 
disparities in access to political representation and participation for African Americans. It 
was later expanded in 1975 to include Latinos, Native Americans, Native Alaskans, and 
Asian-Americans (Engstrom 1994). The act helped increase the number of minority elected 
officials through minority electorate expansion and a shift to SMD/ward elections. The shift 
in electoral system alleviated some of the institutional constraints of the at-large system 
such as voter dilution (Engstrom 1994).  
A substantial amount of literature has explored the extent to which electoral 
structure has been helpful in alleviating institutional political constraints for minorities as 
expected. Scholars are divided on the issue with some concluding that the SMD/ward 
electoral system is more favorable toward minority representation compared to an at-large 
electoral system (Meier and Stewart 1991; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Karnig 1976; Karnig 
and Welch 1982; Jones 1976), and others finding support for the at-large system being 
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equally beneficial to minorities (Fraga, Meier and Stewart 1986; Welch and Karnig 1978).  
A third sector of the literature finds that mixed systems, that is, electoral systems that use 
both at-large and SMD/ward elections, have a positive effect on minority representation 
(Welch 1990; Taebel 1978; MacManus 1978; Davidson and Korbel 1981), though Welch 
(1990) finds that minority representation through mixed systems is not as equitable as 
pure SMD/ward or at-large systems.  
More recent studies attempt to adjudicate the conflicting results, suggesting that  
the position minorities hold in a county or district’s total population best predicts the most 
advantageous system for the group  (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Marschall, 
Ruhil, and Shah 2010; Meier and Gonzalez-Juenke 2005). Marschall, Ruhil and Shah (2010) 
find that Blacks must make up at least 25 percent of the population to gain electoral 
representation under a SMD/ward system and 40 percent of the population under an at-
large system.  Alternatively, researchers find evidence of a double bias in electoral 
structures. Minorities gain less representation under an at-large system when they are the 
numerical minority in the district. However, when minorities are the majority in a school 
district, they use the at-large system to also gain representation; an at-large system is 
equally beneficial for minorities as a SMD/ward system, and in some cases more beneficial 
(Meier and Gonzalez-Juenke 2005). An at-large system holds a majoritarian bias toward 
any group that constitutes the majority of the population, termed an “at-large bias.” This 
means, theoretically, any electoral system is beneficial to racial minorities who comprise 
the numerical majority of the population.  The empirical research shows that this is often 
the case for both African American and Latino representation (Meier et al. 2005; Meier and 
Gonzalez-Juenke 2005).  
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Electoral Structure in Education  
Many scholars use the case of education to explore the relationship between 
electoral structure and minority representation, and the consequences of this 
representation for minority students. Polinard et al. (1994) and Stewart, England and 
Meier (1989) find that electing minorities to political positions is directly related to 
recruiting and hiring more minority bureaucrats. Meier et al. (2005) find similar results, 
with minorities elected through ward systems having a greater influence on the number of 
minority administrators in school districts compared to minorities elected through at-large 
systems. The effect has also been found to translate into more minority teachers, which has 
implications for other policies such as suspensions, dropout rates or assignment to specific 
courses (Meier et al. 2005; Meier and England 1984). Electoral structure also affects 
education finance. While Blacks fail to significantly improve expenditures for Black 
students under any structure, Latinos improve expenditures for Latino students under 
both systems (Ellis, Hicklin and Rocha 2009).  
On the other hand, research also indicates that structure can directly influence 
educational outcomes. Ellis, Hicklin and Rocha (2009), find that the general structure of 
SMD/ward systems is related to benefits for minority student, separate from minority 
school board representation. They show that structure can change the nature of equity in 
schools.  Ward systems promote racial and ethnic equity in public education expenditures, 
shifting the resource distribution toward minority students even when minority 
representation fails to produce greater expenditures for minority students.  
Outside of electoral systems studies, scholars also show that having a consolidated 
electoral structure also shapes school board representation and holds implications for 
educational governance and outcomes. Allen and Plank (2005) examine the effect that 
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consolidating school board elections with municipal elections or using special elections has 
on minority representation, contending that separate elections reduce democratic 
participation in school governance and those that participate in the separate school board 
elections are often not representative of the population at-large. They find that 
consolidated electoral structures do increase minority participation, while reducing low-
income participation. Special elections were associated with less electoral participation, 
and hence less democratic representation in school governance. Special elections allow 
school districts greater control over elections, and those elected through these systems 
were found to be less responsive to the public compared to those operating in a 
consolidated system (Allen and Plank 2005).   
The institutional structure literature provides a solid ground to root questions of 
school and student performance across various educational settings. Studies on electoral 
structure provide a pretty clear picture on “the why” and “the how” structure matters for 
student outcomes. The picture on the factors that influence this relationship, particularly 
the policy setting, is less clear. Consequently, the role of structure in the desegregation 
story is unknown.  How does structure act in an imbalanced educational environment? 
How does it operate in a racially balanced environment? And how does structure in each 
environment shape representation? What are the implications for students in these 
systems; do the benefits of ward elections transcend to students in racially segregated 
schools too? In sum, does institutional structure’s effect look different in a racially balanced 
environment versus an imbalanced environment and what are the implications for 
performance? The coming chapters tackle these questions.  
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Understanding Representative Bureaucracy 
 Political science scholars agree that representation matters when it comes to 
implementing public policies and distributing public goods and services to the citizenry 
(Miller and Stokes 1963; Pitkin 1967; Eulau and Karps 1977; Erikson 1978).  
Representation is a fundamental component of democracy.  It ensures that the will of the 
people is reflected in government. Public administration scholars take this a step further, 
however, and argue that representation matters in the electorate-determined government 
as well as the bureaucracy that supports elected officials in executing policies.  From this 
proposition emerges the theory of representative bureaucracy. Originally introduced to 
study the English Civil Service, the theory hinges on the idea that bureaucracies should be 
reflective of the dominant class in society and no group can be trusted if it is not reflective 
of such (Kingsley 1944; Krislov 1974). Scholars applying this theory to an American 
context held that bureaucracies should indeed be reflective of the citizenry, but 
demographically, not on class position alone (Levitan 1946; Long 1952; Van Riper 1958).  
Simply stated, scholars theorized that as the bureaucracy increases in demographic 
representativeness, it will also become more responsive to the public’s needs and demands 
because people with shared demographics tend to share values and interests through 
similar socialization processes and experiences. Bureaucrats are assumed to use these 
values in their discretionary decision making process (Selden 1997; Dolan and 
Rosenbloom 2003).  
Mosher (1968) expanded the base theory to include classifications of 
representation, similar to Pitkin’s (1967) classic work on political representation. He 
introduced the concepts of passive and active representation. Active representation 
involves bureaucrats advocating or “acting for” constituents’ interests, while passive 
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representation focuses on origins and demographic characteristics of bureaucrats and the 
degree to which they mirror the society—“standing for” a particular group (Mosher 1968). 
These two concepts have become the main tenants of studies on representative 
bureaucracy as many scholars agree there are substantive links between the two concepts.  
Consequently, much scholarship has focused on understanding the two concepts, their 
effects, their relationship to each other and the casual mechanisms responsible for their 
relationship.  
The Passive to Active Representation Link  
 Recall that the basic premise of the theory of representative bureaucracy is that 
passive representation is necessary or preferred in public bureaucracies because it affects 
the level of active representation—the distribution of goods and services to clients based 
on shared demographic based values and interests.  The relationship between these two 
concepts is highly debated in the literature, as some scholars find supporting evidence of 
this relationship (see Hindera 1993; Selden 1997; Bardbury and Kellough 2008; Wilkins 
and Keiser 2006), others contend that the relationship is conditional (see Hindera and 
Young 1998; Rosenthal and Bell 2003) and yet a third camp notes that the relationship 
does not exist, but instead supporters are finding “correlates” of the possible relationship 
and very little sound evidence of it (see Rehfuss 1986; Wilkins and Williams 2008, 2009; 
Lim 2006). Frank Thompson (1976) is perhaps one of the earliest critics of the contended 
relationship between the two concepts, and many scholars have taken his work to either 
defend the relationship or contest it also. His research highlights the potential barriers to 
active representation, yet contends that under certain circumstances these barriers may be 
broken in which passive representation can lead to active representation. Barriers to the 
passive to active representation link are broken when groups and institutions recognize 
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and “press” for minority interests; when issues hold obvious ramifications for one’s group; 
and there is employee mobilization, support and discretion (Thompson 1976).     
 Meier (1993a; 1993b) builds on Thompson and others’ arguments and suggests 
that several related conditions should be met for passive representation to actually 
transcend to active representation in a way that produces substantive outcomes. First, the 
bureaucrats should be integrated into positions that allow them to influence policy 
outcomes (Meier 1993b). Racial minorities or women should not be regulated to positions 
in the organization (i.e. clerical, maintenance and support) that prevent them from shaping 
policy outcomes. Second, organizational socialization must be minimal or at least 
supportive of representative behavior. In order to shape policy, bureaucrats must be able 
to use their personal values and beliefs to make decisions, separate from the organizational 
values they are expected to adopt. If the organization's values conflict with the 
demographic groups’ values, bureaucrats may act on the organizational values that they 
have adopted as their own instead of their natural demographic values when making policy 
decisions. Third, the agency must have jurisdiction over an area where policy outcomes can 
actually affect the represented group (i.e. social welfare, education). Finally, bureaucrats 
must have discretion in making decisions for the agency. Organizations in which 
bureaucrats have little to no discretion limit when and how bureaucrats may use their 
demographic values, and consequently, active representation is not likely to occur.  
Based on these conditions, education agencies are an ideal arena to test the theory 
of representative bureaucracy because education policy generally meets all of the noted 
conditions. Racial minorities are found at every juncture of school districts—from top level 
administration and governing boards to street level bureaucracy. Organizational 
socialization is minimal; education actors receive large amounts of professional 
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socialization, but less formal district-level socialization, leaving much room for 
demographic values and beliefs to permeate the organization. Education policy decisions at 
each level of a district are aimed at affecting students, including minority groups. Finally, 
every level of education agencies has a substantial amount of discretion in implementing 
policies.  As such, many scholars have used this theory to explain the relationship between 
administration representation and teacher representation, and teacher representation and 
student outcomes.   
Representative Bureaucracy in Education  
 Public administration scholars frequently use the case of education to test the 
theory of representative bureaucracy, particularly in the implementation of school policies. 
Many have found that representation is a positive predictor of student success. Minority 
students educated in schools with greater percentages of minority teachers experience 
greater performance outcomes (Weiher 2000; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Meier 
and Stewart 1991).  When female math teachers teach female students, they help to 
improve girls’ math performance (Keiser et al. 2002).  Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) 
find that minority teacher representation also has a significant effect on grouping and 
tracking decisions. Having minority teachers decreases the likelihood that a minority 
student is tracked into special education, increases his/her chances of being recommended 
for gifted courses, and reduces the likelihood he/she receives the most severe form of 
discipline. They conclude that greater levels of minority representation affect this process 
because minority teachers share the same experiences, interests and goals as minority 
parents and students.    
 Although education scholars may not always base their studies in representative 
bureaucracy theory explicitly, their theoretical arguments and research findings support 
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the theory and corroborate public administration scholars’ works. They show that pairing 
students with teachers of a shared gender or race has a positive effect on students’ 
academic achievement (Klopfenstein 2005; Evans 1992; Dee 2005, but see Farkas et al. 
1990; Ehrenberg and Brewer 1995) They are more likely to take more challenging 
academic courses under a same race or opposite gender teacher (Klopfenstein 2005); more 
likely to have better work habits, and better attendance records (Farkas et al 1990). Some 
attribute the findings to the “role model effect,” in which same race, ethnicity, or gender 
teachers provide an example of the benefits to education for students, prompting students 
to alter their prior beliefs, increase their enthusiasm, confidence, and effort to perform 
better academically (Klopfenstein 2005; Dee 2004; Dee 2005). Under this model, it is 
assumed that teachers expect more and take more of an interest in mentoring students 
with a shared demographic also helping to improve their overall performance (Dee 2004).   
 Others consider the cultural similarities that co-ethnic teachers and students share 
that allow teachers to reach students better (Ladson-Billings 1994; Goldsmith 2004). The 
teachers are either able to relate and sympathize with the students’ racial and/or class 
background or more effectively use cultural references and history to develop the 
knowledge and skills necessary to improve student performance (Ladson-Billings 1994; 
Goldsmith 2004). Here, the assumption is that students learn more and better when their 
home and school environments match. Same-race or same-gender teachers provide this 
“cultural congruence” (Ferguson 1998; Howard 2001).  Beyond the representative 
bureaucracy frame, education scholars highlight the credibility that a shared demographic 
provides a teacher in shaping outcomes for co-ethnic or co-gender students. 
 The education benefits of representation are not restricted to a teacher-student 
relationship, however.  Research indicates that street level bureaucrats have perhaps the 
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largest effect on student performance, but upper level bureaucrats can also influence 
outcomes and district policies and decisions. Having minority representation on school 
boards and having minority superintendents or principals is related to positive outcomes 
for minority students and an increase in minority focused policies and programs (Leal and 
Hess 2000; Theobald 2007;Rocha and Wrinkle 2011).  School districts with larger 
proportions of Latino school board representatives are more responsive to limited-English 
proficient (LEP) students’ needs. These districts allocate more aid for English language 
learners (ELL) teachers and designate more of these teachers to bilingual education 
programs (Leal and Hess 2000; Theobald 2007, but see  Robinson 2002). The same effect 
holds for Latino superintendents (Theobald 2007). Rocha and Wrinkle (2011) take these 
findings one step further and find that having Latina representation improves support for 
bilingual education and other Latino centered programs at a rate higher than simply having 
any Latino representative.  Greater levels of African American and Latino school board 
representation are associated with the hiring of more African American and Latino school 
administrators and teachers (Rocha 2007; Fraga, Meier, and England 1986).   
 Like the institutional structure research, the representative bureaucracy literature 
also provides a solid ground to root questions of school and student performance across 
various educational settings. This research on representative bureaucracy theory in public 
education provides us with a plethora of examples of how, why, and when it works and 
matters for students. It proves that the theory is pretty solid in predicting bureaucrat-client 
relationships and outcomes. However, will these findings hold when the policy 
environment is considered? That is, how much of the past findings of representational 
effects are dependent on policy environment in which it occurs, and how might the policy 
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environment alter or shape policy outcomes? The theoretical framework developed in this 
chapter considers this. 
Understanding Public Management 
Public management is a diverse and fragmented theory of academic and 
practitioner wisdom and experience with a primary goal of informing public managers of 
effective actions toward making government work (Bozeman 1993).  Most scholars agree 
that the discipline is defined by a few character features that unite much of the public 
management literature such as the focus on upper level management25, case study design26, 
and managerial behavior (Kettl 1993, 58).  However, the central research question of 
public management studies—the relationship between political strategies, policy 
implementation, and program results—defines the study of public management. The 
question makes public management very useful in the study of public policy, particularly 
the implementation and outcome dimensions.  
Similar to the research on representative bureaucracy theory, public 
administration and public management scholars examine the unique factors, strategies, 
and techniques of public managers and often public organizations to understand how and 
                                                 
25
 There is a more recent emphasis in the literature on the multiple levels of management that also make a 
difference in policy implementation and organizational performance. Scholars show that middle management 
decision making is just as important to organization’s implementation and policy outcomes as upper level 
management (Johansen 2012; Morgan et al. 1996).  A wave of research also holds the competing position that 
middle management is not very beneficial to organizations and is a source of conflict. Theories rooted in 
organizational theory and human resource management suggest that street level bureaucrats or localized 
employees are more productive and satisfied when they are more directly connected and responsible for the 
conditions of organizational success and production (Peters and Waterman 1982; Cohen and Brand 1993). 
Research in the government reform movement also hold the position that middle managers are costly, 
dysfunctional , and are less relevant as the government shifts its focus from producing goods to contracting out 
and managing goods’ production (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  
 
26 Many scholars have moved beyond the case study approach to quantitatively predict behavior and 
management using sophisticated models of management behavior, best practices, and effectiveness in moving 
the discipline beyond observational studies (O’Toole and Meier 1999; Heinrich 2000).   
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why polices are implemented and the results of this implementation process. This research 
is particularly useful in learning about policy success and failure. As such, much of their 
work centers on the manager. The collective works consistently indicate management as a 
fundamental factor of organizational functioning, policy implementation, and policy 
outcomes (Boyne 2003; Lynn et al. 2001; Rainey 2009). Scholars note that everything from 
a manager’s specific techniques or tools of management, to one’s personal traits and 
behaviors matter in managing an effective and productive organization. They contend that 
it is a manager’s ability to motivate and lead subordinates, network with stakeholders and 
external actors for resources and information or buffer the organization from external 
constraints that allows them to shape an organization’s performance and outcomes 
(Lieberson and O’Conner 1972; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Meier and O’Toole 2001).   
Public Management in Public Education  
Public management researchers suggest that managers affect policies and 
outcomes to a greater extent at the local level than at any other level of government (Kettl 
1993, 63). As such, many of the large-n analyses of public management and organizational 
outcomes are based in local governing systems such as public education. School districts 
have proven to be an ideal setting for answering public management questions and 
observing the public management and public policy connection for several reasons. First, 
they are the largest US service providers, serving nearly 50 million students nationally 
based on Fall 2012 enrollment estimates (National Center for Education Statistics 2012).  
They are designed as independent “governments” intended to restrict external government 
and political influence (Tyack 1974; Meier and O’Toole 2001). However, a range of other 
actors and voices—from political to social service—influence much of what school districts 
do. Second, school districts are managed organizations that engage in the policy process. 
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The school board serves as the overarching governing board that oversees policy, but 
school superintendents serve as upper level managers in the district responsible for 
implementing the school board’s policies and making policy suggestions to the governing 
board based on their interactions with subordinates. Superintendents operate a central 
office, as well as the set of schools within the district. They are responsible for overseeing 
the function of this office and every school in the district. School principals act as middle 
managers—semi-autonomous managers of their individual schools with control and 
oversight over the teachers, or local street-level bureaucrats within their school. They 
assist superintendents in managing the individual schools. Both superintendents and 
school principals yield a substantial amount of discretion in implementing policy, making 
them optimal candidates for empirical studies on policy implementation and evaluation.  
Finally, school districts are perhaps the most frequently evaluated public 
organizations. Current federal education policies require school districts to evaluate 
schools’ and the district’s overall performance annually across subpopulations. As such, the 
policies school boards enact, managers implement, and street level bureaucrats execute are 
constantly measured, assessed, and provide a plethora of data on outcome indicators for 
researchers of the policy process and policymakers.  
Public management scholars have found that a range of managerial factors are 
positively related to student performance. For example, Meier and O’Toole (2001) show 
that a manager’s networking behavior, that is, the frequency in which they interact with 
school district and community actors, is positively related to improvements in student 
performance. Students perform about four percentage points higher on the Texas state 
achievement test under a manager who networks more frequently. Scholars also find that 
superintendents who adopt a proactive managerial style, that is, actively seeking to 
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preemptively control outcomes, versus a reactive style also help to improve student 
performance (Goerdel 2005). Superintendents of higher quality, as assessed by any 
additional compensation beyond a one’s base pay, also help to improve students’ 
performance (Meier and O’Toole 2002).  In sum, public managers play an important role in 
student achievement and success.  
Educational leadership and administration scholars hold a similar contention, 
finding that education managers—superintendents and school principals—not only 
execute policy directives from the school board, but they also work to directly affect 
student achievement and performance (Marks and Printy 2003; Eberts and Stone 1988; 
Brewer 1993). The educational leadership work shows that specific  management or 
leadership behaviors and traits influence student performance (Eberts and Stone 1988; 
Friedkin and Slater 1994; Grissom and Loeb 2011, but see Hallinger, Bickman and Davis 
1996); that specific leadership styles have a greater effect on student performance than 
others (Robinson, Lloyd, and Rowe 2008; Brewer 1993); and that particular leadership 
characteristics such as one’s gender influence the manner in which one leads and 
consequently alters student performance (Hallinger and Murphy 1985; Hallinger, Bickman 
and Davis 1996). Linkages between a principal’s level of experience as a principal, a 
teacher, or experience in a particular school and improvements in student performance 
have been established in the education literature as well (Eberts and Stone 1988; Brewer 
1993). Brewer’s (1993) research also indicates an indirect relationship between school 
principals and student performance; they influence outcomes through teacher 
appointments and academic oriented goal setting. Schools with principals holding more 
leverage of teacher employment and campus goals experience an increase in student 
performance from 10th grade to 12th grade (Brewer 1993).  
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These collective bodies of literature emphasize the importance of understanding 
how and why public managers matter in general and specifically to public education. The 
research provides much evidence that public managers are vital to student performance 
and can greatly alter their level of success, but do these managers have the same effect 
when addressing challenging policies or in challenging policy environments? Are they able 
to also manage these situations to help student performance or provide resources to 
teachers and students? Does management have the same effect on students when it 
operates in a racially imbalanced environment as when it operates in a racially balanced 
environment?  
Conclusion  
The above literature highlights a few things that will help this exploration into why 
the levels of desegregation efforts and attempts to maintain racial balance in schools vary 
across individual campuses and districts, and the implications of variations in racial 
balance for education policies, teacher and administrative behavior, and student 
performance.  
First, the literature on institutional structure with a specific emphasis on electoral 
structures indicates that the structural rules and policies that determine how an 
organization will be governed and who will govern it matter for organizational decisions 
and outcomes. Electoral structures have long been investigated as a deterrent to minority 
representation; however, the more recent work illustrates that the bias of structure is not 
against racial minorities per say, but against any group in a numerical minority (Jones 
1976; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Meier and Gonzalez-Juenke 2005; Meier et al. 2005).  
Institutional structures play a significant role in determining who governs and 
consequently which policies are pursued, how the policies are designed and implemented, 
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and the outcomes that follow. The first puzzle to understanding local desegregation 
policies and its consequences is to consider the varying structures and their policy 
environments that can potentially lead to significant variation in the policy process across 
school districts.   
Second, the representative bureaucracy literature provides a substantive amount of 
evidence that beyond the rules and structural norms, “people matter.” That is, one’s local 
administrators, leaders, and street level bureaucrats play an important role in district 
governance, policy decisions, and inevitably policy outcomes and outputs. However, these 
people do not simply matter due to their position in the organization or the function they 
may serve; they also matter on a personal, demographic dimension (Long 1952; Van Riper 
1958; Selden 1997; Keiser et al. 2002).  Representing a range of demographics in an 
organization translates into representing and serving a range of interests that may not 
have been recognized without a change in organizational representation. Therefore, 
another piece of the puzzle to understanding local desegregation policies—or even policies 
in general—and the consequences of such policies for students across demographic groups 
is to consider the demographic nature of a school district. The demographic makeup of 
one’s district and/or schools via local bureaucrats and administrators presents an 
opportunity for changes in policy decisions, implementation, and outcomes that reflect the 
diverse policy environment.  
Finally, the public management literature offers another vantage of considering 
how and why “people matter” in this desegregation picture. Broadly, the literature notes 
that public managers are essential to the functioning of an organization as the chief 
implementers. The management literature, especially the more recent studies that seek to 
explain how and why “management matters” to public organizations, has spent a great deal 
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of time explaining the role and significance of public managers, exploring their decision 
making process and actions, and finally quantifying this decision making process, their 
behaviors, and the consequences for public organizations. An overwhelming amount of 
evidence suggests that indeed “management matters;” therefore, it seems highly relevant 
to see if and how management matters to this desegregation puzzle. Public managers may 
also use their policy implementation decisions and behaviors to influence the policy 
environment in a way that produces different outcomes across policy settings. In sum, the 
established literature on institutional structure, representative bureaucracy, and public 
management provide a solid basis for understanding how bureaucrats affect policy and 
policy outcomes. I use these literatures to develop a theory of desegregation policy through 
bureaucratic action and policy environments, and examine the implication of these actions 
for students under settings of varying levels of racial balance.   
The Tri-Part Theory of School Desegregation  
The Theoretical Model and Its Components 
 I construct a three part, integrative theory to predict a district’s decision to pursue 
racially balanced schools as an indication of maintaining or establishing a desegregation 
policy. Because this project focuses heavily on non-political actors’ role in shaping policy 
decisions and outcomes, I build upon studies of bureaucrats. Other scholars taking an 
integrative approach to answering challenging policy questions also note the role of 
bureaucrats and public managers in developing and implementing public policy (Hicklin 
and Godwin 2009; Howlett 2011; Kingdon 1984). This provides some supporting evidence 
to the validity of this approach in addressing policymaking via “non-policymakers” and 
addressing the questions of desegregation policy. Secondly, the various sectors of literature 
each indicate that bureaucrats and public managers are highly salient to public policy; 
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therefore, it is imperative to use them as a lens for investigating the research questions. 
Finally, school desegregation policy has always been a locally implemented policy, and in 
more recent years has become a locally decided policy in which the local education leaders 
decide not only the implementation process, but also the policy’s overall fate.  
Phase 1: The Determinants of Desegregation Policy  
The theory aims to explain two parts or phases of the current desegregation policy. 
First, it explores why differences in the pursuit of the policy occur across school districts. In 
other words, why are some schools desegregating while others are resegregating? Here, I 
argue that bureaucratic actions drive this process. There are a set of institutional, 
structural, and management factors that best explains why some school districts seek to 
achieve racial balance through desegregation policies, while others do not. In this section, I 
outline the main tenants of the argument and present an overview of the findings for first 
phase of this dissertation project. All empirical results are included in Appendix A. Phase 1 
provides groundwork research on which the more extensive and focal second phase of the 
dissertation project is based. It establishes the predictors of racially balanced educational 
settings, while the second phase pushes these findings to explore the consequences of 
racial balance and imbalanced educational settings for minority students. More specifically, 
the second phase of research, discussed in more detail in future sections of this chapter, 
poses the question, “If institutional, structural, and management factors can predict the fate 
of desegregation polices, how does the policy environment affect the predictors and what are 
the consequences for students? “ Phase 2 essentially looks at the relationship between the 
policy environment and bureaucratic actions to predict education policies and student 
performance.  
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 The three factors—institutional, structural, and management—used to predict the 
level of racial balance in school districts are considered for a few reasons. First, the 
literature suggests that the factors are solid predictors of individual stages of the policy 
process. Institutional factors like representation shape the implementation and outcome 
phases; structural factors establish the rules of the process; and management also shapes 
the implementation and outcomes stages of the policy process.  Assuming past findings are 
correct, one may also expect the factors to successfully predict the outcome of 
desegregation policy—more racially balanced schools or imbalanced schools. 
  Second, as outlined and discussed above, the mid theory literatures from which 
this model is drawn provides substantive evidence of these factors mattering a great deal 
for policy outcomes, particularly at a local level. Minority representation has been shown 
to have the greatest effect at bureaucratic level (Meier 1993b; Roch et al. 2010). 
Institutional structure’s effect on outcomes and polices has also traditionally been studied 
at the local level with implications at other levels of government. Public management, 
typically tested at the organizational or “unit” level, has shown a positive effect at multiple 
levels of government, including the local level. If these collective literatures are correct, 
these findings may also hold consistently for the policy outcome of racially balanced 
schools, used in this context as an indication of a district’s efforts toward racially 
desegregated schools. The model, shown in Figure 3.1, suggests that the racial balance of a 
school district is a function of the local representation, a district’s institutional structure, 
and the management of that district.  
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Figure 3.1: Theoretical Model of the Determinants of Desegregation Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
However, one reason we might not expect these predictors to work as well in 
predicting the level of racial balance in a district is the stronger predictive power of other 
confounding factors such as the level of residential segregation in a community or school 
district. Residential segregation makes it very difficult for school districts to manipulate the 
racial composition of their schools, particularly when neighborhood schooling is the 
general policy.  A second reason may be the unobserved influence of state government. 
Many state governments have also moved away from focusing on the racial balance of 
schools to other issues. Their power to pass laws and directives on education policy may 
reflect this shift in focus and effortlessly restrict the amount of time, funding, and effort 
local districts may place into racially balancing their schools. Finally, local school districts 
may have shifted their focus from racial balance to other means of equality such a bilingual 
education, accountability though test scores, and special programs.   
 Although the theoretical model is organized as an additive relationship among the 
non-policy making bodies and the level of racial balance of a school district, I examine each 
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factor’s effect individually. The subsequent sections further explain how each factor relates 
to desegregation27 and the differing effects they have on the racial balance of school 
districts.  
Institutional Structure 
 The electoral structure under which a representative is elected can have a direct 
effect on one’s understanding and view of representation. Representatives elected under 
an at-large system may represent differently from those elected under a ward/SMD system 
because their constituent base and perceived responsibilities differ. Representatives 
elected under a ward electoral system can represent more narrow interests, those that 
appeal to the ward’s majority electorate. On the other hand, those elected under an at-large 
system must represent the interests of the entire locality because their electorate is drawn 
from all possible voters. Consequently, the policies that each representative proposes, 
supports, and implements differ.  
 For minority representatives, this means that being elected through an at-large 
system may provide less room or opportunity to propose policies that are beneficial to 
minorities or represent their more narrow interests, especially when they fail to make up a 
plurality or the majority of the locality’s total population.  An at-large elected minority may 
have to downplay minority salient issues to appeal to the median voter and majority 
constituents in an effort to remain in office (Meier, Walker and Walker 2008; but see 
Guinier 1991). However, being elected through a ward system may provide some 
advantages to minority interests outside of simply gaining descriptive representation. The 
                                                 
27
 Ideal analysis of this question would include a direct measure of a district’s desegregation policy or plan; 
however, the current research uses the outcome of policy—the racial composition of schools in a district—as a 
proxy to a district’s desegregation policy or plan. This practice is consistent with the past and current research 
investigating the effect of school desegregation policies (or lack of) on student achievement and various 
outcome measures  (see Rivkin 2000; Card and Rothstein 2007 for examples). 
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potential for substantive representation is higher under such a system because actively 
seeking to represent minority interests and interests of that specific region in the locality 
only helps the representative’s chances of being re-elected. Therefore, minority 
representatives elected through a SMD/ward system emphasize and put more effort into 
maintaining racial balance in their schools as a minority interest compared to at-large 
elected members responsible for representing majority interests that expand beyond the 
narrow focus of racial minority interests, especially when racial minorities are the 
numerical minority of a district. 
Empirical research, however, shows that minorities actually benefit from 
representation through an at-large system over a ward/SMD system (see Appendix A). 
School districts in which the minority representatives are elected through an at-large 
electoral structure are more racially balanced28. This seems to indicate that one way of 
changing the racial balance of school districts is through the election of minority 
representatives with enough power to make desegregation more than a “ward” or 
“minority” issue, but to present it as a district-wide issue that serves multiple interests. 
Minorities elected through an at-large system are able to do this.  
Representation  
Having substantial minority representation among education bureaucrats to 
convey the interest of racially balanced schools that they share with minority parents, 
community members, and students is another way to alter the level of racial balance in a 
district. Having passive representation in a bureaucracy often shapes an organization’s 
values in a way that includes the interests, preferences, and ideals of previously 
                                                 
28 Electoral structure has no significant effect on the level of racial balance between White and Latino students.  
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underrepresented groups.  As the values of the bureaucracy changes with the added 
representation, the policy agenda and development also change to reflect this shift. 
Additionally, having this representation at multiple levels of a bureaucracy—upper, 
middle, and street-level—provides the power and discretion necessary to substantively 
represent minority interests. Varying discretion and power levels is likely to alter the 
extent to which a bureaucrat is a representative and the effect this representation has on 
policy and outcomes. 
The empirical findings indicate that representation does affect the racial balance of 
a district; however, it does not help to improve the level of racial balance. Instead, 
increases in African American teacher and administrator representation are related to 
decreases in the level of racial balance in a school district29. Additionally, the level at which 
representation occurs has a negative effect on the racial balance of a district, though the 
magnitude of the effect is magnified as expected. These findings provide little support for 
the contention of representation being a predictor of desegregation and are likely 
indicating where minority teachers and administrators represent larger proportions of the 
faculty. Nevertheless, the findings leave room for more theoretical exploration into why 
representation matters less at this stage and when it is more likely to matter in helping to 
affect the racial balance of schools or other policies for students.  
Public Management  
 Finally, the management of an organization affects how policies are implemented 
and the resulting outcomes of the implementation process.  Public managers play a 
significant role in shaping the success of public policies. Their leadership style, 
                                                 
29 Latino teacher and administrator representation fails to have a significant effect on the level of racial balance 
for Latino students. 
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management behaviors, and the role adopted all alter policy decisions; they dictate how 
policies are viewed, decided and implemented, and therefore also shape the overall success 
of policies in the organization. Similarly, public managers, or school administrators in this 
context, can also influence the outcome of racial balancing efforts in one’s district. Through 
their leadership, unique strategies, or particular behaviors such as networking and internal 
management, managers are able to get difficult policies such as desegregation on the 
district’s agenda, gain community and staff support for it, or protect the schools and 
district from any external challenges to the policy.  A manager that is able to increase the 
salience of desegregation, able to gain support for pursuing and maintaining racial balance, 
and buffer any external challenges to the policy, is likely to have a more racially balanced 
school or district. 
 Results (see Appendix A) show that some of a principal’s management behaviors—
networking with the external actors and managing the internal workings of one’s school—
are related to a more racially balanced school. This suggests that another way to improve 
the racial balance of imbalanced schools is through the hiring or training of public 
managers to manage better internally and externally, and to collaborate with others on the 
issue directly. Adopting an advocate role to address minority issues has no affect on the 
racial balance of one’s school. Being simply an advocate is not enough to enact real change. 
 
Phase 2: Evaluating Desegregation Policies through Bureaucratic Actions and Policy 
Environments  
The hallmark of this dissertation project is evaluating policy and performance 
outcomes under racially segregated and desegregated school districts. The first portion of 
this research (see Appendix A) establishes that institutional structure, representation, and 
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public management matter to a limited and varied extent in predicting the racial 
composition of schools. Although these factors may shape the process toward more 
desegregated schools, the reality remains that for many school districts, racial imbalance is 
and will remain the norm in its schools. Changing their level of bureaucratic 
representation, adopting alternative management strategies, or altering the electoral 
structure to improve representation is likely not enough to convince such school districts 
that pursuing racially balanced schools is worthwhile and important to improving their 
district’s success. For such districts, a deeper analysis of the consequences to racially 
imbalanced schools for the entire organization may be more convincing.  Realizing this and 
the theoretical importance of investigating policy environments, I pose the second stage of 
research questions: what are the implications of differences in the level of racial balance for 
student performance and outcomes when the predictors are considered? In other words, are 
students better off in racially segregated or desegregated schools?  Here the focus is less on 
predicting where desegregated education is likely to occur and why, and more on how 
desegregated education differs from segregated education and why they differ. The 
literature and findings of the first phase indicate that representation, structure, and 
management loosely matter for predicting desegregation and student performance 
outcomes. Based on those findings, I theorize and examine how the previously tested 
predictors matter across different policy environments and the consequences for policies 
and organizational outcomes. In sum, the practical questions of the chapters as they relate 
to the theoretical model are: does institutional structure perform the same, yielding the 
same outcomes suggested in the traditional literature and empirically shown above? Do 
bureaucrats represent the same way in segregated settings versus desegregated settings? 
And management, does it look different in these two settings? These questions are rooted 
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in the organizational theory and behavior literature. Organizational theorists who study 
the relationship between organizations and their environments argue that organizational 
functioning and outputs are largely a function or consequence of the environment and its 
contingencies and constraints (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Scott and Meyer 1983; Oliver 
1997; Thompson 1967). In other words, they contend that the governance of organizations 
is mainly external. Organizations develop and implement policies in response to their 
policy environments, and their outcomes are reflective of the environmental influence. In 
essence, organizations are puppets of the external environment. I take a similar approach 
to public education organizations, realizing that they too are largely a function of internal 
workings at the hand of external influence. I argue the policy environment in which locally 
elected officials, bureaucrats, and public managers operate plays a significant role in the 
manner in which they establish and make policy decisions, implement policy, and the 
outputs and outcomes produced. Consequently, district policies, behaviors, and outcomes 
may be more so a reflection of the policy environment versus the independent effect of 
structure, representation, or public management. By comparing these previously tested 
factors of school desegregation in racially balanced and imbalanced districts, I am able to 
not only explore the role of external control in public policy, but also demonstrate the 
unique differences of the two settings. In each empirical chapter, I probe the relationship 
between the policy environment and a policy factor—institutional structure, bureaucratic 
representation, or public management—and the implications for this relationship for 
student outcomes. 
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Figure 3.2 Theoretical Model of the Evaluation of Desegregation Policies through 
Bureaucratic Actions and Policy Environments 
 
 
  
 
  
 Lacking from the organizational theory research is clear guidance on the direction 
in which policy environment influence may shape the tested factors and what this 
translates into for student outcomes. In other words, it is unclear from the research if 
externally controlled policy factors and policies are likely to have a positive or negative 
effect on policy outcomes. Similarly, it is unclear from this work if we should expect one 
type of policy environment, (i.e. a racially balanced school district) to have a more positive 
or negative effect on the tested factors and student outcomes. However, research on the 
racial composition of schools and its effect on student achievement provide some reason to 
expect a more racially balanced district to be more advantageous for student outcomes and 
a more positive policy environment for the examined factors. Scholars note that racially 
balanced school districts tend to have more experienced teachers, greater resources, more 
advanced courses, and higher achievement and attainment levels for minority students 
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(Southworth and Michelson 2007; Goldsmith 2009; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). 
Nevertheless, this dissertation project focuses less on making a solid, a priori claim for or 
against one type of school district and more on demonstrating the policy environment 
differences, the implications of these differences for structure, bureaucratic representation, 
public management, and ultimately student outcomes. Such an investigation will provide a 
better understanding of the pros and cons of school desegregation and how students fare 
under both educational settings.  
Substantively, the research questions of this phase fit into the larger discussion of 
school accountability and closing the achievement gap between minorities and Whites. 
Under the current public education accountability model, students are expected to learn 
and meet achievement goals irrespective of their environment. The research questions put 
this model to the test. No indication of observable differences in student performance and 
policies between racially balanced and imbalanced schools and districts will provide 
support for the model’s contention and will indicate to some degree that the setting in 
which one learns and the resources or barriers that accompany that setting matter less for 
closing the achievement gap than expected. If students learn and perform equally well in 
racially segregated districts as balanced districts, then perhaps moving into the vision of 
the current accountability model is correct. Opposite findings in which there are 
observable differences may indicate the flaws of the current accountability model and a 
need to refocus its emphasis to include the level of racial balance and students’ learning 
environments.  
The Effect of Policy Environment on Institutional Structure and Representation  
 The first empirical chapter builds from previous findings that related the 
interactive effect between electoral structure and representation to the racial balance of 
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school districts. The previous results provide some evidence that structure manipulates the 
way in which school board members represent, but two things are not clear. First, does this 
effect influence other policy outcomes such as teacher representation or student 
performance?  Past research suggests that ward systems promote equality (Ellis, Hicklin 
and Rocha 2009) and administrator and teacher representation is increased under 
minority school board members elected under a particular system(Stewart, England and 
Meier 1989), yet the research linking this representation directly to students is limited (but 
see Meier, Stewart and England 1989). Second, how do the previous findings hold in a 
varying policy environments? Other research fails to acknowledge the significant role of 
the environment in shaping the internal workings of an organization and its outcomes. In 
this chapter I look to see if the interactive effect between structure and representation 
changes with the policy environment.  
 Why might the previously observed relationships and outcomes differ when the 
policy environment is considered? Theorists of organizations and external control suggest 
that organizational structures are externally defined. Organizations adopt institutional 
structures that reflect the expectations, rules, regulations, and interests of their policy 
environment to gain legitimacy, support, prestige, and to maintain or earn resources. Each 
of these factors adds to the organization’s ultimate goal of increasing its probability of 
survival (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987; Oliver 1997).  In this chapter, I adopt this 
knowledge to predict the structure most likely to be adopted in racially balanced and 
imbalanced districts, structure’s conditional effect on school board representation, and 
then how the policy environment shapes structure and representation’s effect on policy 
outcomes. I develop a series of hypotheses to test the differences and similarities in racially 
balanced and imbalanced districts, while also demonstrating its potential effect on 
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minority representation and outcomes. This chapter also allows me to probe how well 
students are being represented and likely to fare under each policy environment. 
Theoretically, the chapter adds to the established research on electoral structures in its 
attempt to offer an alternative explanation for past inconsistent findings.  
Minority Representation under Varying Policy Environments 
In the second empirical chapter, I dissect representative bureaucracy’s previous 
findings to consider how representation changes when the environmental context of policy 
decisions is considered.  The first section suggested that representation may not work as 
expected to improve the racial balance of a district; however, past scholars have shown 
that representation is beneficial to student outcomes. The results coupled with the past 
literature seem to suggest that perhaps representation matters less for the overall makeup 
of the school, but its energy and emphasis does matter for the internal happenings of the 
school. I look at the effectiveness of minority bureaucrats, in this case teachers, in creating 
an equal, less discriminatory policy environment for racial minority students through the 
grouping and tracking policies in racially balanced and imbalanced school systems. Meier, 
Stewart, and England (1989) and Meier and Stewart (1991) demonstrate that African 
American and Latino teachers help reduce the rate in which Black and Latino students are 
grouped into lower academic tracks (i.e. special education) and receive harsher discipline. 
They also show that minority students are more likely to be recommended for more 
advanced academic courses in such settings. Additionally, minority student performance is 
significantly improved in districts and schools with greater amounts of minority teacher 
representation (Weiher 2000; Dee 2005). The goal of this chapter is to push the theory of 
representative bureaucracy and see if the previous findings hold across varying policy 
settings.  
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The chapter uses the open systems theory research of organizational theory to 
explain when and why minority representation in racially balanced and imbalanced 
districts are likely to be the same or at least similar, and when the two policy environments 
are likely to diverge. I contend that when the policy environment strongly dominates the 
organization, minority representatives will represent according to the dictates of their 
policy environment.  As the education literature suggests, differences between racially 
balanced and imbalanced districts are likely to lead them to diverge in policy; 
representation will differ; and student outcomes based on the representation will also 
differ.  However, when organizations are able to leverage even a small amount of 
autonomy, particularly at the street-level, minority bureaucrats may use this flexibility to 
advocate for minority policy interests and equity. Given the representative bureaucracy 
findings on minority bureaucratic behavior, we might expect this response in either policy 
environment—racially balanced or imbalanced districts.   The chapter tests for both 
arguments to give a deeper understanding of representative bureaucracy research and also 
probe where students are faring better in terms of school equity.  
Managing the Constraints  
 The final empirical chapter moves the focus to the management level and considers 
how public education managers—school principals in this case—handle different policy 
environments. The chapter builds on the previous chapter’s findings to investigate the final 
level of local governance that the environment may shape. Like the previous chapters, I use 
the organizational theory literature to understand how the environment influences 
managers and public organizations, but I also center this research in a set of studies on 
managers’ specific actions in influencing the functioning, operation, and success of public 
organizations to understand their potential responses to their policy environment and its 
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imposed constraints. This chapter deviates from the previous formats because it focuses 
less on demonstrating how and why policy environments influence public management, 
and more on managerial response to the environment; the environment’s effect is taken as 
a known, established fact of the literature in this chapter.  
 Public management literature has shown that public managers often deal with 
constraints in two fashions—they exploit them, that is, they use them to benefit the 
organization, or they buffer them to protect the impact on the organizations (Thompson 
1967; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Honig 2009).  This chapter looks to managerial style—
a manager’s collective leadership practices, management practices, and strategies—to 
explain how managers respond to  varying policy environments, particularly those that 
may not be buffered or exploited, and why public managers respond differently. I contend 
that style determines how a manager views constraints, the decisions related to them, the 
implementation process, and the resulting consequences for organizational performance. 
The analysis of this chapter centers on showing that managers handle “fixed” constraints 
differently and these differences lead to different outcomes for students.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter outlines the collective theories used in one of the first three–part, 
integrative theories of school desegregation policy. It dissects the literature on institutional 
(electoral) structure; introduces and summarizes representative bureaucracy theory; and 
highlights public management’s contributions to policy research, particularly in education 
policy. The three-part theory of school desegregation explains why we should expect these 
factors—representation, structure, and management—to have a significant, but possibly 
different effect on students according to their school environment. It proposes that these 
factors matter a great deal for school desegregation policy and are likely to matter for 
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public policy in general. The theory also explains how these factors matter and why they 
matter differently under a segregated and desegregated setting. In the coming chapters, I 
test the theoretical model’s components through an examination of student performance 
measures and grouping and tracking indicators. Student performance and tracking 
variables allow me to test the robustness of this theory for student achievement and 
student and racial equity. It also allows me to test our knowledge and prior understanding 
of why desegregated education mattered for minority students and possibly to 
demonstrate its continual importance. The landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision 
was rooted in the assumption that minority students would receive more equitable 
opportunities and consequently better outcomes in racially balanced schools. In the next, 
chapter I explore if this assumption holds and how electoral structures and school board 
representation affects this process.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF POLICY ENVIRONMENT ON INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND 
REPRESENTATION  
 “[Institutional] structure is a major determinant of policy,” (Moe and Wilson 1994). 
Empirical research provides solid evidence that structure can have a significant effect on 
leadership, policy decisions and the overall direction of an organization or elected body 
(Bawn 1995; Balla 1998; Meier et al. 2005; Knott and Payne 2004; Welch 1990; Jones 
1976). It affects the decision making process of organizations, bureaucracies, and 
governmental bodies (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Epstein and O’Halloran 1994). 
It influences who makes the decisions; the linkage between representative elected 
positions and electoral structures is well established in the literature and continuously 
demonstrates the role of electoral structure in the under or overrepresentation of minority 
elected officials on school boards and county councils (Karnig and Welch 1982; Fraga, 
Meier and Stewart 1986; Davidson and Korbel 1981). Institutional structure often shapes 
the substantive outputs that flow out of this representation (Polinard et al. 1994; Meier et 
al. 2005; Meier and England 1984), and has also been shown to influence policy outcomes 
directly (Ellis, Hicklin and Rocha 2009).  Although scholars have not looked at this effect in 
relation to desegregation policies and efforts, results of the first phase of the dissertation 
project provided support for these traditional ways that structure influences outcomes. 
Results indicated that the structure of an electoral system influences the level of racial 
balance in a district, as a measure of policy outcomes; although not as expected. The 
unanticipated results suggested a need for a greater understanding of the factors 
potentially driving institutional structure and its observed effect on outcomes and 
governance as a whole. What influences institutional structure; what makes structure such 
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an important factor for understanding the governance and outputs and outcomes of 
governing bodies and organizations?  
Few researchers have probed the factors that influence electoral structure, leaving 
us with a very limited understanding of why structure is such an important factor for 
representation and substantive policy outcomes. However, a recent wave of research has 
begun to shift the focus on predicting when structure’s effect is manipulated or reduced 
and its implications for minority representation, focusing on the influence of population 
size and partisanship (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier and Rutherford 2012).  
On the other hand, early theorists of policy and institutions contend that policy decision 
making and related administrative actions are best understood within an organization’s 
context, that is, an organization’s environmental or political setting (Simon 1957; Barnard 
1938). As such this chapter focuses on the relationship between the racial balance of school 
districts (as the policy environment) and the electoral structures used to elect school board 
members to understand the nature of minority representation and student outcomes. It 
takes a step back from the previous research on the linkages among electoral structures, 
minority representation, and policy outcomes to figure out how these linkages even occur. 
Without a consideration of the policy environment in which institutional structures 
operate and must navigate, past research provides an incomplete picture and explanation 
for why and how structures can be used to alter institutional access and equity within 
institutions.  
I take an in-depth look at the policy environment and the means through which 
minority school board members are elected to understand the role of electoral structure in 
shaping the level of minority representation on a school board, the political agenda and 
policies pursued, and the policy outcomes that follow. Specifically, the chapter addresses 
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the following research question: how does the policy environment influence institutional 
structure and its effect on representation and policy outcomes? I examine the differences and 
similarities in minority representation and student outcomes based on the policy 
environment and the electoral structure to determine if students are represented better 
through a particular structure given the level of racial balance.  
Literature drawn from the institutionalism framework of political science and 
institutional theory of organizations provide a basis for thinking about how this process 
could or should work and drive my expectations for student outcomes. In political science, 
institutions refer to the rules, norms, standards, and strategies that are used to govern, and 
structure is one of many elements that define institutions30. They establish rational choices 
among actors and guide their efforts to navigate conflicting or competing interests (Hill 
1997; Frederickson and Smith 2003, 68-73; Ostrom 2007, 22). Organizational theorists, 
however, include the external environment into their theories concerning institutions. 
They contend that institutional environments exert external normative pressures to 
influence an organization’s structure-related decisions (Zucker 1987). Here, organizational 
structure31 and the operations that flow out of structure are a consequence of 
organizational conformity to environmental pressure in an effort to increase resource 
accessibility and improve chances of long run survival (Zucker 1987; Meyer and Rowan 
1977).   
                                                 
30
 This explanation of institutions is based on its more common treatment within institutional theory. The term 
“institution” may also refer to different types of organizations such as states, various governmental 
jurisdictions, universities, bureaucracies, political parties, etc. (Ostrom 2007, 22-23; Frederickson and Smith 
2003, 68). References made to the political science view of institutions throughout this chapter are based on 
the institutional theory treatment of institutions discussed in the text.  
 
31 Organizational structure and institutional structure will be used interchangeably to reference the system of 
governance use in school districts. Similarly, electoral structure will be used to describe the system of elections 
used to elect school board members.  
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Drawing from both bodies, though most heavily from the organizational theory 
perspective, I contend that the environment can pressure the operation of electoral 
structures in a way that influences school board representation and its outcomes for 
students. These governing institutions are not exempt from the weight of external policy 
environments and consequently, their structures are a reaction to the policy environment.  
Pressures from varying policy environments allow for potentially differing effects on 
minority representation and policy outcomes, despite the shared type of structure. In other 
words, structures are a function of their surrounding policy environment. An at-large 
electoral structure in a racially imbalanced school district may differ in its effect on 
representation and outcomes from an at-large structure in a racially balanced school 
district. Chapter results suggest interesting trends on the effect of electoral structure and 
representation across policy environments. In general, there are both benefits and 
disadvantages to both types of structures based on the level of racial balance.  
Policy Environments, Structure, and Desegregation Policy 
 Political science research on the structure-policy environment relationship often 
treats the policy environment, that is, the setting in which policy outcomes are being 
influenced, as a part of the organization or institution. Some acknowledge that institutions 
and their structure, rules, and are influenced by their external social, economic, and 
political context, but many view the institution and its components as more powerful 
influences on the policy environment in general (Frederickson and Smith 2003, 68). This 
approach has provided much insight on the relationship between institutional structures 
and policy outcomes; however, treating the environment as a part of the organization or 
institution and an element of the broader framework is also a weakness of this approach to 
exploring structure because it restricts the relationship to only the institution and its 
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structure influencing the environment. It fails to consider the fact that institutions and its 
components such as structure, actually operate within the broader framework of policy 
environments that can also influence institutions. Organizational theorists, on the other 
hand, take this more inclusive approach to viewing institutions and organizations and offer 
explanations as to why and how organizations and structures are externally established 
and manipulated.  
I view this approach as a more accurate depiction of the desegregation policy story 
and locally elected school officials’ policy decisions regarding desegregated education. 
Early research on school districts’ limited compliance and weak plans to racially balance 
schools suggests that school boards and administrators often looked to the external 
environment, in this case Whites’ public opinion of desegregation, to develop plans and 
gauge their efforts. White civic elites, local business leaders, local council leaders and on 
occasion civil rights organizations were influential in plan development (Crain 1968; 
Rodgers and Bullock 1976). The slow progress toward compliance amidst the strong white 
opposition to desegregated schools, particularly in the south, demonstrates the important 
role of the external policy environment in shaping organizational decisions and the policy 
consequences. 
The politics surrounding more recent efforts of school desegregation also offer 
some insight on the way that the policy environment can shape school boards as political 
institutions and their decisions. For example, the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle that ruled against using race for school 
assignments has created a federally supported policy environment that discourages 
desegregation plans based on race. Consequently, interested districts and those still under 
court order desegregation must turn to more race neutral means to achieve racially 
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balanced schools.  Additional mandates to improve teacher accountability and student 
performance through market based principles have also helped to create a policy 
environment that leads school board members to focus less on the racial balance of their 
districts and its implications, and more on meeting the newer federal mandates. A similar 
policy environment effect can be observed in the case of eroding desegregation policy in 
Wake County, North Carolina. Amongst much opposition to the school board’s decision to 
eliminate their desegregation plan and adopt neighborhood school assignments, support 
from affluent white, suburban parents and conservative advocacy and interest groups 
fueled their policy decision (Sturgis 2012).  
Some researchers also find more direct linkages between the racial composition of 
schools as a policy environment and district policies. For example, Condron and Roscigno 
(2003) demonstrate that inequalities in within district academic spending are related to 
racial and class inequality and concentration in school districts. They note that local school 
board discretion in funding allocation is often subject to and shaped by local “stratification 
arrangements,” leading board decisions to reflect the stratification patterns engrained in 
the surrounding environment. In other words, school boards are responsive to their 
external environment, likely the dominant voting constituency, and their resource 
allocation decisions follow this trend. Renzulli (2006) finds the level of racial balance in a 
district is positively related to charter school policies and Black charter school enrollments.  
A handful of empirical studies less related to school desegregation and the racial 
composition of schools also show continual support for the role of the external 
environment in shaping school board decisions and the manner in which they govern 
school districts. Land (2002) contends that school boards design and develop policies and 
priorities in response to their local policy environment, including the economic, social, 
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political and sometimes even religious context. Newman and Brown (1992) point out that 
school boards typically adopt policies and make decisions based on community 
involvement or interests or the superintendent’s suggestions. As expected, factors such as 
school resources and size also contribute to school board’s policy making process (Land 
2002).  
These studies suggest the important role that a district’s policy environment, 
particularly the racial composition of the district, can play in influencing the policies 
adopted and policy outcomes.  They show that the organization and its leaders are not lone 
players in the decision making process. Instead, we see the external environment actively 
influencing and manipulating the process.  As such, it is important to explore the manner in 
which this policy environment influences the system of policy development.  
Controlling Structure: Policy Environments and Institutional Structure   
Theories of “institutional environments,” as external policy environments are 
referenced in this literature, suggest that the environment defines and determines 
organizational structures. Meyer and Rowan (1977) contend that because the modern 
context of organizations is heavily “institutionalized,” organizational structures that 
develop in this context are often a reflection of the rationalized norms and expectations of 
societal institutions. In other words, organizations develop structure type and norms based 
on the level and type of external pressure experienced (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 
1987). This perspective of external control relies less on resource-dependence, market 
motives, and competition to explain external influence and control, and more on entities of 
power such as the state, professional associations, powerful constituents as sources of 
external control (Oliver 1997; DiMaggio 1988). It centers on the relationship between 
external rules, regulations, and requirements and internal organizational rules, protocol of 
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production, and performance (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1997). The policy 
environment establishes the organizational structures, norms, and activities that are 
deemed appropriate, legitimate, or socially acceptable for an organization and its leaders 
(Oliver 1997; Meyer and Scott 1983). Theorists of this frame of external control cite a few 
reasons, or theoretical mechanisms, that explain why organizations yield to the external 
environment in developing structure and consequently, shaping organizational 
performance and outcomes.  
First, institutional theorists suggest a host of incentives that the policy environment 
provides organizations to influence its structure. Organizations that come into 
isomorphism with their environment are more likely to gain support, legitimacy and 
prestige, and resources (Oliver 1997; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Rowan 1982; Zucker 1987). 
Organizations, particularly public organizations, recognize the need for external support to 
achieve their goals and maintain functioning; therefore, adopting the rules, regulations, 
preferences, and norms of the external policy environment helps to build the desired 
support. Externally influenced structures show conformity to the collective norm and 
responsiveness to external interests and public expectations that foster greater support. 
Such support is fundamental to improving organizational productivity and performance.  
Similarly, organizations seeking to legitimize their activities, goals and interest may 
adopt structures that reflect the norms and rules of the institutional environment (Zucker 
1987; Oliver 1997). Doing this establishes a perception of responsiveness and social 
validity, and allows the organization, to not only gain support of the structure, activities 
and goals that mirror the environment, but also the personal, individual goals and interests 
of the organization that are likely different from the broader goals and interests of the 
environment. Organizations are able to establish some internal flexibility in other areas of 
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functioning when the structure meets the interests and demands of the environment 
(Zucker 1987; Oliver 1997). And perhaps, a large driver of much of this activity is access to 
resources. The environment is most welcoming to organizations that meet its “collective 
normative order,” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987), and therefore, having an 
institutional structure that fits this “collective normative order” provides access to valuable 
societal resources, both human and capital (Zucker 1987; Scott and Meyer 1983).  
Collectively, these factors increase an organization’s probability of survival and 
stability, perhaps the strongest motive of any organization (Zucker 1987). Gaining support, 
prestige and legitimacy, and greater resources help to build an organization’s “stock,” and 
those of greater stock have a higher probability of survival and are also assumed to be the 
most successful organizations (Oliver 1997; Rowan 1982). Nevertheless, it is their 
adherence and adoption of external rules, regulations, expectations and norms via 
structure that ultimately determines survival and makes the institutional environment a 
highly significant player in the internal structure decisions of the organization.   
Institutional theorists also cite goal displacement as a second reason that 
organizations adopt structures reflective of their environment (Zucker 1987). 
Organizations with unstable and less “popular” values and goals are more likely to lose 
their goals to the broader goals, interests, and norms of the policy environment. Similarly, 
organizations of less popular structures are also likely to “lose” their structures to the 
institutional environment. This practice is often observed, for example, in the 
transformation of low-performing public schools into charter schools or the closing of low 
performing charter schools. Such school districts often find themselves under the pressure 
and influence of the boarder policy environment to change their structure, and many 
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choose to change their structure to a market-based charter system over the less favorable 
policy alternative of school closings.  
Finally, the organization’s level of power, independent of its environment, also has 
an effect on the extent to which the policy environment influences its structure. 
Organizations with less independent power and control over its boundaries are more likely 
to adopt internal structures that are reflective of the policy environment (Zucker 1987). 
Public organizations, such as school districts, often have less power and control over their 
boundaries relative to private firms and organizations. They are typically viewed as 
entities of the state, and as such, are subject to much more environmental intrusion and 
influence. Therefore, public school districts are likely to adopt structures that are more 
reflective of the policy environment.  
In sum, organizational structure is a function of external policy environment 
influence because of environmental incentives toward isomorphism, goal displacement, 
and limited power (Zucker 1987; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Rowan 1982). If these 
arguments are correct, a school district’s policy environment should also be a valid 
predictor of its electoral structure. Here, the level of racial balance is viewed as the policy 
environment of interest.  
Hypothesis 1: The level of racial balance in a school district will be significantly 
related to electoral structure.  
The literature provides limited guidance on predicting the electoral structure most 
likely to be associated with racially imbalanced or balanced school districts. However, 
scholars of electoral structures note trends in electoral districts more or less likely to 
operate under at-large or ward systems. For example, scholars find minority population to 
be a strong predictor of representation under certain structures (Meier et al. 2005). 
 99 
 
Relatedly, areas of large minority populations are historically more likely to use ward 
systems of election based on restrictions and regulations of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
Majority-minority districts and ward electoral systems were viewed as a solution to Black 
voter dilution. On the other hand, some have argued that the ward structure is restrictive 
and makes it difficult for minorities to gain electoral seats, particularly in more integrated 
areas (Bowler, Dovovan, and Brockington 2003, 17-18).  Applied to the policy environment 
argument, we might expect:  
Hypothesis 1a: Racially balanced school districts are more likely to operate under an 
at-large electoral structure.  
Hypothesis 1b: Racially imbalanced school districts are more likely to operate under a 
ward electoral structure.  
As highlighted in prior chapters, the bulk of research on electoral structure has 
focused on its relationship to representation for racial minorities and has come to varied 
conclusions concerning the extent to which certain electoral systems are harmful to racial 
minorities. This body of research places a heavy emphasis on structure and its ability to 
manipulate descriptive and substantive representation; however, the institutional 
environment research suggests that structure alone is not the dominant factor shaping 
representation. Instead it is equally, if not more important to recognize that organizational 
structures form out of their external environments (Zucker 1987). As the policy 
environment predicts the structure used, it also influences the meaning of such structures. 
The policies, procedures, and systems that dominate an organization are enforced by the 
external policy environment—the constituents, laws, or public opinion, for example (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977).  Therefore, the policy environment may determine how electoral 
structures function.  Structures developed in a policy environment that is hostile to 
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minority representation, for example, may yield fewer minority representatives, while 
those developed in more friendly environments are likely to yield the opposite effect. 
Applying this logic to school districts and school board elections, we may find that an at-
large system in a racially balanced policy environment may yield a different level of 
minority representation than one in a racially imbalanced environment (see Meier et al. 
2005; Leal et al. 2004 for a similar argument). The same type of relationship could occur 
for a ward system. Whereas previous scholarship has generally found ward structures to 
be more beneficial for minority representation, considering the policy environment of the 
ward structure may alter these findings. Instead, ward structures may only be beneficial to 
minorities when they are in racially imbalanced districts or vice versa. Similarly, at-large 
systems may be only beneficial to minorities when they are seeking election in racially 
balanced districts.  
Hypothesis 2: The level of racial balance in a school district and structure will be 
significantly related to the level of minority representation.  
 If the first set of hypotheses perform as expected, that is, if ward systems are more likely to 
be found in racially imbalanced districts and the general findings for minority 
representation under a ward structure are true, I expect the following relationship,  
Hypothesis 2a: Racial minorities will gain greater representation under a ward system in 
racially imbalanced districts (than an at-large structure in an imbalanced district).  
 On the other hand, research on the differences and similarities of racially balanced 
and imbalanced districts give reason to expect an alternative effect. As anticipated, scholars 
find that the level of racial balance in a school district often affects students. Those in 
racially balanced districts tend to have greater access to resources, more educational 
opportunities, and higher education attainment levels when compared to students in 
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racially imbalanced districts (Southworth and Michelson 2007; Dawkins and Braddock 
1994). However, it also affects teachers. Teachers in balanced districts tend to be more 
experienced, are less likely to lack certification, and are considered for higher quality. They 
tend to have more resources for teaching and more support from administrators also 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). These works seems to suggest that a more racially 
balanced environment provides the greatest benefits for minorities and should also be a 
more positive electoral policy environment for minority candidates. This contention, 
coupled with the research findings on structure and minority representation, suggests an 
alternative relationship:  
Hypothesis 2b: Racial minorities will gain greater representation under a ward system in 
racially balanced districts (than an at large system in balanced district).  
A smaller body of scholarship has focused on the substantive benefits that follow 
the election of minority representatives under a particular electoral structure. This 
research takes the traditional electoral structure research one step further to probe why 
this representation matters for policy outcomes. Polinard et al.’s (1994) research shows 
that electing minorities to political positions is directly related to recruiting and hiring 
more minority bureaucrats.  Meier et al. (2005) find similar results; minorities elected 
through ward systems tend to help increase minority administrator and teacher 
representation in a district (Meier and England 1984). In general, these works propose the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: The level of racial balance and electoral structure of minority representation 
will be significantly related to policy outcomes.  
 However, if the arguments of institutional environment research are true, then we 
should also expect these findings to differ based on the policy environment. Policy 
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outcomes are also likely to be a function of the policy environment’s effect on structure and 
representation. Building from the previous hypotheses, research on electoral structures, 
and institutional environments, I hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 3a: Minority representatives elected under a ward structure in racially 
imbalanced districts will have a greater effect on policy outcomes than those elected in a 
racially balanced district.  
 Alternatively, the policy environment may also have a limited effect on the 
organizational outcomes of the district. Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest that 
organizations yield the development of formal structure to the environment, conditionally. 
They propose that organizations of externally controlled structures maintain “gaps” 
between their externally influenced structures and their core, technical tasks and activities 
to maintain some level of autonomy and control over organizational performance. If this 
argument holds, we might expect the policy environment to maintain its influence over 
electoral structures, but play a smaller role in influencing the outcomes that follow.  In 
other words, the policy environment effects of racially balanced and imbalanced districts 
may mirror each other when policy outcomes are considered.  
Hypothesis 3b: Policy outcomes of minority representatives elected under a ward structure in 
racially balanced districts will mirror those of minority representatives elected under the 
same structure in racially imbalanced districts.  
 Here, I expect the structure and minority representation effect on policy outcomes 
to be the same, regardless of the policy environment. In other words, I do not anticipate 
any differences in outcomes given the two policy environments. The same results are also 
expected to hold for minorities elected under an at-large system.  Figure 4.1 provides a 
summary of the hypotheses discussed above and the expected relationships.  
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Figure 4.1: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
 
 
Methods and Measures 
Data for this chapter are collected over three school terms, 2000-2001; 2003-2004; 
and 2008-2009 from a series of sources.  I use the National Education Survey of US Public 
Schools, an original survey of the 1800 largest school districts in the United States, to 
gather data on the racial composition of the school faculty (teachers and administrators); 
the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) School District Demographic System 
and Common Core Database for data on schools’ student racial compositions and 
community resource variables; and the 2000 Census to create a measure of residential 
segregation.  The units of analyses are public school districts with a 1999-2000 school 
enrollment above 5000.   
Dependent Variables 
 Dependent variables examined are grouped into three classes: structural, school 
board representation, and bureaucratic representation. The structural and board 
representation dependent variables also serve as explanatory variables in several models. 
Structural 
Hypothesis  
Number  
 Policy Environment  (Expected) 
Electoral 
Structure  
School Board 
Representation  
Policy 
Outcome 
1a Racially Balanced   At-large n/a n/a 
1b Racially Imbalanced   Ward  n/a n/a 
2a Racially Imbalanced  Ward    n/a 
2b Racially Balanced  Ward   n/a 
3a Racially Imbalanced Ward     
3b Racially Balanced= Racially 
Imbalanced 
Ward=Ward         
 104 
 
  Electoral structure is measured as the proportion of board members elected under 
an at-large or ward system. This measure allows me retain all districts operating under a 
mixed/hybrid electoral system, in which some members are elected under a ward system 
and others are elected under an at-large system. 
Board Representation  
Minority board representation is measured as the percentage of African American 
and Latino board members in each school district.  
Bureaucratic Representation  
Bureaucratic representation variables include the level of teacher and 
administration representation, measured as the percentage of Black and Latino teachers 
and administrators in a district. The measures serve as indicators of  the substantive policy 
outcomes that flow out of minority board representation, consistent with past research 
that demonstrate a positive relationship between the two sectors (Polinard et al. 1994). 
This relationship holds important implications for minority students because coethnic 
representation is associated with increased student performance, greater aid to minority-
centered programs, and reduced racial inequality in schools (Theobald 2007; Weiher 
2000?; Meier, Stewart, England 1989). As such, I examine school board representation’s 
ability to provide this resource to minority students, given the policy environment and 
electoral structure.  
Explanatory Variables  
  A key explanatory variable in this study is the level of school district racial 
balance, the measure of policy environment. Racial balanced is assessed as a Taeuber 
dissimilarity index for each district, indicating the overall evenness of schools within a 
district (Tauber 1964). The measure itself indicates the percentage of students that would 
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need to transfer to different schools to make all of the schools within the district equally 
mixed among the races and ethnicities.  Traditionally, lower valued indices indicate greater 
levels of racial balance and fewer student transfers, while higher numbers indicate less 
racial balance and more student transfers. I convert the measure into a similarity score to 
simplify interpretation as follows:  
 
where b equals the Black students in an individual school, B equals the number of Black 
students in the entire district, and w equals the Anglo students in an individual school and 
W equals the Anglo students in the entire district  
 
where l equals the Latino students in an individual school and L equals the Latino students 
in the entire district (Rodgers and Bullock 1976, 34-36).   
An index score of zero (total racial isolation) shows that a district is completely 
segregated and nearly all of their students would need to change schools to equally 
distribute the races across the district, while a score of one (complete racial balance) 
indicates complete desegregation. A similarity index score of .30 or below indicates high 
levels of segregation; scores between .40 and .50 are considered moderate levels of 
segregation and values of .60 typically signal maximum desegregation or a close 
approximation.  The .60 cutoff is used in analyses below to distinguish more racially 
balanced districts from less racially balanced districts.  As previously mentioned, electoral 
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structure and minority school board representation serve as the remaining explanatory 
variables.  
Control Variables  
 As mentioned above, population size is noted as a predictor of political 
representation on school boards, so I control for the 2000 Census population percentage 
estimates of Black and Latino population in the respective models (Dennis 1990).    
A dummy variable was included to control for geographic region, in which a one 
designates a state as southern.32 Southern states have a historical legacy of instituting 
discriminatory policies and manipulating structure and laws to restrict minorities’ access 
to politics and limit their political power (Engstrom and McDonald 1982). The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 was established to eliminate such discriminatory policies and practices; 
however, as recent as 2012, some southern states have come under fire for their efforts to 
covertly restrict voting rights and political power in a way that adversely affects racial 
minorities (Demessie and Capers 2012; National Conference of State Legislatures 2012). 
Interestingly, Census statistics reveal that African Americans remain heavily concentrated 
in southern states and their school districts continue to be some of the most desegregated 
in the nation (Orfield 2005). These tidbits lead to two potential expectations for 
representation and student outcomes in southern states: there will be greater African 
American representation and positive outcomes for Black students in southern states, 
given their population size, or there will be less minority representation and fewer positive 
student outcomes in southern states, given their history and current efforts of restricting 
                                                 
32 The Census Bureau acknowledges the following states as the “South,” which are included as a controls in the 
current study: West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Washington, D.C. Missouri 
and Kansas were also included in control group of the South because of their history of lawful discrimination 
toward blacks (Census Bureau 2010; Meier, Stewart and England 1989). 
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minority political power and access.  I expect similar or null effects for Latino 
representation and student outcomes in the south, given their smaller, but growing 
population and limited history of discrimination in southern states, with the exception of 
Texas.  
I also control for the level of residential segregation in a district. Scholars such as 
Orfield and Eaton (1996) credit the changes in the racial composition of schools to regional 
residential trends. Lower levels of residential segregation increase the probability that 
students attend more racially balanced schools. I include an interaction index, an exposure 
measure, scaled from zero to one that measures the probability of Blacks or Latinos 
interacting with Whites in their school district, given the census block restrictions. Index 
values are calculated as follows:  
 
where  is the population of group in census block ;  is the total population of 
group j in the district;  is the total population of group  in census block , and  is 
the total population in census block  Greater index values indicate higher levels of 
exposure (less segregation) and values closer to zero represents a smaller probability of 
interacting with Whites (White and Kim 2005).  
I account for a host of resource variables that are likely to influence both the 
electoral process and student outcomes. Greater resources increase minorities’ ability to 
actively participate and influence local politics and political systems (Robinson, England, 
and Meier 1985). They may also use the resources to pressure school districts to improve 
outcomes for minority students (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 
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1991).  I control for the percentage of Blacks and Latinos with college degrees, the 
percentage that are homeowners, the median Black or Latino family income, and the 
percentage of Whites in poverty.  The percent of Blacks with college degrees is measured as 
the percentage of the Black population over age 25 with a bachelor’s degree or beyond. 
Median income is measured as a ratio of Black or Latino median income to white median 
income. The percentage of Whites in poverty is measured as the percentage of white 
families living below the 1999 poverty level. The variable provides a measure of social 
class and minority educational opportunity based on the social distance argument of the 
power thesis. The power thesis suggests that discrimination based on race and class should 
increase as social distance increases; therefore, white middle class populations may favor 
Black middle class populations over lower-class Whites because the middle class Blacks are 
closer to them economically and socially (Triandis and Triandis 1961; Meier, Stewart, and 
England 1989).  This bias should result in greater political and educational opportunities 
for middle class minorities, so I expect a negative relationship between minority 
representation and student outcomes and the level of white poverty. Year dummy 
variables are included to control for any time variation. The analysis uses a maximum 
likelihood estimation method, the logit model, to test the first hypothesis and ordinary 
least squares modeling for the remaining hypotheses. Clustered, robust standard errors 
were also used to address issues of heteroskedasticity.  
Findings 
Policy Environments and Electoral Structures 
 A test of the first hypothesis establishes the baseline influence of policy 
environments on institutional structures. Table 4.1 shows the predicted electoral structure 
type based on the level of racial balance in a school district. The models show that more 
 109 
 
racially balanced school districts are more likely to utilize an at-large electoral system for 
board elections, while more imbalanced districts are more likely to use the opposite—ward 
systems, as predicted.  
Table 4.1: Effect of the Policy Environment on Electoral Structure    
 
VARIABLES Black Ward 
 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Black At Large 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Latino Ward 
 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Latino At Large 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (4) (3) 
Level of Racial Balance -0.620*** 0.505*** -0.476*** 0.358*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.080) (0.082) 
 Voting Population(%) 0.021*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Residential Segregation  0.020 -0.047 -1.042*** 0.779*** 
 (0.168) (0.175) (0.203) (0.208) 
Year 2001 -0.208*** 0.145* -0.204*** 0.142* 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.072) (0.074) 
Year 2004 -0.122* 0.055 -0.115 0.051 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.072) (0.074) 
Constant -0.109 0.540*** 0.876*** -0.270* 
 (0.131) (0.135) (0.149) (0.152) 
     
Observations 5,090 5,093 5,089 5,092 
Pseudo R-squared 0.030 0.028 0.021 0.013 
Logistical regression; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
 
 
An examination of the predicted probability results reveals that a racially balanced 
district has about a 35 percent probability of operating a ward structure and a 54 percent 
probability of operating under an at-large system.   Figure 4.2 shows this outcome 
graphically. 
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability of Ward Structure Based on Level of Racial Balance 
 
 
 
 
 
The results support all three parts of the first hypothesis set; the policy 
environment is demonstrated to be a predictor of structure, suggesting that organizations 
develop structures based on their external policy environment. This finding is also 
consistent with the research on the relationship between minority population size and 
electoral structure as it shows that when minorities are segregated and constitute a large, 
centralized population in various “pockets” of the district, the district is more likely to use a 
ward system. When minorities are more dispersed throughout the district and therefore 
seem to make a “smaller” or more proportional size of the population, the district is more 
likely to use an at large system.  Lastly, the findings guide expectations for the latter 
hypotheses for board representation and bureaucratic representation given the noted 
influence of the policy environment on electoral structure. If the policy environment is able 
to influence the electoral system, it is also likely to shape the level of minority 
representation under each structure.  
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 Minority Board Representation across Structures and Policy Environments  
Table 4.2 reveals the interactive effect of the policy environment and electoral 
structure on the level of minority representation. The models suggest that the policy 
environment effect on ward structures has no significant effect on Black school board 
representation, but has a negative effect on Latino school board representation. Marginal 
effects graphs suggest that the insignificant finding of the first model only applies to lowest 
and highest ends of the racial balance scale; in school districts that are “severely 
segregated” and those that are highly balanced, school board representation through a 
ward structure is unaffected by the level of balance between white and Black students in 
the school district (See Figure 4.3). Interestingly, nearly half of the cases fall into the 
significant category and show that in the average school district—one that is either 
moderately imbalanced or acceptably balanced, the level of racial balance does have a 
positive and significant effect on Black school board representation. More Black board 
members are likely to be elected under the ward structure, over the at–large structure (see 
Figure 4.4); however, they gain greater representation in more racially balanced districts.  
For Black school board representation, a racially balanced district appears to be a better 
policy environment than a racially imbalanced district. Ward structures continue to have a 
positive, though limited effect on Black board representation when the policy environment 
is considered.  
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Table 4.2: Effect of Electoral Structure on Board Representation across Policy 
Environments   
 
VARIABLES Black Board 
Representation 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Black Board 
Representation 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Latino Board 
Representation 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Latino Board 
Representation 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ward Structure (%) -0.0235  0.0225**  
 (0.017)  (0.010)  
Black/Latino Level of Racial 
Balance 
-3.5330** -2.5945 -1.1061 -4.6885*** 
 (1.704) (1.623) (1.223) (1.819) 
Ward* Racial Balance 0.0191  -0.0235*  
 (0.024)  (0.013)  
At Large Structure (%)  0.0011  -0.0468*** 
  (0.019)  (0.017) 
At-Large*Racial Balance  0.0028  0.0515** 
  (0.025)  (0.022) 
Population (%) 0.9795*** 0.9774*** 0.4778*** 0.4813*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
Level of Residential Segregation  -2.5973*** -2.6624*** -0.1857 0.0802 
 (0.772) (0.769) (0.901) (0.911) 
Black Income ($1000s) -0.0000 -0.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
Black College Graduates -0.0194** -0.0181*   
 (0.010) (0.010)   
Black Homeownership  -0.0025 -0.0045   
 (0.006) (0.006)   
South -2.4029*** -2.5260*** -0.3968* -0.5038** 
 (0.360) (0.359) (0.230) (0.233) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) 0.1822*** 0.1750*** 0.0757** 0.0683** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.031) (0.031) 
Year 2001 -0.2204 -0.1930 -0.8034*** -0.7902*** 
 (0.336) (0.335) (0.275) (0.275) 
Year 2004 -0.2547 -0.2327 -0.6833** -0.6837** 
 (0.341) (0.341) (0.271) (0.270) 
     
Latino Income ($1000s)   -0.0000** -0.0000** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino College Graduates    0.0502*** 0.0478*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Latino Homeownership    0.0225*** 0.0222*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 4.6689*** 3.5913** -2.2253* 1.0707 
 (1.376) (1.480) (1.166) (1.521) 
N 4,500 4,504 4,315 4,317 
R2 0.5996 0.5992 0.3460 0.3481 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 4.3: Marginal Effect of Ward Electoral Structure on Black Representation as 
the Policy Environment Changes 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of At-Large Electoral Structure on Black Representation 
as the Policy Environment Changes 
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For Latinos, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 suggest greater support for the expectation that 
racial minorities would receive greater representation under a ward system in racially 
imbalanced districts than representation in a racially balanced, ward system and a racially 
balanced, at-large system. However, two interesting trends emerge from the figures. Both 
electoral structures perform as expected. In general, the ward system has a positive effect 
on Latino school board representation, and the at-large system has a negative effect on 
Latino school board representation. However, the policy environment reduces the positive 
effect of ward structures and also reduces the negative effect of at-large structures on 
Latino representation. As a consequence of the policy environment’s mitigating influence, 
Latinos can also gain significant representation in at-large structure of a racially balanced 
district. In sum, Latinos are likely to see significant levels of school board representation 
under both types of electoral structures as the policy environment dictates. This trend 
complements the research of an at-large basis toward numerical majority populations and 
other research suggesting negative ward effects in large majority, minority districts (see 
Leal et al 2004; Bowler, Donovan, and Brockington 2003). 
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Figure 4.5: Marginal Effect of Ward Electoral Structure on Latino Representation as 
Policy Environment Changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Marginal Effect of At-Large Electoral Structure on Latino Representation 
as Policy Environment Changes 
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Bureaucratic Representation across Structures and Policy Environments 
 The final set of analyses test the policy implications of school board representation 
under at-large and ward electoral systems in the two policy environments. Here, I examine 
the substantive effects of minority board representation, given the policy environment and 
electoral structure. Per the outlined theoretical expectations and previous results, if the 
policy environment predicts the electoral structure and the level of minority 
representation under each structure, then it is also likely to greatly influence the outcomes 
of the board representation.  
Administration Representation  
 Table 4.3 suggests that greater board representation and ward-elected members 
reduces the level of Black administrator representation in balanced districts, while it has a 
null effect in racially imbalanced districts. An insignificant effect is also observed for the 
models testing at-large structures. The marginal effects graph of Black administrator 
representation in racially balanced districts under ward structures is consistent with Table 
4.3; Black school board representation under a ward system in racially balanced districts 
has a positive, but diminishing effect on Black administrator representation. In other 
words, Blacks receive fewer substantive benefits in racially balanced districts when their 
level of school board representation increases through ward election increases. The policy 
environment seems to reduce the potential for substantive policy benefits through 
minority board representation in this case. The findings suggest a negative consequence to 
the typically positive factors linked to racial equality and representation (see Figure 4.7).  
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The insignificant finding for imbalanced districts is not consistent. Instead, I find 
that Black administrator representation increases only slightly with greater Black school 
board representation under a ward system (See Figure 4.8).  Here, Blacks are subject to 
gain nearly the same amount of policy outcome benefits, regardless of the proportion of 
Black, ward-elected members. Racially imbalanced districts seem to restrict substantive 
minority representation through structure to a greater extent than racially balanced 
districts.  
Marginal effects graphs on Black representation in at-large structures suggest that 
that Blacks gain the greatest policy outcomes through pure at-large systems in racially 
balanced districts (see Appendix B). This finding conflicts with both the stated hypothesis 
and the previous research on electoral structures and policy outcomes, but is consistent 
with the desegregation literature on the benefits of racially balanced districts.  In sum, the 
at-large system in racially balanced districts is an avenue for greater Black policy gains. 
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Table 4.3: Effect of Black Board Representation and Electoral Structure on 
Administration Representation across Policy Environments 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Ward 
Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At- Large 
Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Ward 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At-Large 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Black Board Members (%)    0.2002*** 0.1477*** 0.2768*** 0.3064*** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.064) (0.080) 
Ward Structure (%) 0.4984  0.5808  
 (0.393)  (1.110)  
Black Members*Ward -0.0731**  0.0204  
 (0.033)  (0.064)  
At-Large Structure (%)  -0.6554*  -0.0006 
  (0.388)  (1.103) 
Black Members*At-Large  0.0500  -0.0416 
  (0.035)  (0.064) 
Level of Residential Segregation  -4.3060*** -4.3292*** -8.2825*** -8.1444*** 
 (0.913) (0.916) (2.187) (2.156) 
Population (%) 0.7527*** 0.7472*** 0.6530*** 0.6518*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.087) (0.084) 
Black College Graduates 0.0364** 0.0367** 0.0873** 0.0877** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.043) (0.043) 
Black Income ($1000s) -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0003* 0.0002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) -0.2908*** -0.2937*** -0.1696* -0.1698* 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.090) (0.087) 
Black Homeownership 0.0033 0.0021 -0.0811*** -0.0788*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.030) (0.030) 
South 1.6780*** 1.6233*** 3.7802*** 3.8315*** 
 (0.478) (0.480) (1.263) (1.286) 
Year 2001 -0.7342** -0.7144** -0.8350 -0.8546 
 (0.299) (0.299) (0.997) (1.002) 
Year 2004 0.6744 0.6775 0.1368 0.1346 
 (0.423) (0.423) (1.089) (1.103) 
Constant 3.6981*** 4.3530*** 5.3716** 5.5825** 
 (0.769) (0.857) (2.168) (2.242) 
     
N 2,821 2,823 505 506 
R2 0.6185 0.6185 0.7150 0.7152 
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Figure 4.7: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts) 
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Overall, the results fail to support the third set of hypotheses, but continue to show 
the role of the policy environment in manipulating structure. The unexpected benefits of 
at-large structure representation in racially balanced districts reveal interesting 
differences between the two policy environments and their relationship to structure and 
substantive policy outcomes.  
Latino Administrator Representation  
Results of Table 4.4 and marginal effects graphs on Latino bureaucratic 
representation suggest that increases in Latino board representation and ward structure 
representation have a positive and additive effect on Latino administrator representation 
in racially imbalanced districts, but a positive and slightly diminishing effect in racially 
balanced districts (See Figure 4.9 and 4.10). The findings show some support for my 
expectation of greater administrator representation in ward structures of racially 
imbalanced districts over racially balanced districts, and are consistent with the results of 
Table 4.4.  Here, Latinos gain the best outcomes in imbalanced districts. The findings are 
inconsistent with the desegregation literature, but the policy environment’s effect on 
structure and representation is consistent with the broader literature on external control.  
They suggest that there are benefits to racially imbalanced district also; Latinos do not 
appear to be politically restricted in an imbalanced district.  
 
  
 121 
 
Table 4.4: Effect of Latino Board Representation and Electoral Structure on 
Administration Representation across Policy Environments 
 
VARIABLES 
Ward Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At- Large 
Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Ward 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At-Large 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Latino Board Members (%) 0.2503*** 0.2076*** 0.1711*** 0.3617*** 
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.036) (0.042) 
Ward Structure 0.1160  -0.7614  
 (0.280)  (0.624)  
Latino Members*Ward  -0.0282  0.2026***  
 (0.059)  (0.048)  
At-Large Structure (%)  -0.0513  0.7723 
  (0.280)  (0.638) 
Latino Members*At-Large  0.0505  -0.1905*** 
  (0.055)  (0.048) 
Level of Residential Segregation  -0.2352 -0.1862 6.2475*** 6.9220*** 
 (1.065) (1.062) (1.827) (1.905) 
Population (%) 0.3809*** 0.3820*** 0.4996*** 0.5086*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041) 
Latino College Graduates 0.0593*** 0.0599*** 0.1650*** 0.1672*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.034) (0.033) 
Latino Income ($1000s) -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) -0.0411 -0.0321 0.0677 0.0554 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.075) (0.079) 
Latino Homeownership 0.0287*** 0.0281*** 0.0343* 0.0388** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) 
South 0.6801* 0.7094** 1.2795* 1.4723** 
 (0.358) (0.357) (0.676) (0.658) 
Year 2001 -1.0443*** -1.0617*** -1.9713*** -1.9697*** 
 (0.313) (0.313) (0.664) (0.672) 
Year 2004 -0.9294** -0.9260** -1.5012** -1.4830* 
 (0.379) (0.380) (0.755) (0.763) 
Constant -1.7041 -1.7311 -7.7190*** -9.2371*** 
 (1.246) (1.262) (1.848) (1.878) 
     
N 2,766 2,768 565 565 
R2 0.6976 0.7003 0.8595 0.8577 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 4.9: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts) 
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The opposite trends are observed for Latino administrator representation in 
racially balanced and imbalanced districts under at-large systems (see Appendix B). The 
marginal effect graphs show that in general, increases in Latino board representation 
continues to have a positive effect on Latino administrator representation, but greater at-
large representation suppresses it in racially imbalanced districts, and weakens it in 
balanced districts.   
Teacher Representation  
 Although few teachers are hired directly through the school board, considering 
their effect on teacher representation is also important to understand the broad reaching 
implications of the way in which policy environments shape structure. Table 4.5 provides 
the regression results of Black board representation’s effect on teacher representation 
across policy environments and electoral structures. The first two models suggest a 
positive and significant relationship between the interactive effect of Black board 
representation and the proportion of ward electoral seats, regardless of policy 
environment. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 support the models of Table 4.5, as well as my 
expectation of mirroring policy outcomes under a shared electoral structure. Marginal 
effects graphs of Black teacher representation under an at-large structure follow the same 
pattern (see Appendix B). Increases in at-large board representation decreases the positive 
effect of Black board representation on teacher representation in both racially balanced 
and imbalanced districts. The findings on teacher representation deviate from previous 
substantive outcome findings and suggest that the policy environment plays a smaller role 
in influencing structure’s effect on it. This finding could be related to the indirect 
relationship between board representation and teacher representation. It may also be 
related to the shared formal practices and norms of teacher representation of the two 
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policy environments. Nevertheless, in this case, Blacks receive more policy outcomes in 
ward structures of both environments.  
 
 
 
Table 4.5:  Effect of Black Board Representation and Electoral Structure on Teacher 
Representation across Policy Environments  
 
VARIABLES Ward 
Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At- Large 
Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Ward 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At-Large 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Black Board Members (%) 0.0603*** 0.1604*** 0.0196 0.1551** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.061) (0.072) 
Ward Structure (%) -0.1300  -0.3280  
 (0.381)  (1.150)  
Black Members*Ward 0.0886**  0.1832***  
 (0.035)  (0.062)  
At-Large Structure (%)  0.1456  -0.0193 
  (0.367)  (1.192) 
Black Members*At-Large  -0.1157***  -0.1294* 
  (0.033)  (0.074) 
Level of Residential Segregation  -3.3636*** -3.5001*** -7.8653*** -8.0465*** 
 (0.770) (0.766) (2.089) (2.120) 
Population (%) 0.5510*** 0.5402*** 0.6425*** 0.6289*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.072) (0.076) 
Black College Graduates 0.0710*** 0.0701*** 0.1453*** 0.1684*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.039) (0.044) 
Black Income ($1000s) -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0002 -0.0004** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) -0.0197 -0.0318 -0.0969 -0.1650* 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.080) (0.085) 
Black Homeownership 0.0172** 0.0176** -0.0121 0.0015 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.022) 
Year 2001 -0.3562* 0.3510* 1.2527 -0.8715 
 (0.200) (0.196) (0.856) (0.867) 
Year 2004 1.3600*** 1.7206*** 1.3808 0.1958 
 (0.403) (0.388) (1.136) (0.989) 
     
Constant 0.6274 0.3357 4.1144* 6.7711*** 
 (0.879) (0.969) (2.128) (2.524) 
     
N 3,015 3,018 611 612 
R2 0.5379 0.5415 0.7304 0.7238 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 4.11: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts) 
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Latino Teacher Representation 
Latino teacher representation across the two policy environments presents a 
different picture. Table 4.6 suggests that structure’s effect on Latino board representation 
and on teacher representation only matters in racially imbalanced districts; models suggest 
insignificant interactive effects for at-large and ward systems in balanced districts. 
However, marginal effects graphs reveal significant effects for all models. Figures 4.13 and 
4.14 shows support for my expectation of greater policy outcomes in racially imbalanced 
districts under a ward structure. Latino teacher representation increases as the Latino 
board representation and members ward-elected increases, but it decreases slightly under 
this same standard in racially balanced districts. Results show a slight disadvantaged to a 
racially balanced policy environment. Interestingly, in a racially balanced district, Latino 
teacher representation also increases with increases in Latino board representation and at-
large elected members. Although the finding conflicts with the hypothesis, it shows an 
interesting trend observed earlier in the test of Latino board representation in racially 
balanced districts under an at-large structure. Again, I find that Latinos are able to benefit 
from both structures in both environments. In an imbalanced district, I find a diminishing 
effect on Latino teacher representation under an at-large structure (see Appendix B).   
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Table 4.6:  Effect of Latino Board Representation and Electoral Structure on Teacher 
Representation across Policy Environments 
 
VARIABLES  
Ward Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At- Large 
Balanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Ward 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
At-Large 
Imbalanced 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Latino Board Members (%) 0.2047*** 0.1655*** 0.0471 0.2272*** 
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.035) (0.047) 
Ward Structure 0.1099  -0.2399  
 (0.238)  (0.527)  
Latino Members*Ward  -0.0248  0.1967***  
 (0.050)  (0.049)  
At-Large Structure (%)  -0.0313  0.0679 
  (0.245)  (0.551) 
Latino Members*At-Large  0.0489  -0.1798*** 
  (0.047)  (0.049) 
Level of Residential Segregation  1.2131 1.2562 0.5873 1.0800 
 (1.043) (1.061) (1.260) (1.344) 
Population (%) 0.3943*** 0.3939*** 0.5376*** 0.5471*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.038) (0.038) 
Latino College Graduates 0.0628*** 0.0632*** 0.1821*** 0.1867*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.031) (0.031) 
Latino Income ($1000s) -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) 0.0725 0.0858 0.3053*** 0.2961*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.076) (0.081) 
Latino Homeownership 0.0242*** 0.0231*** 0.0370** 0.0422*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) 
Year 2001 -1.0855*** -1.0997*** -1.2858** -1.2364* 
 (0.243) (0.244) (0.626) (0.635) 
Year 2004 -1.1270*** -1.1193*** -1.3591** -1.3124** 
 (0.314) (0.316) (0.647) (0.656) 
     
Constant -3.0576*** -3.0839*** -6.8910*** -7.7365*** 
 (0.872) (0.845) (1.386) (1.470) 
     
N 2,975 2,978 648 648 
R2 0.7450 0.7474 0.8402 0.8378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 4.13: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher 
Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts) 
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Conclusion 
This chapter establishes the extent to which racial balance influences electoral 
systems and affects descriptive and substantive representation for minority students. 
Amongst the myriad of findings, a few trends emerge that shed light on the theoretical and 
substantive questions of the chapter. On the substantive question, are minority students 
better served in racially balanced districts versus racially imbalanced districts, the 
conclusion depends on the set of minority students being discussed. On the dimensions of 
minority board and administrator representation, Black students tend to experience 
greater outcomes in racially balanced districts, and in terms of Black teacher 
representation, they experience increases with board representation in both policy 
environments. Latino students, on the other hand, attain their greatest representational 
benefits in racially imbalanced districts. Therefore, the general finding of desegregation 
literature that racially balanced districts are the best educational setting for minority 
students is not supported (see Figures 4.15 and 4.16).   
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Figure 4.15: Electoral Structure Effects on Black Representation Results Summary 
Table 
 
 Black Representation 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Dependent 
Variable 
Interaction 
Tested 
Hypothesis Support Conclusion-Best Policy 
Environment  
1 Electoral 
Structure 
n/a; board type  supported n/a 
1a Electoral 
Structure  
At-Large supported n/a 
1b Electoral 
Structure 
Ward supported n/a 
2 Board 
Representation 
 supported Racially balanced 
2a Board 
Representation 
Racial balance* 
structure (%) 
Not supported  
2b Board 
Representation 
Racial balance* 
structure (%) 
supported  
3 Bureaucratic 
Representation 
 support Administrator 
Racially 
balanced 
Teacher 
No 
difference 
3a Bureaucratic 
Representation 
Board 
Representation * 
structure (%) 
Administ-
rator 
Not 
supported 
 
Teacher 
Not 
supported 
 
3b Bureaucratic 
Representation  
Board 
Representation * 
structure (%) 
Administ-
rator 
Not 
supported 
Teacher 
supported 
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Figure 4.16: Electoral Structural Effects on Latino Representation Results Summary 
Table 
 
 Latino Representation 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Dependent 
Variable 
Interaction 
Tested 
Hypothesis Support Conclusion-Best Policy 
Environment  
1 Electoral 
Structure 
n/a; board type   n/a 
1a Electoral 
Structure  
At-Large Supported n/a 
1b Electoral 
Structure 
Ward Supported n/a 
2 Board 
Representation 
 Supported Imbalanced 
2a Board 
Representation 
Racial balance* 
structure (%) 
Supported   
2b Board 
Representation 
Racial balance* 
structure (%) 
Not supported  
3 Bureaucratic 
Representation 
 Supported Administrator 
Imbalanced 
Teacher 
imbalanced 
3a Bureaucratic 
Representation 
Board 
Representation * 
structure (%) 
Administ-
rator 
supported 
Teacher 
supported 
 
3b Bureaucratic 
Representation  
Board 
Representation * 
structure (%) 
Administ-
rator  
Not 
supported 
Teacher 
Not 
supported 
 
 
 
 
 
The inconsistent findings spur more questions about minority education, especially 
the distinct experiences of African American and Latino students. Here, the arguments of 
the Brown decision and subsequent research continue to hold for Blacks; racially balanced 
and imbalanced districts have distinct effects on outcomes, but the structural benefits of 
ward systems are enhanced and the negative effects of at-large districts are reduced for 
Blacks in racially balanced districts. As the research predicts, this policy environment 
allows Black access to resources, in this case political resources, which are not as accessible 
in racially imbalanced districts. However, this is not the case for Latinos. Separate does not 
appear to mean unequal for them. In fact, they seem to flourish politically in separate, 
racially imbalanced districts. Scholars studying the resegregation of American schools 
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often place particular attention on the high levels of segregation Latino students 
experience and are likely to continue to experience given their population growth.  
Assumptions that this segregation has a negative effect as seen for Blacks are generally 
made about the Latino education experience; however, here I show that may not be the 
case. While I do not directly test student measures yet, the findings on the political school 
setting factors that are examined set up some of the important parameters that often 
determine education outcomes. Focusing on the policy makers and the effect that the level 
of racial balance has on their access to policy making and their specific policy decisions 
provides the first round of indication that students in racially imbalanced districts may fare 
just as well as those in balanced districts.  If policy makers are able to use structure and 
racial imbalance to their advantage, they make be equally successful in improving student 
outcomes in such an environment.  
The theoretical implications also warrant some discussion. The chapter attempts to 
contribute to the budding literature on the factors that can manipulate electoral structure 
in the favor of minority constituents and candidates. While others have looked at specific 
mechanisms such as political parties and partisanship and population size, the current 
research applies the theories of institutional environment and external control to make an 
argument for why and how we should expect such factors to be theoretically and 
empirically important to predicting electoral structure’s effect on representation at the 
descriptive and substantive level. The findings indicate that structure is indeed not a sole 
actor of representation and policy influence, and is perhaps less influential when the policy 
environment is considered.   
Overall, the findings of this chapter demonstrate the significance of racial balance at 
the electoral level. The next chapter extends the substantive representation findings and 
 133 
 
examines how teacher representation translates into substantive benefits for minority 
students given the level of racial balance. I continue to explore the policy environment that 
best serves minority students, but I move to the second dimension of segregation—
grouping and discipline policies. Many scholars have found teacher representation to have 
a mitigating effect on racial disparities in grouping and tracking policies. I apply the 
currently established knowledge on the two policy environments to this research to 
determine if minority teachers continue to reduce such disparities. 
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CHAPTER V 
 MINORITY REPRESENTATION UNDER VARYING POLICY ENVIRONMENTS 
As thoroughly outlined in the earlier chapters, much empirical research has shown a 
positive relationship between bureaucrats’ ability to actively represent clients and alter 
client outcomes (Keiser et al. 2002; Bardbury and Kellough 2008; Wilkins and Keiser 
2006).  Specifically, minority students tend to perform better and receive more equitable 
treatment in schools with greater minority teacher representation (Dee 2005; Weiher 
2000; Meier, Stewart, England 1989). Similarly, greater resources are allocated for 
minority-focused programs such as bilingual education for Latino students when there is 
greater Latino administration representation (Theobald 2007). However, an interesting 
omission from this literature is the policy environment in which teachers and students 
must operate. The previous chapter shows the policy environment as an important player 
in electoral politics and the outcomes of varying electoral structures. This chapter applies 
the findings of the previous chapter to the bureaucratic level and explores its effect on 
teacher representation.  
The evaluative literature on desegregation policy provides some insight on how one’s 
school environment and the conditions of this environment may shape both teacher 
behavior and student performance, though scholars come to varied conclusions about 
student performance and their overall success in racially balanced and imbalanced 
environments. On one hand, researchers find that there are great benefits to students being 
educated in desegregated, racially balanced schools. When compared to their peers 
educated in segregated schools, students of racially balanced schools tend to have higher 
academic achievement records, greater aspirations, and economic and future success 
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(Southworth and Michelson 2007; Goldsmith 2011; Wells and Crain 1994). The legal 
elimination of segregation of public education, on the other hand, has also led to a rise in 
informal, within-school segregation (Oakes 1985). Additionally, teachers of more racially 
balanced, diverse schools tend to have more experience and have lower turnover rates 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005; Southworth and Michelson 2007).  
Students of racially imbalanced schools tend to have lower levels of academic 
attainment and achievement, are more likely to hold government or blue collar positions; 
and generally earn less than peers of desegregated schools (Frankenberg 2009; Rumberger 
and Willms 1992; Wells and Crain 1994; Crain and Strauss 1985). However, they also tend 
to have more positive and optimistic attitudes about school and higher educational 
aspirations and occupational expectations (Goldsmith 2004). Research indicating academic 
benefits of segregated education is limited, however.   
Collectively, these literatures suggest that both representative bureaucrats and the 
policy environment have a separate, but similar effect on student outcomes. The empirical 
research on representative bureaucracy has generally focused on individual bureaucrats’ 
actions without much attention placed on the environment in which bureaucrats operate 
and the consequences for outcomes in varying policy environments.  Similarly, the research 
on desegregated and segregated education rarely discusses how the two settings affect 
bureaucratic behavior in a way that shapes student outcomes (but see Sanders 1984). The 
miscommunication between these two bodies of research leaves a window for important 
questions on how they relate and the manner in which they may collectively affect student 
outcomes. Such questions include:  should we expect the benefits of representation to 
transcend varied policy environments? Do the previous chapter’s findings that the policy 
environment can help to increase teacher and administrator representation translate into 
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better substantive outcomes for students given the policy environment differences?  Do 
teachers or administrators in segregated schools benefit students in the same manner as 
those in racially balanced schools and vice versa? Are students any better off in the racially 
balanced environment as the traditional desegregation literature suggests?  
This chapter builds from the open systems theory of organizations to look at this 
relationship between policy environments and representative bureaucracy, using the case 
of racially imbalanced and racially balanced school districts as two policy environments 
that may  influence bureaucratic action in a manner that leads to distinct or similar policy 
outcomes for students, particularly minority students. Broadly, open systems theory 
suggests that the (policy) environment can greatly influence organizational behavior and 
outcomes, primarily through resources and support. I draw from this work to contend that 
the bureaucrats act within the confinements of their policy environment. It determines the 
extent to which minority bureaucrats are more or less representative to minority students. 
As this external control changes, it relaxes or contracts, minority representation may also 
change.  I examine the ability of minority bureaucrats, in this case teachers, to create a 
more equal or less discriminatory school experience for racial minority students through 
grouping and discipline policies to demonstrate these differences and the implications for 
student outcomes. Results indicate interesting differences but also similarities in 
representation under racially balanced and imbalanced systems.  
Revisiting Representative Bureaucracy and Education Policy Research 
 There is a plethora of research on the relationship between teacher race and 
student performance. As noted above and in the previous chapter, public administration 
scholars contend that a bureaucrat’s ability to actively represent students leads to changes 
in student performance and the equality of school policies, particularly for minority 
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students of a more racially representative environment (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 
1999; Meier and Stewart 1991; Weiher 2000).  Similarly, education scholars theorize that 
minority students perform better under minority teachers due to the teacher’s ability to 
create a role model effect and use of shared culture in “reaching” minority students (Dee 
2004; Ladson-Billings 1994). This “reaching” effect can extend beyond academics. Atkins 
and Wilkins (2013) find that minority teacher representation helps to reduce the Black 
teen pregnancy rate. The findings of both bodies of research are consistent and robust, and 
they extend beyond the teacher-student relationship. The scholarship also notes a positive 
relationship between minority student outcomes and minority administrators (Leal and 
Hess 2000; Rocha and Wrinkle 2011).  
 This research is particularly salient to the broader scholarship on the unintended 
consequences of federal desegregation policy because it suggests one way to mitigate the 
within school segregation and inequalities that have expanded post-Brown.  Meier and his 
colleagues show on multiple occasions that teacher representation, as a form of political 
power and access, helps to reduce grouping and tracking inequalities for African American 
and Latino students (Meier, Stewart, England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991). The 
inequalities of grouping and tracking procedures within schools highlight an aspect of 
school desegregation policy that the courts and law makers did not foresee, but also did not 
directly ban or correct. Plus, the negative effect that ability grouping has on student 
achievement, especially among lower ability students who are often students of color or 
from a lower income background, threatens the overall academic success and quality of life 
for these students (Carbonaro 2005; Schofield 2006). It undercuts the vision of the Brown 
decision.  
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Yet in the abundance of this literature, there is a dearth of theoretical exploration 
into exactly how the environment affects the relationships and to what extent these past 
findings hinge on the setting in which they operate. Does this effect happen in all types of 
schools—racially diverse or homogenous? After all, among the many arguments supporting 
the Brown v. Board of Education decision was the contention that the conditions under 
which students are taught play a large role in student and teacher resources and 
experiences, and inevitably outcomes. The research of external organizational control and 
constraint offers one lens for examining the relationship between the policy environment 
in which teachers and students operate and educational outcomes for students.  
The Environment as an External Control 
 To understand why minority bureaucrats may be more or less effective in 
producing substantive benefits for their co-ethnic clients, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the internal and external factors that contribute to the organizational 
outcome process. Internal processes—the factors that are within the bureaucrat’s or 
organization’s control—are often times easy to manipulate or navigate around to ensure 
productivity and organizational success. For example, organizations have much more 
control over employee morale than political support, and can therefore adjust internal 
happenings to make this a positive factor for organizational success. However, external 
processes, factors outside of the organization or bureaucrat’s realm of control are more 
difficult to manipulate and address. These factors may consist of clientele preferences or 
opinions, political elites’ control, or institutional and structural constraints to the 
organization. Consequently, the actions of organizational bureaucrats, implementers of 
policy and handlers of clientele concerns and interests, may also be restricted to this 
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external control. Such restrictions could lead bureaucrats of varying environments under 
different forms or types of external control to represent differently.  
 I use the open systems theory research of organizational theory and behavior to 
guide my argument and expectations for why and how minority bureaucrats in racially 
balanced districts may represent differently from their colleagues in less racially balanced 
districts. Arguments of organizations under the open systems theory note that 
organizations have interdependences and interactions with their environment that guide 
their actions, outcomes, and outputs (Katz and Kahn 1966).  Changes and cues from the 
broader environment or “system” also influence changes in organizations (Shafritz, Ott, 
and Jang 2005, 476). Two main perspectives on how organizations handle environmental 
influence have emerged from this literature: Thompson’s (1967) synthesis of open and 
closed systems (a contingency perspective) and Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource 
dependency theory.  Under Thompson’s perspective, organizations face uncertainty and 
uncontrollable circumstances through the environment, but they also have rational, closed 
system aspects that permit them to maintain some control and certainty over the 
organization and its outputs. This perspective suggests that the technical, bureaucratic 
level generally remains closed and rational, meaning the actors still have some control over 
outcomes. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) view organizations similarly, but they argue that 
organizational functioning and outputs are largely a function or consequence of the 
environment and its contingencies and constraints because they are dependent on it for 
resources and support. The governance of organizations is mainly external, so 
organizations and the bureaucrats within them are akin to puppets of the external 
environment. Unless organizations are able to dominate their resource environment, they 
have limited room to establish themselves separate from the environment. 
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 In the case of school desegregation policy and the racial composition of schools, the 
arguments provide a lens for explaining and understanding how more racially balanced 
school districts, as a policy environment, could differ from less racially balanced districts, 
outside of the typical discussions of their level of resources and effects on students. It is 
without question that distinctions in resources and student effects matter; however, 
recognizing the nature of organizations and their ability to handle constraints and 
challenges may better explain how the district types could differ and why the two 
experience different student outcome effects based on resources, student peers, and 
teachers, and different educational outcomes overall.   
Additionally, integrating these arguments into the representative bureaucracy 
literature produces an alternative and perhaps more accurate understanding of how 
bureaucrats come to represent clients, when and where they are more or less likely to 
represent their racial group’s interests, and why a minority bureaucrat in a racially 
balanced district could represent very differently or similarly to one in a racially 
imbalanced district, and inevitably alter policy outcomes. Bureaucrats who must represent 
within these frames behave according to the environmental manipulations, demands, and 
expectations differently. Consequently, teachers of a district that aligns more with Pfeffer 
and Salancik’s argument may find themselves more restricted in their ability to represent 
co-ethnic students, particularly if this practice is frowned upon in the organization. On the 
other hand, we might expect those in an organization of Thompson’s perspective to 
experience environmental constraints or restrictions, but they may also have the liberty to 
address environmental uncertainty, demands, and control by creating coping mechanisms 
that allow them to sidestep environmental influence and represent co-ethnic students 
despite the environmental challenges.  
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Minority Representation under Varying Policy Environments: Applying the 
Thompson and Pfeffer& Salancik Perspectives 
 Recall that the basic argument of representative bureaucracy and its supporting 
research is that passive representation is a fundamental component of public 
bureaucracies because it affects the distribution of goods and services to clients based on 
shared demographic-based values, experiences, socialization, and interests, a process 
known as active representation (Selden 1997; Dolan and Rosenbloom 2003). However, as 
noted previously, organizational theorists provide alternative views on why this argument 
for bureaucrats as entities of bureaucratic organizations may not work and may vary 
across organizations’ policy environments. I apply two of those arguments, Thompson’s 
and Pfeffer and Salancik’s here to explain when and why bureaucrats of racially balanced 
districts may look the same as their colleagues in racially imbalanced districts, and when 
and why they may represent differently.  
 Thompson’s (1967) general argument about organizations as they relate to their 
environment is that the environment is indeed a master manipulator of organizations; 
however, organizations also maintain some of their autonomy from the environment at the 
lower, technical level. Applied to school districts, this lower level equates to the teachers 
and other faculty and staff that perform technical functions in the organizations and work 
most closely with the clients, the students. Because this level is considered a “closed 
system” to the environment, teachers hold discretion from the environment to operate as 
they please. Representation may occur freely, and minority teachers are likely to use this 
discretion and their ability to represent to help minority students of their shared racial or 
ethnic group. Thompson (1967) also contends that all formal organizations contain a 
technical “suborganization” that is insulated from external control to focus on effective 
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technical performance. As such, external influence and environmental differences should 
matter less in predicting representation’s effect and organizational outcomes.  Minority 
representatives that are prone to represent minority students will represent the students’ 
interests and help to reduce the level of inequalities regardless of the level of racial balance 
because they operate in a “closed” system from environmental challenges or constraints.   
 Hypothesis 1: Minority representatives in racially imbalanced and racially balanced 
districts will have the same effect on student outcomes.  
 The racial balance, as a proxy of a bureaucrat’s external policy environment, will be 
irrelevant to their representative behavior as they operate semi-independent or 
“protected” from the challenges and demands of the environment. I expect no difference in 
minority representation between racially balanced and imbalanced districts, and findings 
most consistent with previous research on the relationship between minority 
representation and student outcomes.  
 On the other hand, Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) argument leaves room to reach a 
different expectation for minority representation in racially balanced and imbalanced 
districts. Their argument generally holds that organizations’ context shapes their activities. 
The internal operation and happenings of the organization and its bureaucrats reflect the 
external environment on which it is dependent. This would also mean that if organizations 
and those within the organizations depend on different environments, then the 
organizations should also function differently, as the environment dictates.  As 
environments vary, the functioning, processes, and likely outcomes of organizations also 
vary. Under this argument, minority teachers of different school district environments 
should also represent their minority students differently. In other words, minority 
representatives of racially balanced districts will represent in one way, while those of 
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racially imbalanced district will represent in another. Because this research deals with 
inequalities that are likely sensitive to minorities, we may not expect the minority 
representatives of racially balanced and imbalanced districts to always represent in 
opposite ways, but Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) approach gives reason to expect some 
divergent behavior that Thompson’s argument does not necessarily support.  
 Hypothesis 2: Minority representatives in racially imbalanced districts will have a 
different effect on minority students’ outcomes when compared to representatives in racially 
balanced districts.  
 From the Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) perspective, it is unclear the direction or level 
of divergence for representation between racially balanced and imbalanced school 
districts. However, the sizable body of research on the effects of a school’s racial 
composition and teacher behavior, and research on racially balanced and imbalanced 
school district differences may guide expectations for representational differences across 
the two policy environments.  Scholars find that teachers in more racially imbalanced, 
highly minority populated schools are more likely to be novice teachers, have higher 
turnover rates,  have lower salaries, poorer work facilities, and are more likely to be of 
color (Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 2005; Frankenberg 2009; Loeb, Darling-Hammond, and 
Luczak 2005).  In fact, Frankenberg (2009) notes that African American and Latino 
teachers are overrepresented in urban, highly minority populated schools and 
underrepresented in suburban schools and areas where most of the students are white. On 
the other hand, teachers in more racially balanced schools are generally more experienced, 
considered of higher quality, and less likely to lack certification (Southworth and Michelson 
2007; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). Such differences have been linked to student 
achievement. Sanders (1984) finds that Black students of racially isolated teachers “gained 
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5.27 months less achievement” than their peers of non-isolated teachers. The finding 
suggests that differences in the policy environment affect teachers with implications for 
students.  
 Additionally, the desegregation research also highlights general distinctions in 
education under racially imbalanced districts and racially imbalanced districts that support 
the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective of external environmental effects on organizations. 
Racially balanced school districts tend to have a more rigorous academic climate and 
greater financial and human capital (Southworth and Michelson 2007). Scholars also find 
that students of the more balanced, or desegregated environment, are generally more 
successful academically and economically in the long term. They tend to have greater 
academic attainment levels—they are less likely to dropout of school and more likely to 
attend and complete college, often hold occupational positions of higher prestige, and are 
more likely to have white collar and professional jobs (Goldsmith 2009; Wells and Crain 
1994; Crain and Strauss 1985; Guryan 2004).   
 There is also research outside of this desegregation frame that points to differences 
in racially balanced and imbalanced learning environments that help to support the Pfeffer 
and Salancik perspective. Benner and Crosnoe (2010) show that in general, students 
perform better in more diverse settings with more co-ethnic peers (but see Caldas and 
Bankston 1999). Interestingly, white students benefit the most from such an environment. 
The research suggests that the ideal learning environment for students consists of a 
diverse, well balanced body of students. 
 These works, coupled with the previously highlighted research on within school 
segregation, suggests a few important differences between racially balanced districts and 
racially imbalanced districts that help to develop expectations for representation under the 
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two types of policy environments. First, when the organization (school district) is 
dependent on a more balanced environment, they seem to have more resources and 
opportunities for students, all positive indicators of student outcomes. However, greater 
resources and opportunities also equate to greater latitude for the inequitable distribution 
of goods; some students are likely to be favored or fare better than others in such an 
environment.  Although there is evidence that minority representation helps to promote 
equity in schools, minority representatives are less likely to be found in more racially 
balanced environments (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 
2005). Therefore, there are fewer opportunities for minority representation benefits in 
racially balanced environments compared to racially imbalanced environments.  Finally, 
more balanced environments tend to support equality externally, as exhibited through the 
level of racial evenness in the district, but internally there is less equality. Students are 
more likely to be grouped and tracked in a discriminatory fashion (Southworth and 
Mickelson 2007). Given these differences,  
Hypothesis 2a: Racially balanced school districts will have higher levels of inequitable 
policy outcomes compared to racially imbalanced districts. 
While there is also a greater probability of less minority representation in racially 
balanced districts, this policy environment also calls for stronger and more minority 
representation because the demand is greater. Assuming that the environment is not 
completely hostile to active representation, minority teachers may respond to the 
inequitable “functioning” of the organization on behalf of minority students. Greater or 
stronger representation amongst minority teachers may occur within racially balanced 
districts as a response to the policy environment, particularly the inequitable internal 
happenings. In other words, minority teachers that are able to enter the more racially 
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balanced environment are more likely to address the inequitable policies and have a 
greater level of influence on policy outcomes when compared to their colleagues in less 
racially balanced environments.  
Hypothesis 2b: Representation in racially balanced districts will have a greater effect 
on inequitable policy outcomes when compared to representation in racially imbalanced 
districts.  
The probability of greater minority representation is higher in racially imbalanced 
school districts; however, this policy environment may actually demand less minority 
representation, particularly in addressing within school segregation techniques. Here, the 
environmental constraints and demands may call for minority representation to operate on 
a different dimension of “functioning” to represent minority students such as role model 
effects or college readiness.  Therefore, we may expect an opposite or less significant effect 
in the racially imbalanced districts.  
Methods and Measures 
This chapter uses the previously discussed data sources and data over two school 
terms, 2000-2001 and 2003-2004. The units of analysis are public school districts with a 
1999-2000 school enrollment above 5000.  
Dependent Variables 
 Dependent variables are grouped as two areas of education policy: academic 
grouping and discipline. Three measures are used in each category to identify within 
school segregation procedures and to examine any differences in how minority teacher 
representation affects the processes across the two policy environments considered.  
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Academic Grouping 
 Academic grouping is the placement of students in classes outside of the standard 
education setting based on their “estimated achievement or ability levels,” (Office for Civil 
Rights 2010).  I only account for students placed in special education and gifted education 
courses; however, academic grouping also includes students pulled out of regular 
mathematics or language arts classes for alternative or additional assistance33 (Office for 
Civil Rights 2010).  
Academic grouping measures are developed to indicate the disproportionate 
assignment of African American and Latino students to gifted education courses and 
categories of mental retardation for special education assignments.  A proportional index 
measure (odds ratio) is constructed to capture the extent to which African American or 
Latino students are disproportionately assigned to special education or gifted education 
classes. It assumes that students of each racial group represented in a school or district are 
assigned to such courses at a rate equal to their population size. It can be best illustrated as  
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
where     equals the number of Latino students grouped in gifted or special education 
courses,   is the total Latino student population,    represents the total number of 
students grouped in gifted or special education, and  is the total student population. 
Traditional of any ratio calculation, an index value of 1.0 indicates that students are 
                                                 
33  Office for Civil Rights ability grouping data does not include grouping based on required prerequisites for 
certain courses (i.e. Algebra I as a prerequisite for Algebra II) or programs and services for students with 
disabilities served under IDEA  (Office for Civil Rights 2010).  
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proportionally represented in special education or gifted courses relative to their share of 
the total student population; values above 1.0 indicate overrepresentation in the courses 
and values below 1.0 indicate underrepresentation.   
This measure allows me to observe the overrepresentation or underrepresentation 
of students in academic groups to determine how schools are using these systems to create 
segregated settings within the schools. However, the measure fails to capture some 
important aspects of resegregation that are fundamental to desegregation research. First, 
the discriminatory process of academic grouping often follows discriminatory tracking 
policies—the disproportionate assignment of minority students in college bound or 
vocational tracks. The OCR data does not allow me to capture this aspect of resegregation 
and the effect that representation and the policy environment may have on this process, 
though previous scholarship suggests that there is reason to believe that students in a 
racially balanced environment are more likely to be disproportionately funneled into the 
lower, vocational track and less likely to be fostered into the college-bound track (Oakes 
1985). 
Second, I am not able to disentangle the extent to which students are discouraged 
to pursue certain academic tracks or more positive opportunities. It is unclear how much of 
the grouping is related to “self-selection,” and the amount attributed to teacher or 
administrator behavior. Though the theory contends that teachers and administrators of 
certain backgrounds affect the process through their recommendations, a full picture of 
physical recommendation (submitting formal paperwork to group a student), and verbal 
recommendation to individual students would be ideal to capture academic grouping and 
tracking assignments. Nevertheless, the measure is the best measure for capturing within 
school segregation and limitations in students’ educational experiences.  
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Discipline 
 Three common disciplinary actions are used as the second set of dependent 
variables: corporal punishment, out of school suspensions, and expulsions. Corporal 
punishment consists of paddling, spanking, or other forms of physical punishment imposed 
on a student (Office for Civil Rights 2010). Although controversial, corporal punishment 
remains legal in some US public schools. Only 31 states and the District of Columbia have 
outlawed the practice in their public schools. States that permit corporal punishment 
generally leave policy making on its use and severity to local school boards (Center for 
Effective Discipline 2011). Out of school suspensions include the removal of a student from 
his/her regular school for one day or longer, while expulsions consist of a student’s removal 
for the remainder of the year or longer (Office for Civil Rights 2010).  
 Again, a proportional index measure (odds ratio) is constructed to capture the 
extent to which African American or Latino students are disproportionately punished 
under the same assumptions of proportional representation discussed above. A separate 
measure is generated for each form of discipline.  The current discipline measures fail to 
capture other, and perhaps more frequent, methods of discipline such as verbal 
reprimanding and classroom discipline, visits to a school administrator, and in-school 
suspensions, but it is the most accurate measure of within school discipline practices 
known to date.  
Explanatory Variables 
Bureaucratic representation, the main independent variable, is measured at the 
street level as the percentage of African American and Latino teachers per district.  The key 
explanatory variable, level of racial balance, is measured using the previously explained 
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similarity score (see Chapter 4).  Consistent with the previous chapter, the .60 cutoff is 
used in the analyses below to separate more racially balanced districts from less racially 
balanced districts.  
Control Variables  
Consistent with the previous chapter, I controlled for geographic region, level of 
residential segregation, and a set of resource variables—percentage of Blacks and Latinos 
with college degrees, the percentage that are homeowners, the median Black and Latino 
family income, and the percentage of Whites in poverty (see Chapter 4).  Resource 
variables are expected to improve the equity of grouping and discipline policies for 
minority students because greater resources—financial or political—increase minorities’ 
ability to pressure school districts to create a more equitable academic setting for students 
(Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991).  Biases against poor Whites 
are expected to work in the favor of middle class Blacks and Latinos so I expect a negative 
relationship between the odds ratios of each policy and white poverty.  
I also account for the size of the district, using a measure of district enrollment to 
control for district size. Larger districts are generally more professionalized, more aware of 
civil rights laws and regulations, and are typically under more public scrutiny when it 
comes to questions of equity. Therefore, they are also more likely to be sensitive to even 
covert discriminatory practices like inequitable grouping and tracking policies, leading me 
to expect more equitable polices in larger districts (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989, 36; 
Meier and Stewart 1991, 147).   
 Ordinary least squares modeling is used to test the hypotheses. Diagnostic tests 
revealed heteroskedasticity issues; therefore, robust standard errors were used to address 
the concern.   
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Findings 
Grouping Policies 
Observing the linear relationship between minority representation and grouping 
and tracking policies is insufficient without first establishing baseline levels of 
disproportionate grouping policies by race/ethnicity. Table 5.1 shows the odds of Black, 
Latino and white students being grouped in gifted education and the two special education 
categories. Black and Latino students are underrepresented in gifted courses, while White 
students are about 30 percent overrepresented in gifted education courses. Black students 
also face greater odds of being grouped as mildly or moderately retarded into special 
education courses and are significantly overrepresented in this category; Latino students, 
on average, are represented fairly equitably to their total enrollment in both special 
education categories, and White students are slightly underrepresented.  
  
 
 
Table 5.1 Grouping Policy Ratios by Race 
 
Grouping  Policy  Blacks Latinos Whites 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Gifted Education  .4837 .4241 .5008 .4154 1.417 .6796 
Mild Retardation  1.966 2.2096 .9249 1.425 .8830 .6693 
Moderate 
Retardation 
1.869 5.879 .9808 2.113 .9977 .6106 
 
 
A deeper look at this data by policy environment in Table 5.2 shows that Black and 
Latino students are still underrepresented in gifted classes in both racially imbalanced and 
balanced districts, but to a greater extent in racially balanced districts, supporting my 
hypothesis, though there is no statistical difference observed for Latino students. White 
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students remain overrepresented in gifted classes, regardless of the academic setting, 
though their odds of being placed in gifted education are significantly higher in more 
racially imbalanced school districts.  
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Grouping Policy Ratios by Race and Level of Racial Balance34  
 
 Blacks Latinos Whites 
 Racially 
Balanced 
Racially 
Imbalanced 
Racially 
Balanced 
Racially 
Imbalanced 
Racially 
Balanced 
Racially 
Imbalanced 
Grouping  
Policy  
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Gifted 
Education  
.4657*** 
(.3995) 
.5645 
(.5131) 
.4960 
(.3959) 
.5215 
(.4910) 
1.352*** 
(.4862) 
1.705 
(1.171) 
Mild 
Retardation  
2.017* 
(2.322) 
1.776 
(1.716) 
.9697*** 
(1.498) 
.7354 
(1.046) 
.9212*** 
(.6960) 
.7398 
(.5353) 
Moderate 
Retardation  
1.910 
(6.387) 
1.725 
(3.535) 
.9871 
(1.8199) 
.9546 
(3.041) 
.9999 
(.5402) 
.9894 
(.8139) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Ratios between racial group in racially balanced and imbalanced districts 
statistically different at specified level.  
 
 
 
Results on negative groupings also reveal interesting grouping policy differences 
and similarities across policy environments. While there is a statistical difference in mild 
retardation classification between the two policy environments for all three racial groups, 
only Black students are overrepresented in special education. Latino and White students 
are underrepresented in assessments of mild and moderate retardation and move closer to 
parity in racially balanced districts for both special education categories. Results again 
suggest that all students, especially Latino students, are faring better on average in racially 
imbalanced districts.  
 
                                                 
34 Districts with a similarity index score of .60 or above are considered racially balanced; districts with a score 
below .60 are considered imbalanced districts.  
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Discipline Policies  
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 highlight the inequalities of discipline policies. Black students 
are overrepresented in all three forms of discipline, while white students are 
underrepresented across all three forms. Latino students, on the other hand, fare as 
anticipated. Table 5.3 shows that Latino students have the greatest odds of being 
disciplined at the most equitable rate compared to Black and white students. Latino 
students are underrepresented, on average, in corporal punishment discipline procedures 
and are suspended and expelled from schools at a rate nearly equitable to their total 
population.  It is unclear from the data exactly why Latino students tend to be more 
equitably represented in discipline policies.  
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Discipline Policy Ratios by Race  
Discipline 
Policy 
Blacks Latinos Whites 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Corporal 
Punishment 
1.452 .9817 .6008 1.886 .8451 .5428 
Suspensions 1.846 .8686 .9815 .5344 .8413 .3714 
Expulsions 1.597 1.967 .9467 1.344 .7448 .4306 
 
 
 
When the distribution of discipline actions in racially balanced districts are 
compared to those in imbalanced districts, results indicate statistical differences between 
the two for each racial group, but also similarities consistent with the grouping policies of 
Table 5.2. Black students are consistently overrepresented in disciplinary actions and to a 
greater extent in racially balanced schools, as hypothesized. Latino students, on the other 
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hand, are underrepresented to the greatest extent in corporal punishment relative to the 
other racial groups. All three racial groups seem to experience less disciplinary action in 
racially imbalanced districts, which suggests a more equitable environment in such 
districts. These findings provide a stronger indication of minority students experiencing a 
more equitable and less harsh discipline policies in racially imbalanced districts. Again, 
students in racially balanced districts do not seem to be faring better than their peers in 
racially segregated schools. Instead, these students, particularly African Americans, are 
experience stronger and harsher disciplinary policies.  
 
 
 
Table 5.4: Discipline Policy Ratios by Race and Level of Racial Balance 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Ratios between racial group in racially balanced and imbalanced districts 
statistically different at specified level.  
 
 
 
The research findings overall are consistent with previous literature, suggesting that 
not much has changed in regard to second generation discrimination in public schools 
(Oakes 1985; Meier, Steward and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991). However, two 
interesting trends emerge from Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 when comparing grouping and 
discipline policies in racially balanced and imbalanced school districts that provide new 
 Blacks Latinos Whites 
 Racially 
Balanced 
Racially 
Imbalanced 
Racially 
Balanced 
Racially 
Imbalanced 
Racially 
Balanced 
Racially 
Imbalanced 
Discipline Policy  Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Corporal 
Punishment 
1.469 
(1.017) 
1.417 
(.9029) 
.5124 
(.5278) 
.4527 
(.5482) 
.8503 
(.4964) 
.8339 
(.6340) 
Suspensions 1.912*** 
(.8845) 
1.549 
(.7228) 
1.017*** 
(.5364) 
.8240 
(.4969) 
.8482*** 
(.2052) 
.7322 
(.2676) 
Expulsions 1.660*** 
(2.084) 
1.325 
(1.324) 
.9607 
(1.8199) 
.8896 
(1.300) 
.7738*** 
(.4277) 
.6207 
(.4213) 
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insights on second generation discrimination. First, I find support for the expectation of 
less equitable policies in racially balanced districts compared to imbalanced districts. 
Overall, students tend to fare better in racially imbalanced districts. This finding challenges 
the long held argument that more racially balanced, diverse educational settings provide 
the greatest benefits for students. Although students may receive greater long term 
academic benefits and access to resources in racially balanced schools, the results show 
that the “benefits” come at a cost and are limited to minority students, especially Black 
students. 
 Racially imbalanced districts prove to be particularly more equitable policy 
environments for Latino and White students. They are consistently underrepresented on 
the negative indicators (i.e. discipline and special education classifications). This is 
somewhat expected for white students but is not expected for Latino students. Both tables 
show that grouping and discipline policies in racially balanced and imbalanced school 
districts are consistently harmful to African American students, while other students tend 
to experience some relief in racially imbalanced districts. Black students experience lower 
odds of being place in gifted education and greater odds of being placed in special 
education and experiencing harsh discipline policies. Even in the more segregated 
environments where Black students are more likely to make up the majority of the student 
population, decreasing the “need” to internally separate students, they remain significantly 
overrepresented in special education and disciplinary actions. Consistent with the 
argument of the Brown v. Board of Education decision, separate schools are far from being 
equal from Black students, although they are more equal than racially balanced schools. 
Interestingly, they seem to be more equitable to students that the original legislation did 
not cover. The results suggest that neither environment is particularly beneficial for 
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African American students, leading one to question the state of Black education. If Black 
students experience such inequalities, regardless of the environment, where should 
practitioners and scholars center their focus and efforts in improving their educational 
experience? Additionally, will the similarities of racially balanced and imbalanced districts 
trump any intervention introduced to address the inequalities? Findings of the next section 
consider these questions in showing the effect of minority teacher representation on the 
disparities in grouping and discipline policies in segregated and desegregated school 
districts.  
Representation and Racial Balancing in Public Schools  
Grouping Policies    
 Tables 5.5 and 5.6 include a comparison of the results for the test of minority 
teacher representation’s effect on grouping policies in racially balanced and imbalanced 
school districts for Black and Latino students. The results of Table 5.5 suggest that Black 
teachers positively influence Black students’ odds of being assigned to gifted education and 
reduce their odds of being classified as mildly retarded and recommended to special 
education, but fail to show any effect on more severe special education classifications. 
Although the level of racial balance fails to have a significant effect on any ability groupings, 
its interactive effect is shown to matter for Black gifted education assignments. Figure 5.1 
allows for a more complete view of how the policy environment shapes bureaucratic 
action. The model and figures provide some support for the Pfeffer and Salancik 
perspective. Here, the policy environment reduces teacher representation effects and to 
the greatest extent in racially balanced districts, leading Black representation in the 
imbalanced environment to differ from representation in the most balanced districts. 
Among the entire range of racially imbalanced districts, districts with a racial balance score 
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below the .60 threshold, Black teachers have a positive, but diminishing effect on Black 
students’ odds of being assigned to gifted education. In the most racially balanced districts, 
those in which over 80 percent of the schools are racially balanced, the effect is lost; Black 
teachers fail to have a significant effect on gifted education groupings for Black students. 
The model suggests that Black students in racially imbalanced districts may be faring 
relatively better than their peers in racially balanced districts, given their representational 
support. The results are consistent with the preliminary findings.  
The remaining grouping policy areas yield different results.  Consistent with Table 
5.5, marginal effect figures (see Appendix C) indicate that Black teachers help to reduce 
Black students’ odds of being classified as mildly retarded across both policy 
environments, nearly at the same rate as Thompson predicts; however, they fail to have a 
significant effect on reducing their odds of being classified as moderately retarded.  Though 
insignificant, the model is still consistent with Thompson’s perspective on policy 
environment effects.  Overall results provide greater support for Thompson’s perspective. 
The policy environment is undoubtedly influential in representation’s ability to reduce 
inequitable grouping practices for Black students, but Black teacher representation tends 
to have the same effect on student outcomes, regardless of the level of racial balance. I do 
not find much support for my hypothesis of greater representation effects in racially 
balanced districts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 158 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5: Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Academic Grouping Outcomes 
for Black Students across Policy Environments 
 
VARIABLES Gifted Education 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Mild Retardation  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Moderate Retardation  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black Representation  0.008** -0.029* -0.036 
 (0.003) (0.016) (0.044) 
Black-White Racial Balance Index  0.069 0.015 -0.870 
 (0.093) (0.543) (1.484) 
Representation*Racial Balance  -0.008** -0.006 0.025 
 (0.004) (0.024) (0.064) 
Black/White College Graduate Ratio 0.030 -0.011 0.113 
 (0.036) (0.127) (0.253) 
Black/White Income Ratio  0.005 -1.232*** -2.614 
 (0.020) (0.385) (1.801) 
Homeownership (%) 0.001 0.003 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.009) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) 0.011*** -0.073*** -0.018 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.023) 
Level of Residential Segregation  0.083 -0.439 1.415 
 (0.078) (0.397) (1.047) 
District Size (1000s) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
South -0.060*** 0.095 -0.329 
 (0.021) (0.132) (0.395) 
Latino Gifted (%) 0.007***   
 (0.001)   
Latino Mild Retardation (%)  -0.007**  
  (0.003)  
Latino Moderate Retardation (%)   0.002 
   (0.009) 
Constant 0.176** 3.696*** 3.531*** 
 (0.080) (0.530) (1.258) 
    
N 2,060 1,298 1,201 
R2 0.128 0.048 0.015 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 5.1: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of 
Gifted Education Assignment as Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
 
 
I find a similar relationship for Latino students; Latino teachers help to improve 
Latino students’ odds of being assigned to gifted education, but fail to have any effect on 
their odds of special education assignments (see Table 5.6). Because, the interaction 
coefficients reveal very little about the true relationship between the policy environment 
and Latino representation, I turn to Figure 5.2 for more insight. The figure for Latino 
representation’s effect on Latino students’ odds of being assigned to gifted education 
across the varying policy environments is nearly the same as Figure 5.1 of Black students. I 
find some support the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective, though it is somewhat limited. 
Latino teachers in less racially balanced districts also have a positive, but diminishing effect 
-.
0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
.0
1
.0
1
5
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
B
la
c
k
 T
e
a
c
h
e
r 
R
e
p
re
s
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Level of Racial Balance
Marginal Effect of Policy Environment 
95% Confidence Interval
 
Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Gifted Education for Black Students
 
Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Blacks Odds of Gifted Education as the Policy Environment Changes
 160 
 
on Latino students’ assignment to gifted education, and this finding holds until the higher 
end of racial balance. In the most racially balanced districts, which are also the districts in 
which minority students experience greater levels of inequality, Latino representation has 
no effect on their odds of being assigned to gifted education. This finding only affects about 
60 districts in the sample, but it certainly raises the question of why the benefits of 
representation fade in such districts.  Interestingly, representation is shown to be more 
effective in racially imbalanced districts, the environment in which Latino students are 
grouped more equitably. The results of both figures—Figure 5.1 and 5.2—fail to support 
my expectation of a greater effect in racially balanced districts. 
On the negative grouping dimensions, I find that Latino teacher representation has 
its greatest effect in racially balanced districts, as hypothesized (see Appendix C), in terms 
of mild retardation classifications. Latino teachers in more racially balanced districts help 
to reduce the level of inequitable groupings, while Latino teachers in less racially balanced 
districts fail to influence the policy outcome. Results on the mild retardation classification 
for special education provide more support for the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective, while 
results for the more severe, “moderate retardation” classification are insignificant and 
more consistent with the Thompson perspective of policy environment influence.  
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Table 5.6:  Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Academic Grouping Policy 
Outcomes for Latino Students across Policy Environments 
 
VARIABLES Gifted Education 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Mild Retardation  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Moderate Retardation  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Latino Representation  0.011*** 0.010 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
Latino-White Racial Balance Index  0.412*** 0.746* 0.050 
 (0.098) (0.386) (0.577) 
Representation*Racial Balance -0.009*** -0.023* -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) 
Latino/White College Graduate Ratio  0.031 -0.019 0.083 
 (0.025) (0.069) (0.137) 
Latino/White Income Ratio -0.024 0.100 -0.091 
 (0.050) (0.134) (0.168) 
Homeownership (%)  0.002** -0.005* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) 0.008*** -0.048*** -0.025 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.016) 
Level of Residential Segregation  -0.293*** -0.689** -0.193 
 (0.067) (0.275) (0.362) 
District Size (1000s) 0.000** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
South -0.026 -0.150** 0.049 
 (0.017) (0.069) (0.106) 
Black Gifted (%) 0.006***   
 (0.001)   
Black Mild Retardation (%)  -0.011***  
  (0.002)  
Black Moderate Retardation (%)   -0.010*** 
   (0.002) 
Constant 0.146* 1.761*** 1.424*** 
 (0.077) (0.335) (0.292) 
    
N 2,037 1,279 1,183 
R2 0.121 0.067 0.022 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ 
Odds of Gifted Education Assignment as Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
 
 
Previous scholarship examining the relationship between representation and 
policy outcomes for African American and Latino students separately shows 
representation overall to be a benefit for minority students in improving the access to 
education and reducing the levels of internal segregation that federal polices and 
legislation do not address. Yet, when this representation is examined under the microscope 
of varied policy environments and the realistic context of where teachers are actually 
“representing,” the results suggest that assuming that all minority teachers actively 
represent students or are able to represent the students in a way that significantly 
improves their academic experience is premature.  In some instances, the settings can lead 
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to different representational effects. Figure 5.3 summarizes the academic grouping findings 
for Black and Latino students as they align with the two perspectives of external control. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Academic Grouping Policy Findings Summary 
 Black Students  Latino Students  
 Gifted 
Education 
Mild 
Retardation 
Moderate 
Retardation 
Gifted 
Education 
Mild 
Retardation 
Moderate 
Retardation 
Thompson 
Perspective, No 
differences 
 X X—NS   X—NS 
Pfeffer & 
Salancik; 
differences  
X   X X  
 
 
 
Discipline Policies  
 Tables 5.7 and 5.8 include the effect of teacher representation on discipline policies 
for Black and Latino students in varying policy environments. The coefficients of Table 5.7 
suggest that although Black teacher representation helps to reduce Black students’ odds of 
being suspended and receiving corporal punishment at a disproportionate rate, this effect 
is lost when the environment in which the representation occurs is considered. Figure 5.4, 
a graph of the shared effect of policy environment and Black teacher representation on 
Black students’ suspension odds, indicates that representation has the same limited effect 
on school suspensions for Black students in both policy environments. Black teachers have 
a negative, but constant effect on Black students’ odds of suspension. The finding conforms 
to Thompson’s perspective of environmental effects; Black teachers in racially balanced 
districts represent students in the same manner as their colleagues in racially imbalanced 
districts.  
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Table 5.7: Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Discipline Policy Outcomes for 
Black Students across Policy Environments 
 
VARIABLES Corporal Punishment Suspensions Expulsions 
 Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black Representation  -0.028** -0.011* 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.016) 
Black-White Racial Balance Index  0.183 0.176 1.352*** 
 (0.483) (0.185) (0.408) 
Representation*Racial Balance  0.021 0.0003 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.021) 
Black/White College Graduate Ratio 0.142 -0.132*** 0.068 
 (0.122) (0.035) (0.098) 
Black/White Income Ratio  -0.326 0.205*** -0.065 
 (0.422) (0.025) (0.047) 
Homeownership (%) -0.003 -0.003*** -0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) 0.005 -0.048*** -0.034*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) 
Level of Residential Segregation  -1.166*** 0.050 -0.742** 
 (0.408) (0.125) (0.295) 
District Size (1000s) 0.007*** -0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
South 0.240 0.024 -0.150 
 (0.182) (0.038) (0.098) 
Latino Corporal Punishment (%) -0.008***   
 (0.003)   
Latino Suspensions (%)  -0.002**  
  (0.001)  
Latino Expulsions (%)   -0.014*** 
   (0.002) 
Constant 2.037*** 2.261*** 1.965*** 
 (0.540) (0.173) (0.410) 
    
N 475 2,137 1,699 
R2 0.084 0.108 0.044 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of 
Suspension as Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 The remaining discipline policies provide support for both perspectives (see 
Appendix C). Black teacher representation has a negative effect on Black students’ odds of 
receiving corporal punishment; however, in the most racially balanced districts, 
representation loses its effect. Results provide support for the Pfeffer and Salancik 
perspective, but fail to support my expectation of greater representation effects in racially 
balanced districts. Representation fails to reduce inequalities in districts where it is 
perhaps needed the most.  Black teachers in imbalanced districts provide greater 
representational benefits, possibly because they are more likely to recommend this least 
severe form of punishment to avoid more severe forms. Finally, Black teachers are unable 
to reduce the odds of the most extreme discipline measure, expulsion, similar to the 
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findings of Table 5.7. The insignificant interaction graph supports Thompson’s perspective 
of policy environment influence, as the nearly flat line indicates. Representation’s null 
effect appears to occur separate from any significant policy environment influence.  Past 
research has shown a relationship between teacher representation and expulsion rates, but 
the current finding could be related to the more recent “zero tolerance” clauses added to 
many school discipline policies.  
Table 5.8 suggests that Thompson’s perspective is most appropriate in examining 
the relationship between Latino representation and discipline policies.  In general, Latino 
teacher representation fails to reduce Latino students’ odds of experiencing harsh 
disciplinary measures.  While other figures, discussed below and shown in the Appendix C, 
support the findings of Table 5.8, Figure 5.5 shows more support for the Pfeffer and 
Salancik view of policy environments. The figure shows that Latino teachers in racially 
imbalanced districts fail to reduce the odds of suspension for Latino students, while their 
colleagues in more racially balanced districts help to reduce the practice. Latino teachers in 
the most racially balanced districts, those reaching near perfect racial balance, do not show 
this effect. Findings also support my expectation of greater representation effects in more 
racially balanced districts.  
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Table 5.8:  Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Discipline Policy Outcomes for 
Latino Students across Policy Environments 
VARIABLES Corporal Punishment Suspensions Expulsions 
 Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Latino Representation  0.010 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
Latino-White Racial Balance Index  0.319 0.194* 0.322 
 (0.204) (0.111) (0.316) 
Representation*Racial Balance -0.016 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) 
Latino/White College Graduate Ratio  -0.064* -0.042 -0.245*** 
 (0.033) (0.026) (0.077) 
Latino/White Income Ratio -0.019 -0.126** -0.336*** 
 (0.088) (0.050) (0.111) 
Homeownership (%)  0.002 -0.003*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) 0.017** -0.023*** -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) 
Level of Residential Segregation  -0.821*** 0.050 -0.300 
 (0.143) (0.068) (0.197) 
District Size (1000s) 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
South -0.205* -0.124*** -0.057 
 (0.120) (0.021) (0.065) 
Black Corporal Punishment (%) -0.005***   
 (0.001)   
Black Suspensions (%)  -0.007***  
  (0.000)  
Black Expulsions (%)   -0.007*** 
   (0.001) 
Constant 0.936*** 1.455*** 1.666*** 
 (0.238) (0.085) (0.268) 
    
N 451 2,108 1,700 
R2 0.175 0.224 0.061 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 5.5: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of 
Suspension as Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
 
 
As Table 5.8 suggests, Latino teacher representation does not have an effect on 
corporal punishment for Latino students, regardless of policy environment. The result 
supports Thompson’s perspective, although I fail to show any significant relationship 
among the predictors.  However, the relationship between Latino representation and 
Latino students’ odds of expulsion is more supportive of the Thompson perspective. Latino 
teachers in the least segregated districts and moderately balanced districts reduce Latino 
students’ odds of being expelled; however, the environment’s substantive effect is limited 
as Thompson predicts, given the nearly flat slope. Figure 5.6summarizes the above findings 
as they relate to the two theories of external control.  
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Figure 5.6:  Discipline Policy Findings Summary 
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Conclusion  
 What conclusions can be drawn from the findings of this chapter? Are minority 
students better off in racially balanced districts as much education literature suggests and 
proponents and Supreme Court justices believed in their groundbreaking Brown v. Board of 
Education decision? Summary figures, Figure 5.7 and 5.8, suggest that in some ways they 
are, but in other ways they are not.  Consistent with the findings of the previous chapter, 
minority students do not always fare better in racially balanced districts. This chapter’s 
results show that minority students continue to experience higher levels of within school 
segregation in racially balanced schools.  African Americans, in particular, face the greatest 
barriers to equality in racially balanced schools, and this effect oddly holds in racially 
imbalanced districts also. These findings highlight an unintended consequence of 
desegregated education and challenge the arguments that racially balanced districts are 
“better” for minority students. In fact, it is shown that African American students are 
subject to overrepresentation in special education and harsh discipline policies, regardless 
of level of racial balance in a district.   
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Figure 5.7: Overall Findings Summary: Black Student Outcomes in Racially Balanced 
and Imbalanced Districts 
 
Black Students  
 Gifted 
Education 
Mild 
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Figure 5.8 Overall Findings Summary: Latino Student Outcomes in Racially Balanced 
and Imbalanced Districts 
 
Latino Students  
 Gifted 
Education 
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Moderate 
Retardation  
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 In terms of minority representation “benefits”, minority students in racially 
balanced districts experience a few different effects, but the benefits of representation are 
few. Latino teacher representation in racially balanced districts helps to reduce the odds of 
Latino students being suspended and grouped in special education as moderately retarded, 
while their peers in racially imbalanced districts fail to experience any redress via 
representation. Black students in racially balanced districts do not experience any distinct 
                                                 
35 N/A designates that the Thompson perspective was supported; students in racially balanced and imbalanced 
districts experienced the same representational effects and consequently, the policy environment in which 
students fared better cannot be determined.  
 
36 X designates that the Pfeffer & Salancik perspective was supported and students of the marked category 
fared better than those in the unmarked category.  
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“benefits” through Black teacher representation.  Instead, when the environments differ, 
Black students experience more relief in the segregated districts. Nevertheless, there are 
far more instances of representation having the same effect on policies, regardless of policy 
environment. There is no clear advantage in racially balanced or imbalanced districts for 
minority students when it comes to addressing the inequalities of academic grouping and 
discipline policy. 
These findings raise substantive concerns about public education.  The lack of 
differential support to demonstrate that racially balanced districts are significantly “better” 
for minority students than racially imbalanced districts calls into question the educational 
opportunity both environments provide to students. Although much research supports the 
argument that racially balanced schools provide greater advantages for minority students 
that can be link to better outcomes, excluding them from the courses and opportunities 
that ensure equal academic opportunities undercuts the relevance of the resources and 
advantages. This is not to say that some minority students do not benefit from racially 
balanced districts; however, the results highlight the fact that the full potential and benefit 
of racially balanced school districts is restricted through internal segregation processes.  
Furthermore, as Black students find themselves being grouped and disciplined inequitably 
with limited minority teacher mitigating effects, even in racially imbalanced districts that 
tend to have greater minority teacher representation, it becomes clear that internal 
practices and the effect of these practices are virtually the same for minority students, 
regardless of the level of racial balance of their school. The results call for a more 
meaningful discussion and consideration of what “separate and unequal” really means. The 
alarming resegregation of US schools has drawn some attention to the growing isolation 
and inequitably academic experiences of minority students across school districts; 
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however, this work shows that it is equally important to draw attention and concern to the 
separate and unequal experiences students are receiving within the segregated and 
desegregated schools.  
Findings of the past two chapters lead one to question if the observed relationships 
are simply a matter of representation. Do such outcomes for students only occur on a 
shared ethnic background basis? Should we only expect minority school board members, 
administrators, or teachers to have an effective concern for the outcome and equality of 
minority students? The next chapter moves away from representation effects and focuses 
on the final component of the framework model, public management, to predict policy 
outcomes in varying policy environments. I examine how public managers operate in the 
two distinct environments and their strategies for influencing student outcomes, given the 
policy environment.  
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CHAPTER VI 
MANAGING CONSTRAINTS: PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, POLICY ENVIRONMENTS, AND 
STUDENT OUTCOMES 
The previous chapters provide mixed results in determining the policy 
environment, racially imbalanced or balanced, that best serves minorities students, 
particularly when the level of minority representation is considered. In general, 
representation is an asset for minorities; it is related to greater substantive benefits such as 
the hiring of more minority bureaucrats and less discriminatory grouping policies.  
However, when representational “benefits” are examined under the two policy settings, 
differing outcomes emerge.  In some instances, racially balanced districts are helpful in 
maintaining the benefits of representation, and in others it fails. Imbalanced districts also 
prove to be beneficial to minority students in some instances.  The chapters show that  
policy environment effects on the school board and teachers really determines how much 
representation matters and the extent to which teachers or board members act as 
“representatives” at all. But is this the case when teacher or administrator demographics 
are not assessed? Is it really all about racial demographics and environmental context 
alone or can other factors alter policy or student outcomes. 
  Public management literature shows a strong indication that representation is not 
the only factor that matters in shaping outcomes for minorities. Scholars of this field find 
that public managers play a significant role in affecting organizational functioning, 
outcomes and performance (Boyne 2003; Lynn et al. 2001; Rainey 2009).  Most 
importantly, managers often work to alter the external policy environment’s effect on their 
organization, a somewhat different approach than discussed for elected officials and street 
level bureaucrats.  As the education literature suggests and the previous chapters show, the 
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racial balance of a school as a policy environment plays an important role in shaping 
district and student outcomes.  If public managers also “manage” the environment, can 
management help to alter racial balance’s effect on student outcomes? That is, do the policy 
outcomes of imbalanced schools mirror those of racially balanced schools when 
management is considered? Secondly, why does management matter in this context?  
This chapter shifts to the school level to examine the management factors that may 
mitigate the environment’s effect on student performance. It emphasizes the role of school 
principals as local public managers and the consequences of their management decisions 
for organizational outcomes across the two policy environments. Here, I focus less on 
exploring how the level of racial balance affects policy outcomes and more on how to make 
the policy outcomes of both settings meet. I highlight the management factors that public 
managers bring to the organization, outside of racial representation, to alter performance 
outcomes. Because managers have very little control over altering the racial composition of 
their schools, I explore managers’ use of their own unique abilities to “manage” the 
challenge. Specifically, I make an argument for managerial style’s effect on decision making 
and student performance. Results provide limited support for the theory, but hold 
important implications for understanding how principals affect student performance in 
racially balanced and imbalanced schools. 
Managers’ Effect on Organizational Outcomes and the Environment 
As mentioned above, management is found to be the single most consistent factor 
to affect organizational functioning, outcomes and performance, regardless of a managers’ 
demographic background (Boyne 2003; Lynn et al. 2001; Rainey 2009). Public 
management scholars note that specific managerial behaviors, traits, and techniques are 
responsible for management having such a significant effect on organizational performance 
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and outcomes. They contend that it is a manager’s ability to motivate and lead 
subordinates, to network with stakeholders and external actors for resources and 
information or to buffer the organization from external constraints that allows him to 
shape an organization’s performance and outcomes (Lieberson and O’Conner 1972; 
Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Meier and O’Toole 2001).  Educational leadership and 
administration scholars hold a similar contention, finding that principals not only execute 
policy directives from the school board or superintendent, but they also network with 
teachers and the external environment to improve student performance, build social 
capital, and reduce costs (Friedkin and Slater 1994; Kahne et al. 2001; Smith and 
Wohlstetter 2001). A manager’s leadership ability, as measured through teacher 
satisfaction, is also related to greater student performance (Friedkin and Slater 1994).  
A few scholars have also explored how management matters for specific groups, 
finding that the effect and particular management techniques are not equally beneficial to 
clients. O’Toole and Meier (2004) show that managers’ networking behavior improves 
white students’ performance, but it does not have a significant effect on Latino, African 
American, and low-income students. They conclude that network managers are most 
responsive to politically powerful and dominating groups and contribute to inequalities in 
society. Others find more positive effects; greater networking is shown to mitigate the 
negative effects of organizational diversity on Latino and low income students (Owens and 
Kukla-Acevedo 2012; Meier et al. 2006). Managerial quality also proves to matter for 
improving minority students’ performance outcomes. Black and Latino students earn up to 
3.7 more points on standardized assessments under really good public managers (Meier et 
al. 2006).  These studies all demonstrate that management matters for minority students, 
and this finding is particularly important to the current research as it seeks to address a 
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highly racialized issue through a public management lens. The collective bodies of 
literature also leave one to question to what extent management “matters”—more or less, 
in the desegregation and second generation discrimination story.   
Public Management and the Environment 
 As demonstrated above, there is a strong consensus in the management literature 
that public managers can significantly influence the outcomes of organizations. However, 
less of this literature actually shows how managers influence outcomes of varying policy 
environments, particularly those that are constrained or not easily manipulated. 
Researchers studying organizational response and outcomes in the face of shocks provide 
some insights on how and why managers matter in a constrained fixed environment such 
as racially balanced and imbalanced schools. 
Organizational theorists note that buffering the organization from shocks and 
external strains is a core aspect of management (Thompson 1967). In fact, buffering, 
blocking or minimizing the harmful effects of external actions—is an expected managerial 
action for turbulent environments. Similarly, the strategic management literature contends 
that defending an organization is a valid strategy in dealing with the external environment 
(Miles and Snow 1978).  Protecting the organization from the environment and shocks is 
shown to help implement internal policy goals and improve performance outcomes (Meier 
et al. 2007; Meier and O’Toole 2008; Honig 2009).  
Yet managers may not always seek to block their organization from shocks. Other 
works on organizational response to shocks show that some managers manage the 
environment in their favor.  Rainey and Steinbauer’s (1999) research on effective 
government organizations notes that effective public organizations are often led by strong 
leaders or managers who are able to manipulate constraints into opportunities. Meier and 
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O’Toole (1999) propose a similar theory about management’s response to constraints. 
Their formal model of public management includes a component of system shocks, a form 
of constraint from the environment, that management may attempt to block or buffer, or 
alternatively, exploit and use to positively influence the organization (O’Toole and Meier 
1999). For example, Meier and O’Toole (2009) show that when faced with a budget 
decrease, managers may protect priority expenditures and funding, by reducing 
expenditures and funding in other operational areas and goals. Instead of attempting to 
avoid and block the shock completely, they manage the shock internally to mitigate its 
potential negative effect. Similarly, managers who maintain structural stability are able to 
mitigate and manage the harmful effects of a turbulent external environment (Boyne and 
Meier 2009).  
In general, this research concludes that the most successful organizations have 
managers who protect their organization from shocks through buffering or internal 
management. What many of these studies fail to address or consider is the possibility that 
the environmental constraint is a structural component of the organization that may not be 
buffered and may only be weakly exploited37. Both responses to handling shocks or the 
environment are contingent on the possibility that the environment may be “handled.” 
Periodically, organizations face constraints that are not easily manipulated, and leave very 
little room for managers or policymakers to alter its effect on outcomes. Andrews et al. 
(2005) contend that in such circumstances few real managerial choices are made in 
shaping the organization and its performance.  In other words, managers and management 
                                                 
37 Meier and O’Toole (2009) pose a similar question about environmental shocks that cannot be avoided and 
are forced upon the organization. Though similar, this work differs from their study in its conceptualization of 
the environment, not as a shock, but as a structural constraint embedded into the system.  
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matters less because the constraint overwhelms the potential effect. Although their 
research does not focus specifically on structural or fixed environmental constraints, it 
provides one indication of the relationship we might expect between management and the 
racial composition of schools.   
The education literature is very clear in the fact that the racial composition of 
schools can be a constraint to the overall success of the school as those with higher 
minority populations tend to have fewer financial resources; greater levels of teacher 
turnover, and higher levels of low-income students (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005; 
Goldsmith 2003). It affects student outcomes (Guryan 2004; Michelson 2001; Hanushek, 
Kain, and Rivkin 2009), and as earlier chapters show, it also effects school board members 
and teachers. Therefore, it is not farfetched to expect public managers to experience this 
same constraining effect, making “few managerial choices” as Andrews et al. (2005) 
suggest. Nevertheless, the majority of the management literature suggests that this 
constraint’s significance to student performance may also be managed in a way that 
reduces its impact. The next section considers how managers might address the fixed 
environmental constraints, despite Andrews et al.’s (2005) contention, through a 
discussion of their contributions to public organizations.   
Managerial Style 
I contend that managerial style—a manager’s leadership practices, management 
practices, and strategies—best explains why managers matter and how they handling an 
organization’s environment. Style is important to consider for several reasons. First, 
managerial style sets the tone of the organization. Subordinates, stakeholders and even 
clients often take cues from the manager about the importance of goals, the organization’s 
mission, and vision. Though this information may be stated, the manner in which a 
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manager prioritizes and implements them conveys the actual value attached to the goals 
and mission of the organization. The salience of organizational goals and objectives are 
generally based on the managers’ treatment of goals. He also models and sets the 
expectations, another aspect of setting the tone of the organization. The organization 
moves based on stakeholders and clients’ expectations, which are often convey to it 
through the manager. A manager’s style determines how all of this information is conveyed 
or presented to the organization.  It determines ones’ view of goals and objectives, and 
consequently the responding treatment to them.  
Second, a manager’s style influences his/her decision making process, one’s actual 
decisions, and the steps in which decisions are implemented in the organization.  Public 
managers differ in their decision making calculus because style sets their view of the world. 
It dictates how they perceive and handle problems, as well as successes.  It dictates their 
ability to make decisions and implement them. Similar to distinctions between “type A” and 
“type B” personality traits38,  a manager that has an innovative or progressive style, for 
example, makes decisions very differently than a manager with a more rigid and 
structuralist style. 
Consequently, style also determines how the manager handles the environment. 
Again, a manager will hold different perceptions and beliefs about the environment based 
on his/her style. Some styles may lead a manager to see the environment’s challenge as a 
burden and extra strain to the organization, while others may lead him/her to view it as an 
opportunity. Just as style operates to shape the tone of the organization and the decision 
                                                 
38
 Personality theory defines a “Type A” personality as one exhibiting traits of ambition, hostility, impatience, 
and competitiveness, originally linked to health issues such as coronary disease (Friedman and Rosenman 
1959; Chesney et al. 1981).  “Type B” personality is defined as the relative absence of “Type A” personality and 
instead more a relaxed and easy going nature.  
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making and implementation process of an organization via its manager, it also determines 
how the organization will perceive and respond to the environment. Different responses to 
the fixed environmental constraint of schools’ racial composition can be traced to 
differences in managerial style.  
As managerial style moves to influence each aspect of an organization, it becomes a 
potentially important predictor of the organization’s success. Though the environment may 
place an extra burden on the organization and manager, his/her style is important in 
managing the environment’s effect.  In other words, managerial style may be thought of as 
a buffer or means of internal management to environmental strain, challenges, or conflict. 
Organizations with managers exhibiting the strongest style are likely to perform better 
than those with weaker style. In sum, managerial style determines the success of an 
organization in a constrained or challenging environment. As managers’ styles vary, the 
outcomes and the environment’s effect also vary.  
Hypothesis 1: Managerial style will have a positive effect on organizational outcomes. 
 Although the public management literature does not distinctly discuss managerial 
style, the business and private management literatures support the contention. Many 
researchers note that managerial style is positively related to higher business unit 
performance and general performance outcomes (Slater 1989; Bertrand and Schoar 2003).  
Slater (1989) finds that managerial style—measured on the dimensions of background 
characteristics, behaviors, and personality—is positively related to organizational 
performance. Similarly, entrepreneurial style is associated with higher growth types 
(Sadler-Smith et al. 2003).   
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Understanding Managerial Style: The Components 
 Managerial style is composed of three components: leadership ability, managerial 
behavior, and management strategy.  Both the public management and business 
management literature point to each of the factors mattering significantly to the 
functioning and outcomes of the organization. Managers, however, do not use these factors 
individually; instead they are often used simultaneously and distinctively across managers. 
Each manager uses the factors differently and in different combinations, making style an 
interesting point of study.  Though the development of combinations of the elements is 
unknown, the extent of use is expected to matter greatly for how public managers make 
their decisions, implement decisions, and consequently affect organizational outcomes. 
One should expect these components’ collective effect as style to be positively related to 
organizational outcomes.  
Leadership  
Organizational theorists contend that leadership is one’s capacity to “direct and 
energize people to achieve goals,” (Rainey 2009). Research in this area often attempts to 
pinpoint the characteristics, traits, or factors that make an effective or “good” leader. Early 
leadership researchers considered physical, intellectual, and personality characteristics as 
indicators of effective leadership, while more recent works focus not only on personality 
and character, but also a manager’s treatment of and concern for subordinates and 
strategies for setting standards and productivity (Yukl 2006). The leadership literature 
generally lacks a dominant theory for understanding how and why it matters for 
organizations, and scholars have found mixed empirical results on the relationship 
(Fernandez 2005). However several theories have emerged, including trait and skill 
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theories, situational and contingency theories, and dyadic theories to explain leadership’s 
effectiveness in organizations.  
Some scholars show that leadership can have a significantly positive effect on 
organizations (Peterson et al. 2003; Waldman and Yammarino 1999; Weiner and Mahoney 
1981; Thomas 1988; Hennessey 1998).  Peterson et al. (2003) find that one’s personality 
and traits contribute to organizational performance. Walderman and Yammarino (1999), 
Trottier, Van Wart, and Wang (2008) and Conger and Kanungo (1987) find that specific 
leadership styles contribute greatly to organizational outcomes; charismatic leadership is 
related to more committed , motivated, and satisfied subordinates and higher performing 
organizations. The same is also shown for the closely related transformational leadership 
style (Waldman and Yammarino 1999; Trottier, Van Wart, and Wang 2008).   
Contingency theory research on the relationship between leadership traits, 
situational variables, and organizational performance also indicates that managers’ 
leadership is beneficial to organizational performance (Fielder 1967; Chemers and 
Skrzypek 1972). Fielder (1967) contends that situational demands can mediate leadership 
style and its effectiveness in group performance outcomes.  Hunt’s (1967) analysis 
supports Fielder’s theory, but he also finds leadership to be a very strong predictor of 
outcomes, separate from task structure, the situational variable.  His results suggest that a 
manager’s leadership ability is almost as equally powerful or potentially superior to 
environmental factors. These collective results lead me to also expect leadership ability to 
be beneficial in altering outcomes. 
Hypothesis 1a: Public managers with greater leadership ability will be positively 
related to higher performing organizations.  
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Managerial Behavior 
 Much of the public management literature focuses on what managers actually do to 
matter in public organizations. Two central tasks of management is managing internally—
tending to the daily tasks within the organization—and managing externally, interacting 
with the public outside of the organization.   
Internal Management 
 Perhaps the largest and most significant managerial role is one’s ability to manage 
the internal workings of one’s organization—internal or generic management.  Simon 
(1976) contends that internal management is about maintaining structure—framing goals, 
setting incentives and negotiating contributions from members and system actors. 
Therefore, the daily tasks of internal management consists of motivating employees, 
setting and communicating organizational expectations, standards, priorities, and goals, 
and decision making. Some set organizational culture, and many are also charged with the 
responsibility of evaluating group and subordinates’ performance, recruiting employees, 
and establishing incentives to boost or attract staff and to produce efficient and effective 
outcomes (Meier and O’Toole 2004; Kaufman 1979;Allison 1983; Fernandez 2005). Public 
managers perform a wide range of tasks related to internally managing their organization 
that often vary across organizations’ size, clientele, and overarching purpose.  
External Management and Networking   
Public managers also spend a considerable amount of time managing outside of 
their organization because they are often tied to other organizations through required 
mandates, interagency or inter-governmental linkages, or contracted public-private 
relationships (Hall and O’Toole 2000; Yukl 2006; Meier and O’Toole 2003). External 
management is also done to gain information and political support, resources, reach a 
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collective goal or improve the individual organization (Provan and Milward 1995; O’Toole 
1997; McGuire 2002; Fernandez 2005). They also use it to buffer the organization from 
conflict—political or community. The extent that public managers choose more frequent 
external management behavior over internal management and with whom they engage 
externally is characteristic of one’s style.  Research indicates that such networking and 
external management are key tasks in which managers engage to improve organizational 
performance outcomes. As such, many managers find external management through 
networking to be a beneficial tool in addressing challenging, complicated demands and 
tasks, gaining resources and expertise, and reducing organizational strain and transaction 
costs (Provan and Milward 1995; O’Toole 1997).  Additionally, empirical evidence shows 
that public managers who network more frequently also have better organizational 
outcomes (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2003; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Heinrich and Lynn 
2000; Ewalt 200439).  
 Unfortunately, these works do not specify which function networking serves in 
improving organizational outcomes. The results do not allow scholars to conclude that the 
networking was done specifically to buffer the environment, only to get more information 
and resources, or simply to gain political support. We know very little about what public 
managers do in these networking relationships.  Because of that restriction, one must 
assume that managers use it to serve all or some combination of those purposes to 
                                                 
39
 Though external management is shown to be beneficial to organizational performance and outcomes, public 
managers are often plagued with the tradeoff between internal and external management (Meier and O’Toole 
2001). Greater amounts of external management also mean that a manager spends less time managing 
internally, which may be harmful to one’s organization.  As such, a direct measure of internal management is 
excluded from the study and low levels of external management are understood as high levels of internal 
management. 
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influence organizational outcomes, especially in terms of environment imposed challenges 
and constraints.   
Hypothesis 1b: External management will be positively related to organizational 
outcomes.  
Strategy 
 The final component of style is managerial strategy. Here strategy is rooted 
primarily in Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology of organizational response to the 
environment. They contend that the organizational environment influences managerial 
behavior and consequently determines the nature of an organization. Managers often 
manipulate and shape their strategies to fit the environment in which the organization 
operates—either yielding to the environment and its demands, blocking external 
environment forces, or some variation of these two responses (Miles and Snow 1978; 
Rainey 2009; Andrews et al. 2009). Organizations and managers are placed in one of the 
four orientations of behavior or strategy: prospector, defender, analyzer, or reactor. 
However, the extent to which a public manager yields to one of these orientations over the 
other to handle the environment is a matter of one’s style; strategy is not environmental 
response alone40.  
                                                 
40 Alternative theories of strategy formation and development include rational planning and logical 
incrementalism. Rational planning applies a bounded rationality framework to strategy development, arguing 
that organizations examine their internal and external environment and use analytical, formal and logical 
processes to develop policy options (Elbanna 2006). Logical incrementalism contends that strategy 
development and formation is a political process open to conflict over organizational goals that are “resolved” 
through the strategy formation process (Andrews et al. 2009). Both theories limit the manager’s influence in 
setting organizational strategy and consequently miss the depth of his/her contribution to strategy and 
outcomes. In considering managerial style, I do not dismiss these two theories, but instead view strategy 
formation through the lens of the public manager to highlight his/her contribution to strategy and performance 
outcomes.  
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Prospectors frequently respond to the environment or stakeholders’ demands; their 
organization’s structure is flexible and regularly seeks to adopt innovations or trends. 
Defenders could be viewed as the antithesis of prospectors. Rigid control in strategy, 
structure, and production are characteristic of defenders. They focus on improving the 
organization’s efficiency independent of environmental controls and demands.  Miles and 
Snow (1978) contend that prospectors and defenders will perform better than other 
classifications. Those that exhibit both defender and prospector characteristics are viewed 
as analyzers; they work to balance efficiency in the organization with the flexibility to 
adopt innovation and changes that will enhance organizational efficiency and performance. 
Lastly, reactors are viewed as dysfunctional because they perceive change and 
environmental demands but are unable to respond; they lack consistency and clear 
strategies or approaches for the organization.  
This typology has been used in many studies, with scholars generally finding that 
the strategy is important for organizational performance, but seems to vary based on the 
organization type and the climate of the environment (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006). 
In fact, Andrews et al. (2006; 2009) argue that strategy (content) is the most important 
determinant of organizational performance. They find that organizations perform best 
under a prospector strategy compared to the defender or reactor strategies (Andrews, 
Boyne, and Walker 2006). A more recent study of Welsh public service providers reveals 
that both the prospector and defender strategies are related to greater performance 
outcomes as Miles and Snow originally proposed (Andrews et al. 2009). Yet other research 
shows that the defender strategy alone is best for improving performance outcomes in the 
context of public education (Meier et al. 2004; Meier et al. 2007). On the other hand, Snow 
and Hrebiniak (1980) finds that in highly regulated industries that face many demands and 
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binding constraints from stakeholders, a reactor strategy is positively related to 
organizational performance.  
Despite the varied findings in both the public and private organization literature, 
scholars agree that strategy matters for handling the environment. Andrews et al. (2009) 
also note although strategy is often rigidly implanted into organizations, it should not 
always be treated as such because organizations are most likely to shift strategies as the 
circumstances and challenges also change; Zajec and Shortell (1989) corroborate their 
contention. This contention helps to explain the varied conclusions on the strategy content 
related to greater organizational performance outcomes. It also continuously highlights 
strategy’s close connection to the environment. Expectations for how managers may use 
strategy to deal with challenging, racially constrained environment are unclear however, so 
I test both Miles and Snow’s (1978) and others’ findings to explore how managers use their 
style to manage the effect of racially balanced and imbalanced environments on outcomes.  
Hypothesis 1c: A prospector strategy will be positively related to 
organizational outcomes. 
Hypothesis 1d: A defender strategy will be positively related to organizational 
outcomes.  
Managerial Style and Student Outcomes   
 Why exactly should we expect managerial style to be related to student outcomes? 
First, school principals are held accountable for what happens at the school level, and since 
the 1980s, have been held accountable for student performance especially (Glasman 1984). 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 has only heightened this focus on school principals 
and teachers in relation to student performance. Under this act, school principals are not 
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only expected to improve the overall performance of their schools, but also the 
performance of subpopulations (i.e. low income students, minority students, special needs 
students). Failure to do so holds various consequences, including loss of one’s job. 
Therefore, school principals are likely to use every possible avenue to improve student 
performance or maintain high test scores. Style shapes how avenues are selected, used and 
the frequency of use. For school principals in racially imbalanced schools that are also 
generally lower performing, this could also mean utilizing a host of tactics and techniques 
according to one’s style to overcome or “manage” the environmentally imposed challenge. 
The education literature provides substantial indication that school managers, 
school principals, at various levels play an important role in student achievement outcomes 
(Marks and Printy 2003; Eberts and Stone 1988; Brewer 1993). A great deal of this 
literature focuses on school principals’ leadership. Scholars find that a principal’s behavior 
and traits can influence student performance (Eberts and Stone 1988). It also notes that 
specific leadership styles have a greater effect on student performance than others; 
instructional leadership seems to have a larger effect on student outcomes than 
transformational leadership (Robinson, Lloyd, and Rowe 2008).  Marks and Printy (2003) 
conclude, however, that integrating both transformational and instructional leadership into 
one’s leadership repertoire yields the best effect on student achievement. Principals that 
network with teachers and the external environment also have greater student 
performance outcomes (Friedkin and Slater 1994). However, what much of this research 
fails to address is exactly how principals affect student performance when the racial 
environment is considered, leaving very little guidance on expectations for racially 
balanced and imbalanced schools. This research fills that gap. 
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Figure 6.1: Summary of Managerial Style Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis  
Number  
Description  Dimension 
Tested 
Relationship Direction  
1 Managerial style will have a positive effect on 
organizational outcomes for all students in all 
environments.  
Managerial 
Style 
+ 
1a Public managers with greater leadership ability 
will be positively related to higher performing 
organization for all students in all environments.  
Leadership  + 
1b External management will be positively related 
to organizational outcomes for all students in all 
environments.  
External 
Management 
+ 
1c A prospector strategy will be positively related 
to organizational outcomes.  
Prospector 
Strategic 
Management 
Strategy 
+ 
1d A defender strategy will be positively related to 
organizational outcomes 
Defender 
Strategic 
Management 
Strategy 
+ 
 
 
 
Methods and Measures 
Data for this chapter are taken from the 2011 Texas Middle Management Survey, an 
original survey of about 1500 Texas school principals at various levels; the Texas 
Education Agency database; and the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) School 
District Demographic System.   The survey of school principals was administered across 
five waves and gained a response rate of about 29 percent from Texas public schools. The 
weighted variables are representative of all Texas schools. Among a host of education 
related topics, the survey also provided information on managers’ actions, practices and 
perspectives (Thomas, Walker and Meier 2011). The main independent variables are from 
the middle management survey, while student performance data and data for control 
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variables are taken from the Texas Education Agency database on all Texas schools and 
districts41 or the NCES’s Demographic System.  
Dependent Variable  
The percentage of African American and Latino students that pass the state-
required standardized test, Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) during the 
2010-2011 school term is used as the main dependent variable to represent organizational 
performance outcomes. Although controversial and limiting, standardized test scores are 
used as the main dependent variable because they indicate students’ ability to master basic 
academic skills at the tested grade level, are highly salient to the organization and public, 
and are a sensible measure of management activity toward organizational performance.  
Every TAKS test is aligned to the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills, the Texas academic 
curricula guidelines. The test is required for students in grades three through eleven 
(Texas Education Agency 2010).  The test for students in grade eleven is a high stakes test 
required to receive a regular diploma in Texas. The total pass rate measure used in the 
current study includes the percentage of students in each school that passes the 
assessment’s reading, writing, and math sectors.   
Explanatory Variables  
Management Factors 
Several variables taken from an original survey of school principals (in Texas) are 
used to measure the dimensions of managerial style.  Managers’ leadership ability is 
assessed through three questions aimed at tapping the leadership traits of flexibility, 
                                                 
41
  Using Texas schools is a reasonable ground to test the current ideas. Texas is a diverse state that contains 
nearly eight percent of all US school districts, suggesting that it also includes a larger portion of the US schools. 
Districts and schools serve the same function, but differ in their geography—urban or rural, their finances—
rich or poor, and racial compositions—racially homogenous or heterogeneous. Using Texas allows me to 
capture all of these types of schools from a single, assessable and representative source.  
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innovation and change, and stronger personal relationship with subordinates (Yukl 2006). 
The questions include, “I have the ability to implement policies and procedures in my school 
that are not consistent with district policy if they benefit my students,” “A principal should be 
involved in curriculum planning and selections,” and “I give my teachers a great deal of 
discretion in making decisions.”  Each question is rated on a four point scale of strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). Responses were combined in an index variable ranging 
from 3 to 1242. 
External management43 is measured as the frequency of interaction with 
networking nodes that are not direct-line subordinates or superiors. Respondents were 
asked to rank the frequency of interaction with all the networking actors on a six-point 
scale ranging from no interaction to daily interaction. Their responses were factor analyzed 
to create an external management measure. The factor analysis method is helpful because 
it allows the researcher to combine responses measuring the same concept, in this case, 
external management, while giving each included variable a different weight.  The unequal 
weight distribution of the factor may provide a clearer understanding of the most salient 
actors with the greatest effect on organizational outcomes. The factor is superior to 
indexing in this research because it allows the variables to vary, while indexing treats all 
the included variables equal.    The external management factor loaded positively on the 
first factor and produced an eigenvalue of 1.55.  
Because external management requires the manager to operate outside of the 
organization and manage less internally, this measure also serves as measure of internal 
                                                 
42
 Variables correlate at less than the .10 level.  
 
43External network actors include local business leaders, police and fire departments, health organizations, 
non-profit organizations, state legislators, and local government officials.  
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management. It assumes that greater levels of external management as measured through 
the frequency of interaction with non-direct line subordinates or superiors, is equivalent to 
lower levels of internal management.  
 
 
 
Table 6.1: Measurement of External Management Using Factor Analysis 
Optional Network 
Indicators 
Factor Loadings 
 
Principal Associations 
 
0.339 
Health Related 
Organizations 
0.611 
Teacher Associations 0.318 
Local Business Leaders                        0.534 
Local Police/Fire 
Department 
0.489 
Non-profit organizations  0.664 
Eigenvalue 1.55 
 
 
 
Four questions are used to capture the dimension of managerial strategy based on 
the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. To capture a prospector strategy, respondents are 
asked to rate how much they agree with the statement, “Our school is always among the first 
to adopt new ideas and practices,” and “our school continually adjusts our internal activities 
and structures in response to stakeholder initiatives and activities,” on a four point scale of 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).  Responses to the two questions are summed in 
an index variable to create a “prospector strategy” scale, ranging from two to eight. To 
create “poles” of a prospector strategy (that is combined on a three point “defender” scale 
discussed below), the two through eight scale is recoded from -1 to 0, in which -1 
represents all the respondents falling above the scale’s mean value and all others are coded 
as 0. Negative one is selected to represent those above the mean because it designates that 
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the individual is also the least likely to be categorized as a defender. Those that are coded 
as 0 are more likely to be categorized as a defender or utilize a mixture of both strategies. 
Two questions, “Our school concentrates on making use of what we already know 
how to do,” and “I strive to control those factors outside the school that could have an effect 
on my organization,” are used to capture a defender style, again measured on a four point 
likert scale of strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).  The questions are combined to 
create a “defender strategy” scale of two to eight. All respondents scoring below the scale’s 
mean are recoded as 0 and those score above the mean are coded as 1. The “prospector 
style” and “defender style” scales are combined to create a continuous, three point scale  
ranging from -1 to 1, in which –l indicates a prospector strategy, 0 represents an analyzer 
strategy, and 1 indicates a defender strategy.  
The final variable, managerial style44, is summed to create a continuous value of the 
combined managerial style components—leadership, external management, and strategy. 
Higher values indicate a stronger managerial style, while lower values indicate a weaker 
style.  
Racial Balance 
A key explanatory variable in this study is the level of racial balance in the districts 
and schools. I account for racial balance through Taeuber dissimilarity indices similar to 
those discussed in the previous chapters with a few modifications to fit the context of this 
study. I only calculate indices for school districts in which a least one principal in the 
district responded to the middle management survey. School districts that included one 
school at each level—elementary, middle, and high—were excluded from this sample of 
                                                 
44 None of the style components are correlated higher than the .l0 level.  
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schools because they lack the flexibility to alter racial balance through school transfers. 
These restrictions reduced the total sample to 865 cases.   
Controls  
A set of controls potentially related to student performance are also included based 
on the education literature. Controls are grouped as resources for performance or 
constraints to student performance. As assumed by grouping names, resources are 
expected to have a positive effect on performance, while constraints are expected to be 
negatively related to performance outcomes. The literature suggests that having more 
resources can have a positive effect on student performance (Hedges and Greenwald 
1996). Included resource measures are the average teacher salary, average years of teacher 
experience, average class size, and the percentage of teachers with less than five years 
experience.  I expect teacher salaries and teacher experience to have a positive relationship 
with performance. Conversely, I predict negative relationships between performance and 
class size, and percentage of teachers with less than five years of experience and 
performance.  
  On the other hand, the literature also notes race and poverty as highly correlated 
with education problems. Minority and poor students are reported as more difficult to 
educate and hence, less likely to have positive (high) performance outcomes as a function 
of managerial style. Additionally, the challenges that accompany educating these students 
are likely to affect a school’s overall performance outcome (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 
2003). Therefore, this study also includes measures for the percentage of Latino, Black, and 
poor (students receiving free or reduced lunch) students as constraint control variables 
(Jencks and Phillips 1998; Thernstorm and Thernstorm 2003). A negative relationship is 
expected for all constraint variables.  
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 Finally, standard resource variables included in the previous chapters—the 
percentage of Blacks and Latinos with college degrees, the median Black or Latino family 
income, and the percentage of Anglos in poverty—were also included in the analysis as 
controls, expect to aid in minority student outcomes. Ordinary least squares modeling is 
used to test the hypotheses.  
Findings 
Preliminary Findings: Looking at the Data 
Before assessing the effect managerial style on student performance, the raw data 
is analyzed to highlight similarities and differences between racially balanced and 
imbalanced schools. Table 6.2 shows the results. On average, Black and Latino students 
seem to perform better in racially balanced schools, though the difference in pass rates is 
only statistically different for Black students. These findings are consistent with the past 
literature and expected differences.  
Interestingly, the lowest performing school for African American students, 
Mesquite Academy, is among the more racially balanced schools, and one of the highest 
performing schools, Ditto Elementary, is among the more racially imbalanced schools. A 
similar relationship is observed for Latino students; Star High School is among the lowest 
performing schools for Latino students, but it is also one of the most racially balanced 
schools for them too. Though these cases are interesting outliers, they demonstrate the 
difficulty of making predictions about which type of school best serves minority students. 
They also indicate the necessity of studying other factors that may shape students’ 
performance. The literature predicts that minority students will perform best in racially 
balanced schools, yet these two schools conflict with that contention. Empirical results test 
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the possible managerial factors that may explain interesting outlier cases like Mesquite 
Academy and Ditto Elementary School.  
I also assess the strength of each managerial component and one’s managerial style 
in racially balanced and racially imbalanced schools to observe differences in managers 
based on their environmental settings. Only external management is statistically different 
across environments for both Black and Latino students. Managers in Black-white racially 
balanced schools tend to engage in external management more frequently than those in 
imbalanced schools, while the opposite is shown for managers in Latino-white balanced 
schools.  Managers of imbalanced Latino-White schools manage externally more frequently 
when compared to managers of balanced schools.   This should be expected given their 
more challenging environment.  For Black students, managers in racially balanced districts 
tend be identified as prospectors more compared to their colleagues in racially imbalanced 
schools.  There are no statistical differences in leadership and use of the defender strategy 
between managers of racially balanced and imbalanced schools.  
Finally, managers with strong managerial styles are found in both racially balanced 
and imbalanced schools, but  I only observe a statistical difference in style for managers of 
Latino-white segregated schools. Managers of imbalanced Latino schools are found to have 
a stronger style than those of racially balanced schools.  The difference in managerial style 
across schools and racial groups provides mixed support for the proposed theory and 
hypotheses; however, the multivariate analyses will allow me to examine the effect of this 
style on student performance given the environmental context. A test of each managerial 
style component is done to better understand how the factors individually relate to 
performance in each setting first.  
 197 
 
Table 6.2: Comparison of Means: Racially Balanced Versus Racially Imbalanced 
Schools 
 
 Blacks Latinos 
 Racially Balanced Racially 
Imbalanced 
Racially Balanced Racially 
Imbalanced 
Explanatory 
Variables   
Mean 
(Std. Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std .Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std. Deviation) 
Mean 
(Std .Deviation) 
Black Pass Rate  68.95*** 
(15.01) 
60.92 
(17.75) 
_________ _________ 
Latino Pass Rate   _________ _________ 75.04 
(12.10) 
74.99 
(13.15) 
Leadership  9.301  
(1.141) 
9.389 
(1.208) 
9.275 
(1.151) 
9.4  
(1.153) 
External 
Management 
.0745*  
(.8504) 
-.0235 
(.8319) 
.0426* 
(.8363) 
.1827 
(.8310) 
Prospector 
Strategy 
5.832** 
(1.014) 
5.694 
(1.009) 
5.901 
(1.013) 
5.917 
(1.063) 
Defender 
Strategy 
6.096 
(.9796) 
6.048 
(.9295) 
6.117 
(.9519) 
6.251 
(.0692) 
Managerial Style  14.86 
(2.247) 
14.85 
(2.303) 
14.81** 
(.1232) 
15.27 
(  2.427) 
 
   
 
       Theoretical Findings 
Effect of Managerial Style Components on Student Performance  
Table 6.3 shows the effect of each managerial style component on African American 
students’ performance in imbalanced and racially balanced schools.  One’s leadership 
ability in relation to his/her subordinates is assessed as a predictor of student performance 
also. Table 6.3’s first model suggests that though leadership is significantly related to Black 
students’ performance, it has a negative effect in racially balanced schools. Leaders who 
give their teachers more discretion, participate in developing the school’s curriculum, and 
implement policies unique to their individual school seem to harm Black students’ 
performance in racially balanced schools. This finding may be an indication that such 
leaders fail to consider subpopulations within their schools. Their policies and curriculum 
may work against Black students. On the other hand, students in racially imbalanced 
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schools, especially those in the most imbalanced schools, benefit from a manager having 
more leadership qualities. The fourth model of Table 6.3 shows a positive and significant 
relationship (p<.10) between the Black pass rate and leadership, as hypothesized.  
For Latino students in racially balanced schools, the opposite effect is shown. 
Greater leadership ability is positively related to Latino students’ pass rate in both racially 
balanced and imbalanced schools. Results support my hypothesis. Additionally, 
leadership’s effect on Latino students’ performance is greater in racially imbalanced 
schools compared to racially balanced schools. The magnitude of leadership is more felt in 
racially imbalanced schools.  
Results on external management’s effect on minority students’ performance show 
that a manager’s actions matter differently across policy environments.  The second model 
of Table 6.3 and the second model of Table 6.4 show that managing the external 
environment is positively related to both Black and Latino students’ pass rate in racially 
balanced schools but not in racially imbalanced schools. My expectation of both schools 
benefiting from external management is only partially supported, but is somewhat 
consistent with the findings of Table 6.2. Racially balanced schools benefit more from this 
style component. The difference between racially imbalanced and racially balanced schools 
may be related to the differences in potential network actors in one’s environment.  
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Principals of racially balanced schools may engage in better networks with more 
information, resources, and support, while those of racially imbalanced schools may find 
their networks more limiting with fewer resources, information and support. On the other 
hand, principals of racially balanced schools may have a greater ability to protect or buffer 
threats that may harm student performance.  Alternatively, managers of racially balanced 
schools may not only manage externally more frequently, they may also be better at it. 
Managers of racially balanced schools may possess greater leadership abilities in their 
external management roles.  
In terms of managerial strategy, managers closer to the defender managerial style 
have a negative but insignificant effect on the pass rate of their Black students, regardless 
of environment. African American students in both racially balanced and imbalanced 
schools perform poorly under a defender strategy. Latino students, on the other hand, 
perform well under the defender strategy in racially balanced schools, but it fails to help 
improve performance. There is a negative and insignificant effect on Latino students’ 
performance in those schools. The results fail to support my hypotheses about strategy, but 
reveal that managers of imbalanced and racially balanced schools may not be very different 
in their strategies for managing organizations and responding to the environment.  
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Table 6.3: The Effect of Managerial Style Components on Black Students’ 
Performance 
 
 Racially Balanced Schools Racially Imbalanced Schools 
DV: Black Pass Rate Leadership  External 
Mangmt 
Prospector 
Strategy  
Leadership External 
Mangmt 
Strategy 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
 -1.196* 
(.6650) 
3.096* 
(1.838) 
-.2068 
(1.047) 
.2676* 
(.1518) 
.6592 
(1.218) 
-1.399 
(1.303) 
Percentage of Teachers 
with Less than 5yrs 
Experience 
.0037 
(.1240) 
.1190 
(.2131) 
.0364 
(.1072) 
.2369* 
(.1331) 
.2586** 
(.1179) 
.3159*** 
(.1124) 
Average Teacher 
Experience 
-.2799 
(.5314) 
.5826 
(.9079) 
-.1367 
(.4631) 
1.892*** 
(.6142) 
1.764*** 
(.5377) 
2.122*** 
(.5143) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -.2114 
(.3692) 
2.307*** 
(.6999) 
.5483* 
(.3312) 
1.374*** 
(.4959) 
1.831*** 
(.4216) 
1.537*** 
(.4115) 
Average Teacher Salary ($) .0002 
(.0003) 
-.0005 
(.0006) 
.0004 
(.0002) 
.0004 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
Percentage of Black 
Students 
-.3485*** 
(.1046) 
-.2822 
(.2034) 
-.2932*** 
(.0925) 
-.2526* 
(.1493) 
-.1004 
(.1031) 
-.1305 
(.0904) 
Percentage of Latino 
Students 
-.1553* 
(.0860) 
.0373 
(.1569) 
-.1486* 
(.0767) 
.0318 
(.0942) 
-.0648 
(.0771) 
-.0465 
(.0736) 
Percentage of Low Income 
Students 
-.0482 
(.0688) 
-.0692 
(.1243) 
-.0447 
(.0635) 
.0386 
(.0973) 
-.0727 
(.0769) 
-.0421 
(.0738) 
Median Black Income ($) .0002*** 
(.0001) 
.0002 
(.0001) 
.0002*** 
(.0001) 
.0002** 
(.0001) 
.0002** 
(.0001) 
.0002** 
(.0001) 
Median Latino Income ($) .0001 
(.0001) 
.00004 
(.0002) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
0002 
(.0001) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.0002** 
(.0001) 
Black College Graduates 
(%) 
.4814*** 
(.1638) 
.4136 
(.3353) 
.1383 
(.1064) 
.0875 
(.1791) 
-.0867 
(.1644) 
.0620 
(.1539) 
Latino College Graduates 
(%) 
.1590 
(.1211) 
-.0480 
(.3377) 
.0126 
(.1082) 
-.0724 
(.1304) 
.1440* 
(.0859) 
.1017 
(.0835) 
White Poverty Rate (%) .0280 
(.0716) 
.0808 
(.1262) 
-.0596 
(.0655) 
.0397 
(.0847) 
-.0503 
(.0697) 
-.0735 
(.0664) 
Constant 77.01*** 
(16.59) 
43.50 
(37.45) 
50.34*** 
(14.10) 
-31.83* 
(18.78) 
.0696 
(15.48) 
-5.606 
(14.78) 
N 
R2 
F 
280 
.33 
9.36*** 
115 
.27 
2.67*** 
384 
.27 
9.78*** 
228 
.24 
4.88*** 
280 
.29 
7.58*** 
308 
.30 
8.78***  
* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Table 6.4: The Effect of Managerial Style Components on Latino Students’ 
Performance 
 
 Racially Balanced Schools Racially Imbalanced Schools 
DV: Latino Pass Rate Leadership  External 
Mangmt 
Strategy Leadership External 
Mangmt 
Strategy 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
 .1773** 
(.0821) 
2.290* 
(1.278) 
.1445*  
(.0849) 
1.177** 
(.4113) 
.2406 
(.6939) 
-.1980 
(.8091) 
Percentage of Teachers with 
Less than 5yrs Experience 
.0586 
(.0822) 
.1809 
(.1346) 
-.0442  
(.0716) 
-.0095 
(.0623) 
-.0041 
(.0651) 
.0027 
(.0637) 
Average Teacher Experience .4937 
(.3550) 
.8186 
(.5963) 
-.2390  
(.3238) 
.2119 
(.2720) 
.1889 
(.2902) 
.2481 
(.2779) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 1.293*** 
(.2734) 
1.104** 
(.5082) 
1.090*** 
(.2269) 
1.731*** 
(.2046) 
1.702*** 
(.2142) 
1.603*** 
(.2102) 
Average Teacher Salary ($) .0002 
(.0002) 
.0004 
(.0004) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
Percentage of Black Students -.3223*** 
(.0718) 
-.3236*** 
(.1300) 
-.2994*** 
(.0670) 
-.1698*** 
(.0555) 
-.2095*** 
(.0643) 
-.1670*** 
(.0569) 
Percentage of Latino 
Students 
-.1908*** 
(.0564) 
-.1049 
(.0928) 
-.2432*** 
(.0530) 
-.0936*** 
(.0399) 
-.1084*** 
(.0425) 
-.0790* 
(.0409) 
Percentage of Low Income 
Students 
-.0064 
(.0449) 
-.1484** 
(.0756) 
.0142 
(.0412) 
-.1077  
(.0383) 
-.0780* 
(.0405) 
-.1047*** 
(.0392) 
Median Black Income ($) .0002*** 
(.00005) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.0001** 
(.00004) 
-.00003 
(.0001) 
-.00002 
(.00004) 
-.00003 
(.00004) 
Median Latino Income ($) 0002** 
(.0001) 
.00004 
(.0001) 
.0002*** 
(.0001) 
0001** 
(.0001) 
.0001** 
(.0001) 
.0001** 
(.0001) 
Black College Graduates (%) .0663 
(.0867) 
.4502** 
(.2232) 
-.0138 
(.0868) 
.0769 
(.0970) 
.1033 
(.1060) 
.1021 
(.0989) 
Latino College Graduates (%) -.0197 
(.0533) 
.0848 
(.1142) 
.0499 
(.0461) 
-.0670* 
(.0350) 
-.0701* 
(.0370) 
-.0666* 
(.0358) 
White Poverty Rate (%) -.1484*** 
(.0506) 
-.0861 
(.0825) 
-.1878*** 
(.0514) 
-.0772** 
(.0377) 
-.0647* 
(.0397) 
-.0685* 
(.0383) 
Constant 39.93*** 
(12.75) 
41.05* 
(21.23) 
59.05*** 
(10.41) 
40.60*** 
(8.681) 
47.12*** 
(8.603) 
50.27*** 
(8.337) 
N 
R2 
F 
363 
.32 
11.82*** 
154 
.32 
4.59*** 
492 
.26 
11.99*** 
533 
.28 
14.94*** 
478 
.27 
12.24*** 
537 
.25 
12.48*** 
* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
 
 
 
Managerial Style and Student Performance 
In Table 6.5 the collective effect of managerial style is shown. The first model shows 
that Black students in racially balanced schools do not benefit from a stronger managerial 
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style. Managerial style, as indicated by higher scores on the “style scale,” has a negative 
effect on their performance. In other words, managers that use a more defender-like 
strategy, manage externally more frequently, and have greater leadership abilities are 
more likely to depress the Black student performance rate in racially balanced schools. In 
racially imbalanced schools, such managers do not fare any better. A negative, but 
insignificant relationship is observed between managerial style and Black students’ 
performance. Neither model performs as expected. Public managers are not able to 
improve Black students’ performance regardless of the environmental context. A 
comparison of these two models also shows that public managers in racially balanced 
schools are also more harmful to Black students’ performance than in imbalanced schools. 
The magnitude of their negative effect is slightly larger than in racially imbalanced schools. 
This is somewhat consistent with the previous chapter’s findings on teacher representation 
effects on discipline policies for Black students.  
 For Latino students, the opposite effect is observed. Table 6.6 shows that 
managerial style is positive, but insignificantly related to performance in racially balanced 
schools, and positive and significantly (p<.10) related to it in racially imbalanced schools. 
Stronger styled managers help Latino students’ performance, particularly in racially 
imbalanced schools. The pass rate for Latino students in racially imbalanced schools is 
improved by nearly two points under managers that defend, externally manage more 
frequently, and have stronger leadership. This finding is also consistent with previous 
chapter’s findings that suggest Latinos fare better in racially imbalanced districts in terms 
of political board representation. 
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Table 6.5: The Effect of Managerial Style on Black Students’ Performance 
Racially Balanced Schools Racially Imbalanced Schools  
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Managerial style -.6859** .3501 -.0127 .3897 
Percentage of Teachers with 
Less than 5yrs Experience 
.0839 .1217 .3072*** .1241 
Average Teacher Experience .3370 .5304 1.759*** .5738 
Student-Teacher Ratio .3641 .4312 1.501*** .4471 
Average Teacher Salary ($) .0003 .0003 .0002 .0003 
Percentage of Black Students -.1457 .1005 -.1410 .1052 
Percentage of Latino Students -.0553 .0868 -.0747 .0807 
Percentage of Low Income 
Students 
-.1146* .0698 
 
-.0316 .0808 
Median Black Income ($) .0002*** .0001 .0002** .0001 
Median Latino Income ($) .0001 .0001 0002* .0001 
Black College Graduates (%) .1253 .1094 .1662 -0.29 
Latino College Graduates (%) .0261 .1131 .1451* .0875 
White Poverty Rate (%) -.0486 .0727 -.0959 .0736 
Constant 55.28*** 16.62 1.183 17.12 
N 
R2 
F 
287 
.30 
8.47*** 
 256 
.28 
6.71*** 
 
* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: The Effect of Managerial Style on Latino Students’ Performance 
Racially Balanced Schools Racially Imbalanced Schools  
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Managerial style .0962 .2389 .4004* .2360 
Percentage of Teachers with 
Less than 5yrs Experience 
-.0005 .0780 -.0198 .1241 
Average Teacher Experience .0192 .3529 .2373 .3161 
Student-Teacher Ratio 1.117*** .2768 1.669*** .2318 
Average Teacher Salary ($) .0003 .0002 .00002 .0002 
Percentage of Black Students -.2338*** .0693 -.2399*** .0671 
Percentage of Latino Students -.2448*** .0561 -.1089** .0455 
Percentage of Low Income 
Students 
.0250 .0438 -.0873** .0434 
Median Black Income ($) .0001*** .00004 -.00003 .00004 
Median Latino Income ($) .0002*** .0001 .0001** .00007 
Black College Graduates (%) -.0204 .0912 .2116* .1139 
Latino College Graduates (%) .0679 .0497 -.0285 .0385 
White Poverty Rate (%) -.1970*** .0557 -.0499 .0424 
Constant 50.91*** 11.68 49.34*** 9.783 
N 
R2 
F 
410 
.28 
10.79*** 
 395 
.27 
10.05*** 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter explores the extent to which school principals are able to “manage” 
the effects of their school’s racial composition on student outcomes and considers if 
minority students are better served in racially balanced or imbalanced schools through 
management efforts. Although managerial style performs as predicted for Latino students 
in racially imbalanced schools, overall Latino students, as well as Black students, tend to 
fare better in racially balanced schools. Style and the management components tested are 
insignificant in nearly all instances in racially imbalanced schools. On the other hand, the 
management effects on student performance are varied, but influential in racially balanced 
schools. Such findings conform to the standard desegregation literature and show support 
of the advantages of racially balanced schools over racially imbalanced schools. Here, 
management matters much more for minority students than in racially imbalanced schools.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Findings Summary 
 Racially Balanced Schools Racially Imbalanced Schools  
Hypothesis  Black Students Latino Students Black Students Latino Students 
H1: Managerial style, positive 
effect  
- NS NS + 
H1a: leadership, positive effect - + + + 
H1b: External management, 
positive effect 
+ 
 
+ NS NS 
H1c: Prospector strategy, positive 
effect 
+ - NS NS 
H1d: Defender strategy, positive 
effect 
_ + NS NS 
 
 
 
The finding, however, also leads one to question why management fails to have a 
significant effect in racially imbalanced schools? Perhaps the challenges and constraints 
characteristic of racially imbalanced schools (i.e. fewer resources, more inexperienced 
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teachers, high turnover rates, more inadequately prepared students in poverty) 
overwhelm the management effects. Alternatively, public managers of racially balanced 
schools may simply be better managers than those of imbalanced schools, also consistent 
with the desegregation literature. This could also mean that management contributes to 
the widening disparity between imbalanced and racially balanced schools. An original 
argument for balanced educational settings is the fact that racially balanced schools tend to 
have greater resources—both financial and human—that contribute to higher performance 
outcomes and better life chances for their students (Kluger 2004; Clotfelter 2004). Showing 
that managers in racially balanced schools are able to make their external management or 
strategy techniques “count,” while managers of imbalanced schools do not, leaves one to 
believe that balanced schools receive the better connected, more prepared, and higher 
quality managers, and consequently their students perform better. The results lend itself to 
the argument for why balanced education is a better approach to addressing the racial 
inequalities in public education. Nevertheless, the findings that specific managerial 
qualities have a different effect on students in racially balanced versus racially imbalanced 
schools suggests that there are some aspects of management that should be emphasized 
more, such as leadership, in imbalanced schools to aid student performance.  
Similar to the two previous chapters, I continue to see more distinctions in 
education experiences for Black and Latino students in racially balanced and imbalanced 
schools. While African American students were rarely better off with “strong style” 
managers, Latino students found some benefit in having these managers, particularly in the 
racially imbalanced environment. African American students, on the other hand, found it 
detrimental to their performance in racially balanced schools and irrelevant in racially 
imbalanced schools.  A comparison of the models suggests that using the same strategy to 
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fix the racial balance or performance issues for Latinos and African Americans is not likely 
to work. Though limited, the results show that bringing in the “right” principal or leaders 
could help Latino students in a racially imbalanced school.  However, relying on this same 
strategy alone to improve African American students’ performance is not likely to work as 
well. African American students in racially imbalanced schools will need more than a 
strong or “good” manager to help improve their performance outcomes.  While the 
differences across all three empirical chapters highlight the uniqueness of Black and Latino 
experiences in racially balanced and imbalanced environments, they also demonstrate the 
necessity of further research to understand why these differences occur and what they 
mean for the state of minority education broadly. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 Nearly 60 years after the Supreme Court declared that “separate but equal” was 
inherently unequal and had no place in public education, large portions of the American 
education system remain separate and often unequal. Many students find themselves 
racially isolated and limited in the benefits and opportunities that an education provides. 
Although we tend to value racial diversity and balance in schools and acknowledge its 
contribution to the American “political and cultural heritage,” our understanding of how to 
achieve this goal within the boundaries of Supreme Court restrictions and its relative 
influence on school boards, teachers, and administrators in relation to student outcomes is 
more limited (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007).  
As such, this dissertation seeks to answer the broad research questions: why are some 
school districts pursuing and/or maintaining racially balanced schools, while others are not 
and what are the policy outcome related implications of racially balanced and imbalanced 
schools?  
The first phase of research (see Appendix A) addresses the first research question; 
however, the empirical body of the dissertation, discussed below, addresses the second 
research question. The dissertation’s goal allows for both substantive and theoretical 
contributions that should be important to policy makers, policy implementers, and scholars 
of education, public policy, and public administration.  Substantively, the research centers 
on identifying the differences and similarities of student outcomes in racially balanced and 
imbalanced districts to inform policy makers and education leaders of the implications of 
each policy environment. Theoretically, it examines the way that the external policy 
environment shapes policy decisions, the implementation of policy, and policy outcomes 
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via elected officials, bureaucrats, and managers. The subsequent sections provide a more 
detailed discussion of the research findings and their implications for policy making and 
theory.  
Findings Overview  
The major finding of this research is that racially balanced schools are not always 
better for minority students.  In many instances, students of racially imbalanced districts 
are no different from their peers of racially balanced districts. They are generally able to 
gain the same levels of teacher and administrator representation through structure and 
minority board representation; they often experience the same level of academic grouping 
and discipline relief through minority representation, and can gain the same performance 
outcome benefits of good management traits and practices.  However, when the two 
settings diverge, that is, when differences in school board, teacher, or administrator factors 
in racially balanced and imbalanced districts are observed, minority students tend to fare 
better in racially balanced settings. I find that Black and Latino students are more likely to 
experience better policy outcomes in racially balanced districts more often than in racially 
imbalanced districts. However, the finding is not consistent; I also find some observed 
benefits of a racially imbalanced education. Each chapter showcases at least one instance in 
which minority students are better served in racially imbalanced districts. In Chapter IV I 
conclude that Latino students gain better outcomes in racially imbalanced districts; I reach 
the same conclusion for African American students in Chapter V. The inconsistency 
suggests that positive student outcomes can happen anywhere and despite inequitably 
environments. 
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Implications for Policy Makers 
Accountability =Equity? 
As noted in Chapter III, findings of similar outcomes in racially balanced and 
imbalanced districts could be interpreted as some level of support for the current 
accountability model’s argument that the setting in which one learns and the resources or 
barriers that accompany the setting play only a small role in student outcomes and success. 
Do policy makers and advocates of the current accountability model have it right? Yes and 
no. While there is support for their argument that students can learn and succeed in any 
environment, there are also differences in outcomes that can be attributed to the unique 
policy environments. The differences suggest that advocates looking to this reform method 
as a “solution” to equity concerns and issues in public education must be more mindful of 
the factors that contribute to the mirrored outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced 
districts. For example, Chapter V illustrates that students experience similar grouping and 
discipline policy outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced districts; however, it is the 
level of teacher representation that reduces the significantly higher level of disparity in 
racially balanced districts that leads to the similar outcomes observed across policy 
environments. Similarly, school board representation and management strategies both 
contribute to the reflective policy outcomes in the two policy environments shown in 
Chapters IV and VI respectively. 
Additionally, policy makers should be mindful of the instances in which the policy 
environment does matter for student outcomes. As noted above, when there were 
significant differences in the policy environment effect, racially balanced districts were 
generally more beneficial for minority students, consistent with the historical 
desegregation literature. This finding not only detracts from the belief among school 
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reformers that the racial composition of schools does not matter for student performance, 
but it also shows policy makers and policy implementers that their decisions are not 
divorced from their environment, particularly their racial environment. This racial 
environment is political and influential in every level of school district policy making—
from the elected officials to the teacher at the street-level. Such actors should be more 
sensitive to their policy environment and make policy decisions, programs, and 
implementation strategies that mirror or adapt to the policy environment. It is clear that 
the level of racial balance cannot be subtracted from accountability discussions, especially 
when they focus on minority students and their achievement. 
Because the policy environment—the level of district racial balance—is shown to 
be an important factor in predicting student outcomes, an ideal solution to addressing 
achievement gaps and inequitable outcomes is to address the issues of racial balance. 
Policy makers should take this avenue of “reform” more serious or incorporate it into the 
current accountability models of education reform. While policy implementers and even 
local policy makers are faced with various barriers to incorporating racial balance into 
their agenda, the results highlight that a less direct, but perhaps equally beneficial and 
significantly relevant way to address the outcomes of the racial balance issue is to alter the 
internal institutional, structural, and management factors that also make a difference in the 
outcomes of the district. Now that we know more about how they function in both settings 
and the consequences of balanced and imbalanced environments for students, 
policymakers can use the tested factors as levers to alter the outcomes of each policy 
environment.  The collective results suggest that improvements to broader internal policies 
given the level of racial balance effect may be one way to actually achieve equal schools 
with similar outcomes, despite the environmental barriers.  
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Finally, policymakers should also be mindful of the dual nature of racially 
imbalanced schools.  WEB DuBois asked the novel question—“does the negro need 
separate schools?”—in 1935, nearly 20 years before separate schools were outlawed and it 
was understood that the negro did not need separate schools. Indirectly, this work also 
ponders DuBois’s question, as it attempts to figure out the implications of separate 
education for minority students, but comes to the conclusion that the negro, or any 
minority, does not need separate schools, but separate schools may not be a death sentence 
to minority students as the deciding justices believed in the 1954. The input benefits given 
the level of balance are not one sided. There is also much to be learned from the benefits of 
teacher representation, board representation, and management factors in racially 
imbalanced districts to improve outcomes in racially balanced districts. Therefore, policy 
makers should be sensitive to the unique intricacies of both settings—balanced and 
imbalanced—to maximize their contributions to minority student outcomes and success. 
Latino and African American Education Differences  
A notable trend across the empirical chapters is the variation in findings for African 
American and Latino students. While both groups experience their share of inequity and 
disadvantage in racially balanced and imbalanced school settings, Black students tend to 
fare relatively worse. This is particularly alarming on two fronts. First, although the Brown 
decision was decided with Black students in mind as the primary beneficiaries, they 
generally experience fewer of the benefits of racially balanced schools. As Chapter V 
illustrates, Black students experience the highest level of inequitable grouping and 
discipline in racially balanced districts when compared to Latino and white students.  
Chapter VI shows that they also have lower performance outcomes compared to their 
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Latino peers in racially balanced schools, and they experience fewer of the management-
related benefits of an education in a racially balanced environment.  
The differences highlight a weakness, but also a strength in the goal of the Brown 
decision that policy makers and implementers should note. Racial balance is not improving 
educational opportunities and access for African American students as it was originally 
hoped, but it is improving opportunity and access for another disadvantaged group. As the 
Latino population grows, racial balance may become increasingly important to their 
educational success. Therefore, policies aimed at improving Latino outcomes should also 
take into account the importance of racial balance to Latino students’ academic success.  
On the other hand, the stratified benefits of a racially balanced education leave 
room for greater levels of inequality and disparity between Latinos and African Americans 
in education. Examining this possibility is beyond the scope of the current research, but 
future scholarship will consider the differential effect that group benefits have on other 
equally disadvantaged groups. 
Second, the consistent variation in Latino and African American student outcome 
findings across policy environments is also alarming. Black students saw fewer educational 
benefits and positive outcomes in both racially balanced and imbalanced districts 
compared to their Latino peers. In other words, Black students fail to experience superior 
outcomes even in districts in which they make up a large proportion of the student 
population; Latinos do not share this disadvantaged experience. The findings show the 
complexity of Black education and the unique barriers that Black students experience in 
general.  
Collectively, the unique findings for Latino and African American students 
demonstrate that simple, “one-size fits all” minority solutions are not sufficient in 
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addressing the questions of equity and performance outcomes for African American and 
Latino students. As race scholars note, their experiences are unique, and this uniqueness 
means that we should also expect unique policy outcomes and the need for more careful 
policy decisions in regards to addressing their issues and needs. Policy makers and 
implementers, particularly those serving large minority populations such as racially 
imbalanced districts, should also be more mindful of these differences in policy 
development and implementation. 
Implications for Theory 
 This project also focuses on the theoretical relationship between external 
environmental control or influence and school district policies and outcomes. Chapter III 
introduces the theoretical framework used to guide the empirical chapters, as well as the 
literatures central to developing the arguments of each chapter. Each empirical chapter 
tests a subset of the modeled relationships, bridging the public administration and political 
sciences sub-literatures to organizational theory in an effort to understand the broader 
policy process.  
External Environmental Control 
 Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution of this research is its insight 
into the discussion of control. In political science, scholars often debate the extent to which 
political institutions, also thought of as external power in some cases, control bureaucratic 
actions and political decisions. While some contend that political institutions and 
“principals” yield significant power and influence over the bureaucracy, others 
demonstrate that the bureaucracy often acts semi-independent of its principals to exercise 
the public’s preferences and values via policy decisions. Collectively, these works suggest 
that the bureaucratic decisions are developed through the interests and preferences of 
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political institutions and bureaucratic preferences and values. However, this work often 
neglects to acknowledge the separate, external policy environment’s role in manipulating 
this entire process.  
 Overall, the empirical chapters show that the external policy environment wields a 
considerable amount of influence on the policy process and at multiple levels of an 
organization. While scholars debate the significance of political principals and the 
bureaucracy in establishing policy decisions, the current work shows that much of this 
debate neglects a significant predictor of the entire process. Decision makers, such as 
political elites and bureaucrats, often work within the confines of their external policy 
environment, and consequently, the policy environment changes policy decisions, 
implementation, and outcomes. The chapters show this effect for each level of decision 
making—the elected official or “principal” level, management level, and the bureaucratic or 
“agent” level. At each juncture, I find that the policy environment significantly influences 
decision making and leads to an observable difference in policy outcomes. As such, 
differing policy outcomes and decision processes can be attributed to varying external 
policy environments. 
While external policy environment influence may be a good thing in general for 
meeting citizen demands and reflecting the interests and values of the public, in some 
instances this may also be a deterrent to the policy process. As Chapter V demonstrates, 
sometimes the external policy environment can block or hinder the policy process. Here, 
public managers are less effective in improving organizational outcomes when the external 
policy environment is considered.  Minority students experienced very few benefits to 
management across both policy environments examined; although management has been 
shown to contribute greatly to student outcomes (see O’Toole and Meier 1999).  On the 
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other hand, I find considerable support for the policy environment’s positive effect on the 
policy outcomes in the first two empirical chapters. The findings increase our 
understanding of direction in which policy environment influence generally shapes policy, 
particularly policy outcomes.  
In understanding the significant role that the policy environment has in predicting 
behavior and policy outcomes, we are also able to make better assumptions and develop 
more accurate theories about bureaucratic representation and structure. Adding the policy 
environment dimension to some of the well established theories of representative 
bureaucracy and electoral structure alters the relationships and outcomes typically 
observed in the literature. Chapters IV and V show that the policy environment in which 
minority school board members are elected and environment in which minority teachers 
represent changes their level of representation. Students often experience more or less 
representation based on the policy environment; this finding indicates that not considering 
the external policy environment in our discussions of representative bureaucracy and 
electoral structure may lead to incomplete findings and conclusions.  
Non-Policy Makers in the Policy Process 
 The results also offer some information on how bureaucrats as non-policy makers 
shape outcomes. The results provide more evidence of them engaging in the policy process, 
not as simple “agents” of the organization or institution, but as a semi-independent wing of 
the organization responsible for policy decisions and outcomes. However, they also 
indicate that non-policymakers do not shape policy independent of their constituents and 
their policy environment, suggesting that the true principal of the entire process is the 
policy environment. While some scholarship on bureaucrats and the policy process tends 
to suggest that bureaucrats make decisions based on their expertise or level of discretion 
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to use personal values and interests, the general findings here point to their relationship 
with the policy environment as the predictor of decisions and outcomes.  Non-policy 
makers’ role in the policy process seems to be truly an interactive one between them and 
their constituents of the policy environment. In moving the theories of non-policy makers 
forward, scholars should consider exploring this relationship to understand non-policy 
makers and the extent to which political principals, expertise, or bureaucratic values 
actually serve as the primary modes of influence. Such inquires will help us to better 
understand when bureaucrats are more or less likely to push for outcomes that reflect 
their political principal’s interests, their policy environment or constituent’s interests, or 
their personal values and interests.  
Overall, the dissertation project reveals that the local governance of school districts 
is a complex process that involves not only the elected and internal district leaders, but 
also the external environment and its unique traits. Policy decisions, including the decision 
to actively pursue desegregation plans, and the related policy outcomes are a function of 
political actors and the policy setting. Additionally, the level of racial balance is shown to be 
an important factor in understanding both student outcomes and the behavior of the most 
influential local education actors. As the nation continues to become more diverse and 
schools continue to resegregate, the need to address the importance of district racial 
balancing and its implications is likely to grow also. Similarly, the complexities of the 
desegregation issue may continue to grow; however, scholars and practitioners alike 
should always consider the noted but varied benefits of both environments in making 
decisions about desegregation policy.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A-1: The Effect of Electoral Structure and School Board Representation on Racial Balance 
VARIABLES Black-White 
Racial Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Black-White 
Racial Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Latino-White 
Racial Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Latino-White 
Racial Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Black Board Representation 
(%)  
-0.00014 
(0.000) 
-0.00062** 
(0.000) 
-0.00011 
(0.000) 
-0.00011 
(0.000) 
Latino Board Representation 
(%) 
-0.00090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00096*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00022 
(0.000) 
-0.00019 
(0.000) 
Ward Structure (%) -0.00007**  -0.00002  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Black Representation* Ward -0.00067***    
 (0.000)    
Latino Representation * Ward   0.00003  
   (0.000)  
At-Large Structure (%)  0.01274***  0.00247 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Black Representation * At-
Large 
 0.00050 
(0.000) 
  
Latino Representation * At-
Large 
   -0.00002 
(0.000) 
Black Population (%) 0.00153*** 0.00120*** 0.00177*** 0.00177*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
South -0.00777** -0.01115** -0.00706 -0.00698 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Black/White or Latino/White 
Income 
0.03569*** 
(0.007) 
0.02885*** 
(0.009) 
-0.00028 
(0.009) 
-0.00032 
(0.009) 
Black/White or Latino/White 
College Graduates 
-0.01919*** 
(0.003) 
-0.01794*** 
(0.004) 
-0.02351*** 
(0.004) 
-0.02351*** 
(0.004) 
Black or Latino 
Homeownership 
-0.00016** 
(0.000) 
-0.00022** 
(0.000) 
0.00045*** 
(0.000) 
0.00045*** 
(0.000) 
Whites Below Poverty (%) -0.00360*** -0.00380*** -0.00004 -0.00004 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Level of Residential 
Segregation 
0.10565*** 
(0.016) 
0.11998*** 
(0.024) 
0.31502*** 
(0.032) 
0.31480*** 
(0.032) 
Latino Level Racial Balance 0.59575*** 0.58942***   
 (0.013) (0.018)   
Latino Population (%) 0.00169*** 0.00160*** 0.00222*** 0.00222*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year 2001 -0.00335 -0.00557* -0.00506** -0.00514** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.00458** -0.00514*** -0.00364* -0.00371* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Black Level Racial Balance   0.54932*** 0.54933*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 0.25585*** 0.24893*** 0.08945*** 0.08729*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) 
N 4,221 4,499 4,314 4,316 
R2 0.5348 0.4670 0.4949 0.4951 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A-1: Marginal Effect of Black Representation on Black-White Racial Balance as Electoral 
Structure Changes (Ward) 
 
 
Figure A-2: Marginal Effect of Latino Representation on Latino-White Racial Balance as Electoral 
Structure Changes (Ward) 
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Figure A-3: Marginal Effect of Black Representation on Black-White Racial Balance as Electoral 
Structure Changes (At-Large) 
 
 
Figure A-4: Marginal Effect of Latino Representation on Latino-White Racial Balance as Electoral 
Structure Changes (At-Large) 
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Table A-2: The Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on District Racial Balance 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
VARIABLES Black-White 
Racial Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Black-White 
Racial Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Latino-White 
Racial Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Latino-White Racial 
Balance 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Black Teacher 
Representation (%) 
-0.00311*** 
(0.000) 
   
Black Administrator 
Representation (%) 
 -0.00106*** 
(0.000) 
  
Latino Teacher 
Representation (%) 
  -0.00052 
(0.001) 
 
Latino Administrator 
Representation (%) 
   -0.00067 
(0.001) 
Black Population (%) 0.00144*** 0.00044   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
Size -0.00049*** -0.00054*** -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
South -0.00887** -0.01227*** -0.00173 -0.00324 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Black/White Income 0.04098*** 0.04833***   
 (0.010) (0.011)   
Black/White College 
Graduates 
-0.02029*** 
(0.003) 
-0.02365*** 
(0.004) 
  
Whites Below Poverty (%) -0.00534*** -0.00547*** 0.00048 0.00019 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Level of Residential 
Segregation 
-0.00730 
(0.010) 
-0.00672 
(0.011) 
0.22799*** 
(0.020) 
0.22855*** 
(0.021) 
Latino Racial Balance 0.58464*** 0.58355***   
 (0.016) (0.017)   
Year 2001 -0.00456 -0.00295 -0.00368 -0.00591* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 2004 -0.00132 0.00039 -0.00461 -0.00529 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Homeownership (%) -0.00024*** -0.00030*** 0.00048*** 0.00050*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino Population (%)   0.00144*** 0.00154*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino/White Income   0.01171 0.01056 
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Latino/White College 
Graduates 
  -0.01755*** 
(0.005) 
-0.01738*** 
(0.005) 
Black Racial Balance   0.55563*** 0.54956*** 
   (0.021) (0.022) 
Constant 0.37199*** 0.37685*** 0.14288*** 0.15006*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) 
N 2,935 2,731 2,949 2,781 
R2 0.5494 0.5411 0.4906 0.4868 
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Table A-3: The Effect of Managerial Style on District Racial Balance  
 Black-White Racial 
Balance 
Latino-White Racial 
Balance 
VARIABLES Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) 
Defender Managerial Style -0.00728 -0.00582 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Black/White Income -0.02911**  
 (0.014)  
Black College Graduates (%) 0.00003  
 (0.001)  
Whites Below Poverty (%) -0.00079** 0.00327*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Black Population (%) -0.00174** 0.00232*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Latino Population (%) -0.00174*** 0.00354*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino Racial Balance 0.78465***  
 (0.031)  
Size -0.01573** 0.01208** 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Latino/White Income  0.01786 
  (0.029) 
Latino College Graduates (%)  -0.00094*** 
  (0.000) 
Black Racial Balance  0.81395*** 
  (0.020) 
Constant 0.29971*** -0.11578*** 
 (0.032) (0.027) 
   
N 774 721 
R2 0.6806 0.8085 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A-4: The Effect of Managerial Strategy on District Racial Balance 
 Black-White Racial 
Balance 
Black-White Racial 
Balance 
Latino-White Racial 
Balance 
Latino-White Racial 
Balance 
VARIABLES Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
External Management 0.00878**  -0.00404  
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
Internal Management   0.01133***  0.01675** 
  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Black/White Income -0.02164** -0.02707***   
 (0.010) (0.010)   
Black College 
Graduates (%) 
-0.00270*** 
(0.001) 
-0.00139* 
(0.001) 
  
     
Whites Below Poverty 
(%) 
-0.00159*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00141*** 
(0.000) 
0.00341*** 
(0.000) 
0.00344*** 
(0.001) 
     
Black Population (%) -0.00090 -0.00117* 0.00249*** 0.00168** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Latino Population (%) -0.00205*** -0.00184*** 0.00372*** 0.00392*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Latino Racial Balance 0.87634*** 0.86546***   
 (0.019) (0.020)   
Size -0.01361** -0.01574*** 0.01588*** 0.02255*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Latino/White Income   0.00462 -0.00499 
   (0.029) (0.050) 
Latino College 
Graduates (%) 
  -0.00100*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00159*** 
(0.000) 
     
Black Racial Balance   0.80906*** 0.70031*** 
   (0.021) (0.041) 
Constant 0.26366*** 0.26099*** -0.13396*** -0.03467 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) 
     
N 645 659 655 695 
R2 0.7996 0.7937 0.8040 0.6723 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A-5: The Effect of Managerial Internal Management of Diversity Issues on District Racial Balance  
 Black-White Racial 
Balance 
Black-White Racial 
Balance 
Latino-White Racial 
Balance 
Latino-White Racial 
Balance 
VARIABLES Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Teacher Interactions (on 
diversity) 
0.00020 
(0.009) 
 -0.00817 
(0.005) 
 
     
Superintendent 
Interactions  
 -0.00288 
(0.007) 
 0.00332 
(0.005) 
     
Black/White Income -0.03431** -0.03469***   
 (0.013) (0.013)   
Black College Graduates 
(%) 
0.00028 
(0.001) 
0.00028 
(0.001) 
  
     
Whites Below Poverty 
(%) 
-0.00069* 
(0.000) 
-0.00069* 
(0.000) 
0.00328*** 
(0.000) 
0.00323*** 
(0.000) 
     
Black Population (%) -0.00171** -0.00171** 0.00227*** 0.00220*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino Population (%) -0.00179*** -0.00180*** 0.00339*** 0.00336*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino Racial Balance 0.78071*** 0.78148***   
 (0.031) (0.032)   
Size  -0.00053 -0.00052 0.00020 0.00016 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino/White Income   0.01265 0.01748 
   (0.026) (0.027) 
Latino College Graduates 
(%) 
  -0.00079** 
(0.000) 
-0.00073** 
(0.000) 
     
Black Racial Balance   0.81137*** 0.81141*** 
   (0.019) (0.019) 
Constant 0.27349*** 0.27470*** -0.11361*** -0.12147*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) 
N 836 836 794 795 
R2 0.6636 0.6636 0.8090 0.8078 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A-6: The Effect of Managerial Role Adoption on District Racial Balance 
 Black-White Racial 
Balance 
Latino-White Racial 
Balance 
VARIABLES Coefficient  
(Std. Error)  
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 (1) (2) 
Minority Advocate Role Adopted  -0.00439 -0.00160 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Black/White Income -0.03043**  
 (0.014)  
Black College Graduates (%) 0.00064  
 (0.001)  
Whites Below Poverty (%) -0.00070* 0.00340*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Black Population (%) -0.00220*** 0.00227*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Latino Population (%) -0.00172*** 0.00361*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Latino Racial Balance 0.76664***  
 (0.034)  
Size -0.00069 0.00027 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Latino/White Income  0.01620 
  (0.029) 
Latino College Graduates (%)  -0.00095*** 
  (0.000) 
Black Racial Balance  0.79585*** 
  (0.021) 
Constant 0.29465*** -0.11623*** 
 (0.032) (0.027) 
   
N 701 669 
R2 0.6724 0.8059 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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APPENDIX B 
Figure B-1: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator Representation as 
At-Large Structure Changes (Balanced districts) 
 
 
 
Figure B-2: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator Representation as 
At-Large Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts) 
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Figure B-3: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as 
At-Large Structure Changes (Balanced districts)  
 
 
 
Figure B-4: Marginal Effect on Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as 
At-Large Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts)  
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Figure B-5: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher Representation as At-Large 
Structure Changes (Balanced districts) 
 
 
 
Figure B-6: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher Representation as At-Large 
Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts)  
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Figure B-7: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher Representation as At-
Large Structure Changes (Balanced districts) 
 
 
 
Figure B-8: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher Representation as At-
Large Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts)  
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APPENDIX C 
Figure C-1: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Special 
Education (Mild Retardation) as Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-2: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Special 
Education (Mild Retardation) as Policy Environments Change 
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Mild Retardation, Special Education for Black Students
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Special Education for Latino Students
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Figure C-3: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Special 
Education (Moderate Retardation) as Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-4: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Special 
Education (Moderate Retardation) as Policy Environments Change 
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Moderate Retardation, Special Education for Black Students
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Special Education for Latino Students
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Figure C-5: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Corporal 
Punishment as Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
Figure C-6: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Corporal 
Punishment as Policy Environments Change 
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Corporal Punishment for Black Students
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Corporal Punishment for Latino Students
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Figure C-7: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Expulsion as 
Policy Environments Change 
 
 
 
Figure C-8: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Expulsion as 
Policy Environments Change 
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Expulsion  for Black Students
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Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Expulsion for Latino Students
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